LECTURE IX.

Of the Pleasure and Utility of RELIGION.

THOUGH the author of the following passage, was a great proficient in the mad philosophy of Epicurus, yet he had truth strongly on his side, when he said, "That nothing was more pleasant than to be stationed on the lofty temples, well defended and secured by the pure and peaceable doctrines of the wise philosophers *."

Now, can any doctrine be imagined more wise, more pure and peaceable, and more sacred, than that which flowed from the most perfect Fountain of wisdom and purity, which was sent down from heaven to earth, that it might guide all its followers to that happy place whence it took its rise? It is, to be sure, the wisdom of mankind to know God, and their indispensable duty, to worship Him. Without this, men of the brightest parts and greatest learning, seem to be born with excellent talents only to make themselves miserable; and, according to the expression of the wisest of kings, He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow, Eccl. i. 18. We must, therefore, first of all, consider this as a sure and settled point, that religion is the sole foundation of human peace and felicity. This, even the profane scoffers at religion are, in some sort, obliged to own, though much against their will, even while they are pointing their wit against it; for nothing is more commonly to be heard from them, than that the whole doctrine of religion was invented by some wise men, to encourage the practice of justice and virtue through the world. Surely then, religion, whatever else may be said of it, must be a matter of the highest value, since it is found necessary to secure advantages of so very great importance. But, in the mean time, how unhappy is the case of integrity and virtue, if what they want to support them is merely fictitious, and they

Bene quam munita tenere

Edita doctrinâ sapientum templa serena. LUCRETIUS.

cannot keep their ground but by means of a monstrous forgery! But far be it from us to entertain such an absurdity! For the first rule of righteousness cannot be otherwise than right, nor is there any thing more nearly allied or more friendly to virtue, than truth.

But religion is not only highly conducive to all the great advantages of human life, but is also, at the same time, most pleasant and delightful. Nay, if it is so useful, and absolutely necessary to the interests of virtue, it must, for this very reason, be also pleasant; unless one will call in question a maxim universally approved by all wise men, that "life cannot be agreeable without virtue *:" a maxim of such irrefragable and undoubted truth, that it was adopted even by Epicurus himself.

How great, therefore, must have been the madness of that noted Grecian philosopher, who, while he openly maintained the dignity and pleasantness of virtue, at the same time employed the whole force of his understanding to ruin and sap its foundations! For, that this was his fixed purpose, Lucretius not only owns, but also boasts of it, and loads him with ill-advised praises for endeavouring, through the whole course of his philosophy, to free the minds of men from all the bonds and ties of religion. As if there was no possible way to make them happy and free, without involving them in the guilt of sacrilege and atheism! As if to eradicate all sense of a Deity out of the mind, were the only way to free it from the heaviest chains and fetters! Though, in reality, this would be effectually robbing man of all his valuable jewels, of his golden crown and chain, all the riches, ornaments, and pleasures of his life which is inculcated at large, and with great eloquence, by a greater and more divine master of wisdom, the royal author of the Proverbs, who, speaking of the precepts of religion, says, They shall be an ornament of grace unto thine head, and chains about thy neck: and, of religion, under the name of wisdom, If thou seekest her as silver, and searchest

* Ουκ είναι ἥδεως ζῆν ἀνευ τῆς ἀρετῆς.

t

for her as for hidden treasure. Happy is the man that findeth wisdom, and the man than getteth understanding. For the merchandise of it is better than the merchandise of silver, and the gain thereof than fine gold. Wisdom is the principal thing; therefore, get wisdom, and with all thy getting, get understanding. Prov. i. 9; ii. 4; xiii. 14; iv. 7.

