by Des Maizeaux, as a letter to ****, (intending Mr. Smith of Dartmouth, who had prepared materials for that Life) but without fpecifying either the fubject or occafion. Bonivad anu many 7. The large Latin tract of Mr. Locke's De Toleratione was firft introduced in the late 4to edition of his works, but as we have it tranflated by Mr. Popple to the author's entire fatisfaction, and as there is nothing extraordinary in the language of the original, it was judged unneceffary to repeat fo things over again by inferting it. Perhaps it might afford matter of more curiosity to compare fome parts of his Effay with Mr. Burridge's Verfion, faid to be printed in 1701, about which he and his friend Molyneux appeared fo extremely anxious, but which he tells Limborch (Aug. 1701) he had not then feen; nor have we learnt the fate of this Latin Verfion, any more than what became of a French one, (probably that of P. Cofte, mentioned under Locke's article in the General Dictionary) in correcting which he (Mr. Locke) had taken very great pains, and likewife altered many paffages of the original, in order to make them more clear and eafy to be tranflated *. Many of these alterations I have formerly feen under his hand in the library at Oates, where he fpent the laft and moft agreeable part of his life in the company of Lady Mafham, and where his own converfation muft have proved no lefs agreeable and inftructing to that Lady, fince by means of it, as well as from an education under the eye of her father, Cudworth, she appears to have profited fo much as to compofe a very rational difcourfe, entitled, Occafional Thoughts in reference to a virtuous and Chriftian Life, published 1705, and frequently afcribed to Mr. Locke. [See particularly Boyer's Annals of Queen Anne, Vol. III. p. 262.] She was generally believed (as Le Clerc tells us) to be the author of another difcourfe on the Love of God, in anfwer to Mr. Norris; which has likewife been attributed to Mr. Locke, and has his name written before it in a copy now in the library of Sion College, but others give it to Dr. Whitby. Of the fame excellent Lady Mr. Locke gives the following character to Limborch: Ejus [i. e. Hiftoriæ Inquifitionis] lectionem fibi et utiliffimam et jucundiffimam fore fpondet Domina Cudwortha, quæ paternæ benignitatis hæres omnem de rebus Religionis perfecutionem maxime averfatur. Lett. June, 1691. Lett. June, 1691. Hofpes mea Tyrannidi Ecclefiafticæ inimiciffima, fæpe mihi laudat ingenium et confilium tuum, laboremque huic operi tam opportune impenfum, creditque fruftra de religionis reformatione et Evangelii propagatione tantum undique ftrepitum moveri, dum Tyrannis in Ecclefiâ, vis in rebus religionis (uti paffim mos eft) aliis fub nominibus utcunque fpeciofis obtinet et laudatur. Id. Nov. 1691.. 8. We cannot in this place forbear lamenting the fuppreflion of fome of Mr. Locke's Treatifes, which are in all probability not to be retrieved.. His Right Method of fearching after Truth, which Le Clerc mentions, is hardly to be met with; nor can a Tract which we have good ground to be-. lieve that he wrote, in the Unitarian Controverfy, be well diftinguished at this distance of time; unless it prove to be the following piece, which fome ingenious perfons have judged to be his; and if they are right in their con jecture, as I have no doubt but they are; the Addrefs to me that is prefixed to it must have been made on purpofe to conceal the true author, as a more attentive perufal of the whole Tract will convince any one, and at the fame time fhew what reafon there was for fo extremely cautious a proceeding.. Part of the long title runs thus: The Exceptions of Mr. Edwards in his • Causes of Atheism, against The Reasonableness of Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures, examined and found unreafonable, unfcriptural, and injurious, &c. London, printed in the year 1695,' 47 pages, 4to. It is uncertain whether he lived to finish that Syftem of Ethics which his friend Molineux fo frequently recommended to him: but from a letter to the fame perfon, dated April, 1698, it appears, that he had feveral plans. by him, which either were never executed, or never faw the light. 15 Among the late Mr. Yorke's papers burnt in his chambers in Lincoln's Inn,, were many of Mr. Locke's Letters to Lord Sommers, but probably no copies. of these remain; which must prove an irreparable lofs to the public, many. of them being in all likelihood written on fubjects of a political nature, as that eminent patriot was well acquainted with, and feems to have availed himself confiderably of Mr. Locke's principles throughout his excellent Treatife, entitled, The Judgment of whole Kingdoms and Nations concerning the Rights and Prerogatives of Kings, and the Rights, Privileges, and Properties of the People. A work which feems to be but little known at prefent, tho' there was a tenth edition of it in 1771. The conclufion is taken almoft verbatim from Mr. Locke. 