explications, to prevent others being mistaken in the fenfe of what was formerly printed, and not any variation in me from it: I muft only except the alterations I have made in book ii. chap. 21.

What I had there writ concerning liberty and the will, I thought deserved as accurate a review as I was capable of: thofe fubjects having, in all ages, exèrcifed the learned part of the world with queftions and difficulties, that have not a little perplexed morality and divinity; thofe parts of knowledge that men are most concerned to be clear in. Upon a clofer infpection into the working of men's minds, and a stricter examination of those motives and views they are turned by, I have found reafon fomewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had, concerning that, which gives the last determination to the will in all voluntary actions. This. I cannot forbear to acknowledge to the world with as much freedom and readiness, as I at firft published what then feemed to me to be right, thinking myfelf more concerned to quit and renounce any opinion of my own, than oppofe that of another, when truth appears against it. For it is truth alone I feek, and that will always be welcome to me, when, or from whencefoever it comes.

But what forwardness foever I have to refign any opinion I have, or to recede from any thing I have writ, upon the first evidence of an error in it; yet this I muft own, that I have not had the good luck to receive any light from thofe exceptions I have met with in print against any part of my book; nor have from any thing that has been urged against it, found reafon to alter my fenfe, in any of the points that have been queftioned. Whether the fubject I have in hand requires often more thought and attention, than cursory readers, at least such as are prepoffeffed, are willing to allow; or whether any obfcurity in my expreffions cafts a cloud over it, and thefe notions are made difficult to others apprehenfion in my way of treating them: fo it is, that my meaning, I find, is often mistaken, and I have not the good luck to be every where rightly understood. There are fo many inftances of this, that I think it juftice to my reader and myfelf to conclude, that either my book is plainly enough written to be rightly. understood by those who perufe it with that attention and indifferency, which every one, who will give himself the pains to read, ought to employ in reading; or elfe that I have writ mine fo obfcurely, that it is in vain to go about to mend it. Which ever of these be that truth, it is myself only am affected thereby, and therefore I fhall be far from troubling my reader with what I think might be faid, in answer to those several objections I have met with, to paffages here and there of my book. Since I perfuade myself, that he who thinks them of moment enough to be concerned, whether they are true or falfe, will be able to fee, that what is faid, is either not well founded, or elfe not contrary to my doctrine, when I and my oppofer come both to be well understood.

If any, careful that none of their good thoughts fhould be loft, have published their cenfures of my Effay, with this honour done to it, that they will not fuffer it to be an Effay; I leave it to the public to value the obligation they have to their critical pens, and shall not wafte my reader's time in fo idle or ill-natured an employment of mine, as to leffen the fatisfaction any one

2

has

'has in himself, or gives to others in fo hafty a confutation of what I have

written.

The bookfellers preparing for the fourth edition of my Effay, gave me notice of it, that I might, if I had leisure, make any additions or alterations I should think fit. Whereupon I thought it convenient to advertise the reader, that, befides feveral corrections I have made here and there, there was one alteration which it was necessary to mention, because it ran through the whole book, and is of confequence to be rightly understood. What I thereupon

faid was this:

Clear and diftinct ideas are terms, which, though familiar and frequent in mens mouths, I have reason to think every one who uses, does not perfectly understand. And poffibly it is but here and there one, who gives himself the trouble to confider them so far as to know what he himself or others precisely mean by them: I have therefore in most places chofe to put determinate or determined, inftead of clear and distinct, as more likely to direct men's thoughts to my meaning in this matter. By thofe denominations, I mean fome object in the mind, and confequently determined, i. e. fuch as it is there feen and perceived to be. This, I think, may fitly be called a determinate or determined idea, when fuch as it is at any time objectively in the mind, and so determined there, it is annexed, and without variation determined to a name or articulate found, which is to be fteadily the fign of that very fame object of the mind, or determinate idea.

To explain this a little more particularly. By determinate, when applied to a fimple idea, I mean that fimple appearance which the mind has in its view, or perceives in itself, when that idea is faid to be in it; by determined, when applied to a complex idea, I mean fuch a one as confifts of a determinate number of certain fimple or lefs complex ideas, joined in fuch a proportion and fituation, as the mind has before its view, and fees in itself, when that idea is prefent in it, or fhould be prefent in it, when a man gives a name to it. I fay, fhould be; because it is not every one, nor perhaps any one, who is so careful of his language, as to ufe no word, till he views in his mind the precife determined idea, which he refolves to make it the fign of. The want of this, is the cause of no fmall obfcurity and confufion in mens thoughts and difcourfes.

I know there are not words enough in any language, to answer all the variety of ideas, that enter into mens difcourfes and reafonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one ufes any term, he may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the fign of, and to which he should keep it steadily annexed, during that prefent difcourfe. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear and diftinct ideas; it is plain his are not fo; and therefore there can be expected nothing but obfcurity and confufion, where terms are made use of which have not fuch a precife deter

mination.

Upon this ground I have thought determined ideas a way of fpeaking lefs liable to mistake, than clear and diftinct: and where men have got fuch determined

I

determined ideas of all that they reafon, enquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their doubts and difputes at an end. The greatest part of the queftions and controverfies that perplex mankind, depending on the doubtful and uncertain ufe of words, or (which is the fame) indetermined ideas, which they are made to ftand for; I have made choice of these terms to fignify, 1. Some immediate object of the mind, which it perceives and has before it, 2. That this idea, thus deterdiftinct from the found it ufes as a fign of it. mined, i. e. which the mind has in itfelf, and knows and fees there, be determined, without any change, to that name, and that name determined to that precife idea. If men had fuch determined ideas in their enquiries and difcourfes, they would both difcern how far their own enquiries and difcourfes went, and avoid the greatest part of the disputes and wranglings they have with others.

Befides this, the bookfeller will think it neceffary I fhould advertise the reader, that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new; the one of the affociation of ideas, the other of enthufiafm. Thefe, with fome other larger additions, never before printed, he had engaged to print by themselves, after the fame manner, and for the fame purpofe, as was done when this Effay had the fecond impreffion.

BOOK I.