And it is, indeed, very plain, that if it were possible entirely to dissolve all the bonds and ties of religion, yet, that it should be so, would certainly be the interest of none but the worst and most abandoned part of mankind. All the good and wise, if the matter was freely left to their choice, would rather have the world governed by the Supreme and Most Perfect Being, mankind subjected to His just and righteous laws, and all the affairs of men superintended by His watchful providence, than that it should be otherwise. Nor do they believe the doctrines of religion with aversion or any sort of reluctancy, but embrace them with pleasure, and are excessively glad to find them true. So that, if it was possible, to abolish them entirely, and any person, out of mere good-will to them, should attempt to do it, they would look upon the favour as highly prejudicial to their interest, and think his good-will more hurtful than the keenest hatred. Nor would any one, in his wits, choose to live in the world, at large, and without any sort of government, more than he would think it eligible to be put on board a ship without a helm or pilot, and, in this condition, to be tossed amidst rocks and quicksands. On the other hand, can any thing give greater consolation, or more substantial joy*, than to be firmly persuaded, not only that there is an infinitely good and wise Being, but also that this Being preserves and continually governs the universe which Himself has framed, and holds the reins of all things in His powerful hand; that He is our father, that we and all our interests are His constant concern; and that, after we have sojourned a short while here below, we shall be again taken into His immediate presence? Or can this wretched life be attended with any sort

* Φεῦ τι τούτων χάρμα μεῖζον ἄν λαβοίς.

of satisfaction, if it is divested of this Divine faith, and bereaved of such a blessed hope?

Moreover, every one who thinks a generous fortitude and purity of mind preferable to the charms and muddy pleasures of the flesh, finds all the precepts of religion not only not grievous, but exceeding pleasant and extremely delightful. So that, upon the whole, the saying of Hermes is very consistent with the nature of things: "There is one, and but one good thing among men, and that is religion Even the vulgar could not bear the degenerate expression of the player who called out upon the stage, "Money is the chief good among mankind +.” But should any one say, Religion is the principal good of mankind, no objection could be made against it; for, without doubt, it is the only object the beauties whereof engage the love both of God and man.

But the principal things in religion, as I have frequently observed, are, just conceptions of God. Now, concerning this Infinite Being, some things are known by the light of nature and reason, others only by the revelation which He hath been pleased to make of Himself from heaven. That there is a God, is the distinct voice of every man, and of every thing without him. How much more then shall we be confirmed in the belief of this truth, if we attentively view the whole creation, and the wonderful order and harmony that subsist between all the parts of the whole system! It is quite unneces→ sary to shew, that so great a fabric could never have been brought into being without an all-wise and powerful Creator; nor could it now subsist without the same almighty Being to support and preserve it. "Let men therefore make this their constant study," says Lactantius, ،، even to know their common Parent and Lord, whose power can never be perfectly known, whose greatness cannot be fathomed, nor his eternity. comprehended ‡." When the mind of man, with its faculties,

* Εν καὶ μόνον, εν ἀνθρώποις ἄγαθον ἡ ευσεβέια.

+ Pecunia magnum generis humani bonum.

Ut Parentem suum, Dominumq.; cognoscane cujus nec virtus æsti◄ mari potest, nec magnitudo perspici, nec eternitas comprehendi..

VOL. IV.

R

comes to be once intensely fixed upon Him, all other objects disappearing, and being, as it were, removed quite out of sight, it is entirely at a stand and overpowered, nor can it possibly proceed further. But concerning the doctrine of this vast volume of the works of God, and that still brighter light which shines forth in the Scriptures, we shall speak more fully hereafter.

LECTURE X.

Of the Decrees of God,

As the glory and brightness of the Divine Majesty is so great, that the strongest human eye cannot bear the direct rays of it, He has exhibited Himself to be viewed in the glass of those works which He created at first, and, by His unwearied hand, continually supports and governs. Nor are we allowed to view His eternal counsels and purposes through any other medium than this. So that, in our Catechisms, especially the shorter one, designed for the instruction of the ignorant, it might, perhaps, have been full as proper to have passed over the awful speculation concerning the Divine decrees, and to have proceeded directly to the consideration of the works of God; but the thoughts you find in it, on this subject, are few, sober, clear, and certain; and in explaining them, I think it most reasonable and most safe, to confine ourselves within these limits, in any audience whatever, but especially in this congregation, consisting of youths, not to say, in a great measure, of boys. Seeing, therefore, the decrees of God are mentioned in our Catechism, and it would not be proper to pass over in silence a matter of so great moment, I shall accordingly lay before you some few thoughts upon this arduous subject.

And here, if any where, we ought, according to the common saying, to reason but in few words. I should, indeed, think it very improper to do otherwise; for such theories ought to be cautiously touched, rather than be spun out to a great length,