9. Thirteen Letters to Dr. Mapletoft, giving fome account of his friends,, with a large defcription of a fevere nervous diforder and his method of treating it, and frequent intimations of his defire to fucceed the Doctor in his profeffor hip at Gresham College, &c. were very obligingly communicated. by a grandfon of the Doctor's; but we have not room to infert them, as they contain very few matters of literature, to which our enquiries are chiefly confined at prefent: nor fhall we be excufed perhaps for taking notice of his Letter to the Earl of **, dated May 6, 1676, with a curious old MS. on the fubject of Free Mafonry, published in the Gentleman's Magazine for September, 1758. We are informed, that there is a great number of original Letters of Mr. Locke, now in the hands of the Rev. Mr. Tooke, chaplain to the British factory at Petersburgh; but have no proper means of applying for them.. (f1o. Forty Letters to Edward Clarke, Efq; M. P. are among Dr. Birch's papers in the Museum, but of like unimportance. Perhaps fome readers think that the late editions of Mr. Locke's Works are already clogged with too many of that kind; however I fhall give one of thefe for a fpecimen, on Taifing the value of Coin, as the fame method which he there recommends,. viz. of weighing it, has of late been practifed. See the Letter in Vol. IV.. of this edition, p. 649. The two Letters from Lord Shaftesbury and Sir Peter King, will fpeak for themfelves. 1. It may likewife be obferved, that our Author has met with the fate of moft eminent writers, whofe names give a currency to whatever pafies under them, viz. to have many fpurious productions fathered on him.. Befide Beside those above mentioned, there is a Common-place Book to the Bible, first published in 1693, and afterwards fwelled out with a great deal of matter, ill digefted, and all declared to be Mr. Locke's; but whatever hand he might beofuppofed to have in the original book itself, it is plain he had none in that Preface, which is neither fenfe nor English. A puerile edition of Æfop's Fables has likewife his name prefixed to it, and was in all probability afcribed to him for no better reafon than the frequent mention made of that book in his Thoughts on Education. The title runs thus: fop's Fables in English and Latin, interlineary, for the benefit of those who, not having a Mafter, would learn either of thofe Tongues. The fecond edition, with Sculptures. By John Locke, Gent. Printed for A. Bettesworth, 1723. 12. But it is high time to conduct the reader to Mr. Locke's more authentic and capital Productions, the constant demand for which fhews that they have ftood the test of time, and their peculiar tendency to enlarge and improve the mind, muft continue that demand while a regard to virtue or religion, fcience or common fenfe remains amongst us. I wish it were in my power to give fo clear and juft a view of these as might serve to point out their proper ufes, and thereby direct young unprejudiced readers to a more beneficial ftudy of them. jenom dedi Bobalagos ad llaw The Effay on Human Understanding, that moft diftinguished of all his works, is to be confidered as a fyftem, at its first appearance abfolutely new, and directly oppofite to the notions and perfuafions then eftablished in the world. Now as it feldom happens that the person who first suggests a difcovery in any fcience is at the fame time folicitous, or perhaps qualified to lay open all the confequences that follow from it; in fuch a work much of courfe is left to the reader, who must carefully apply the leading principles to many cafes and conclufions not there fpecified. To what elfe but a neglect of this application fhall we impute it that there are still numbers amongst us who profefs to pay the greatest deference to Mr. Locke, and to be well acquainted with his writings, and would perhaps take it ill to have this pretenfion queftioned; yet appear either wholly unable, or unaccustomed, to draw the natural confequence from any one of his principal pofitions? Why, for inftance, do we ftill continue fo unfettled in the first principles and foundation of Morals? How came we not to perceive that by the very fame arou ments which that great Author ufed with fo much fuccefs in extirpating innate Ideas, he most effectually eradicated all innate or connate fenfes, inftincts, &c. by not only leading us to conclude that every fuch fenfe muft, in the very nature of it, imply an object correfpondent to and of the fame ftanding with itself, to which it refers [as each relative implies its correlate]," the real exiftence of which object he has confuted in every Thape; but also by fhewing that for each moral propofition men actually want and may demand a reafon or proof deduced from another science, and founded on natural good and evil; and confequently where no fuch reafon can be affigned, thefe fame fenses, or instincts, with whatever titles decorated *, whether stiled fympa 2003 argu * See a very accurate explanation of Mr. Locke's doctrine on this head and fome others, in an Philofophical Difcourfe on the Nature of Human Being, prefixed to fome Remarks upon Bp. Berkley's Treatife on the fame fubject. Printed for Dodfley, 1776. thetic or fentimental, common or intuitive, ought to be looked upon as no more than mere HABITS; under which familiar name their authority is foon difcovered, and their effects accounted for.. From the fame principles it may be collected that all fuch pompous theories of morals, however feemingly diverfified, yet amount ultimately to the fame thing, being all built upon the fame falfe bottom of innate notions; and from the hiftory of this fcience we may fee that they have received no manner of improvement (as indeed by the fuppofition of their innateness they become incapable of any) from the days of Plato to our own; but must always take the main point, the ground of obligation, for granted: which is in truth the shortest and safest way of proceeding for fuch felf-taught philofophers, and faves a deal of trouble in feeking reafons for what they advance, where none are to be found. Mr. Locke went a far different way to work, at the very entrance on his Effay, pointing out the true origin of all our paffions and affections, i. e. fenfitive pleafure and pain; and accordingly directing us to the proper principle and end of virtue, private happiness, in each individual; as well as laying down the adequate rule and only folid ground of moral obligation, the Divine Will. From whence alfo it may well be concluded that moral propofitions are equally capable of certainty, and that fuch certainty is equally reducible to ftrict demonftration here as in other fciences, fince they confift of the very fame kind of ideas, [viz. general abstract ones, the true and only ground of all general knowledge]; provided always that the terms be once clearly fettled, in which lies the chief difficulty, and are conftantly applied (as furely they may be) with equal feadiness and precifion: which was undoubtedly Mr. Locke's meaning in that affertion of his which drew upon him fo many folicitations to fet about fuch a fyftematic demonstration of morals. In the fame plain and popular Introduction, when he has been proving that men think not always, [a pofition which, as he obferves, Letter to Molineux, Aug. 4, 1696, was then admitted in a Commencement A&t at Cambridge for probable, and which few there now a-days are found weak enough to queftion] how come we not to attend him thro' the genuine confequences of that proof? This would foon let us into the true nature of the human conftitution, and enable us to determine whether thought, when every mode of it is fufpended, tho' but for an hour, can be deemed an effential property of our immaterial principle, or mind, and as fuch infeparable from fome imaginary fubftance, or fubftratum, [words, by the bye, fo far as they have a meaning, taken entirely from matter, and terminating in it] any more than motion, under li various modifications, can be judged effential to the body, or to a purely material fyftem*. Of that fame fubftance or fubftratum, whether bismob vean busine dosa voi asdi gulvadi Vide Defence of Locke's Opinion concerning Perfonal Identity. Appendix to the Theory of Religion, p. 431, &c. and Note 1. to Abp. King's Or. of E. Sir Ifaac Newton had the very fame fentiments with thofe of our Author on the prefent fubject, and more particularly very far parton, had on that fate to which he was approaching; as appears from a converfation held with him a little before his death, of which I have been informed by one whe took down Sir Ifaac's words at the time, and fince read them to, me... the Jitada material material or immaterial, Mr. Locke has farther fhewn us that we can form but a very imperfect and confused idea, if in truth we have any idea at all, of it, tho' cuftom and an attachment to the established mode of philofophifing ftill prevails to fuch a degree that we scarcely know how to proceed without it, and are apt to make as much noife with fuch logical terms and diftinctions, as the fchoolmen ufed to do with their principle of individuation, fubftantial forms, &c. Whereas, if we could be perfuaded to quit every arbitrary hypothefis, and truft to fact and experience, a found fleep any night would yield fufficient fatisfaction in the prefent cafe, which thus may derive light even from the darkest parts of nature; and which will the more merit our regard, fince the fame point has been in fome measure confirmed to us by Revelation, as our Author has likewife fhewn in his Introduction to the Reasonableness of Chriftianity. The abovementioned Ejay contains fome more refined fpeculations which are daily gaining ground among thoughtful and intelligent perfons, notwithstanding the neglect and the contempt to which studies of this kind are ́ frequently expofed. And when we confider the force of bigotry, and the prejudice in favour of antiquity which adheres to narrow minds, it must be matter of furprife to find fo fmall a number of exceptions made to fome of his difquifitions which lie out of the common road. · If That well-known chapter of Power has been termed the worst part of his whole Effay *, and feems indeed the leaft defenfible, and what gave himself the least satisfaction, after all the pains he and others took to reform it; [v. Letters between him and Molyneaux and Limborch. To which may be added Note 45 to King's Or. of E. p. 220, 4th Ed.] which might induce one to believe that this moft intricate fubject is placed beyond human reach; fince fo penetrating a genius confeffes his inability to fee thro' it. And happy are thofe enquirers who can difcern the extent of their faculties! who have learnt in time where to ftop and fufpend a pofitive determination! you will argue,' fays he, for or againft Liberty from confequences, I will not undertake to answer you; for I own freely to you the weakness of my understanding, that though it be unquestionable that there is Omnipotence and Omniicience in God our Maker, yet I cannot make freedom in man confiftent with Omnipotence and Omniscience in God, though I am as fully perfuaded of both as of any truths I moft firmly affent to; and therefore I have long left off the confideration of that queftion, refolving all into this short conclufion: that if it be poffible for God to make a free agent, then man is free; though I fee not the way of it.' Letter to M. Jan. 20, 1693. 13. Connected in fome fort with the forementioned Effay, and in their equally the Understanding, both are his Tracts on Education and the early Conduct of as we apprehend, of a more careful perufal than is commonly bestowed upon them, the latter more efpecially, which feems to be little known and lefs attended to. It contains an easy popular Biogr. Brit. tho' others are pleafed to file it the fincft. illuftra |