VIII. one that which he hath been told already, or he is supposed to know before? C H A P. For I am fuppofed to know the fignification of the word another uses to me, or else he is to tell me. And if I know that the name gold ftands for this complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fufible, malleable, it will not much inftruct me to put it folemnly afterwards in a propofition, and gravely say, all gold is fufible. Such propofitions can only ferve to fhew the difingenuity of one, who will 'go from the definition of his own terms, by reminding him fometimes of it; but carry no knowledge with them, but of the fignification of words, however certain they be. man and palfry. § 6. EVERY man is an animal, or living body, is as certain a propofition Inftance, as can be; but no more conducing to the knowledge of things, than to say, a palfry is an ambling horse, or a neighing ambling animal, both being only about the fignification of words, and make me know but this; that body, fenfe and motion, or power of fenfation and moving, are three of those ideas that I always comprehend and fignify by the word man; and where they are not to be found together, the name man belongs not to that thing: and fo of the other, that body, fenfe, and a certain way of going, with a certain kind of voice, are fome of thofe ideas which I always comprehend, and fignify by the word palfry; and when they are not to be found together, the name palfry belongs not to that thing. It is just the fame, and to the fame purpose, when any term ftanding for any one or more of the fimple ideas, that all together make up that complex idea which is called man, is affirmed of the term man: v. g. fuppofe a Roman fignified by the word homo all these distinct ideas united in one fubject," corporietas, fenfibilitas, poten"tia se movendi, rationalitas, rifibilitas;" he might, no doubt, with great certainty, univerfally affirm one, more, or all of these together of the word homo, but did no more than say that the word homo, in his country, comprehended in its fignification all thefe ideas. Much like a romance knight, who by the word palfry fignified these ideas; body of a certain figure, fourlegged, with fenfe, motion, ambling, neighing, white, used to have a woman on his back; might with the fame certainty univerfally affirm also any or all of these of the word palfry: but did thereby teach no more, but that the word palfry, in his or romance language, ftood for all these, and was not to be applied to any thing, where any of these was wanting. But he that shall tell me, that in whatever thing fenfe, motion, reason, and laughter, were united, that thing had actually a notion of God, or would be caft into a fleep by opium, made indeed an inftructive propofition: because neither having the notion of God, nor being caft into fleep by opium, being contained in the idea fignified by the word man, we are by fuch propofitions taught fomething more than barely what the word man ftands for; and therefore the knowledge contained in it is more than verbal. §. 7. BEFORE a man makes any propofition, he is fuppofed to understand For this the terms he ufes in it, or else he talks like a parrot, only making a noife teaches but the fignificaby imitation, and framing certain founds, which he has learnt of others; tion of words. but not as a rational creature, ufing them for figns of ideas which he has in his mind. The hearer also is supposed to understand the terms as the speaker uses them, or else he talks jargon, and makes an unintelligible noife. And VOL. I. Dd d there IV. But no real Book therefore he trifles with words, who makes fuch a propofition, which, when it is made, contains no more than one of the terms does, and which a man was fuppofed to know before; v. g. a triangle hath three fides, or faffron is yellow. And this is no farther tolerable, than where a man goes to explain his terms, to one who is fuppofed or declares himself not to understand him: and then it teaches only the fignification of that word, and the use of that fign. § 8. We can know then the truth of two forts of propofitions with perknowledge. fect certainty; the one is, of thofe trifling propofitions which have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but not inftructive. And, fecondly, we can know the truth, and fo may be certain in propofitions, which affirm fomething of another, which is a neceflary confequence of its precife complex idea, but not contained in it: as that the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the oppofite internal angles; which relation of the outward angle to either of the oppofite internal angles, making no part of the complex idea fignified by the name triangle, this is a real truth, and conveys with it inftructive real knowledge. General propofitions concerning fubftances are often trifling. And why. § 9. WE having little or no knowledge of what combinations there be of fimple ideas exifting together in fubftances, but by our fenfes, we cannot make any univerfal certain propofitions concerning them, any farther than our nominal effences lead us: which being to a very few and inconfiderable truths, in refpect of those which depend on their real conftitutions, the general propofitions that are made about fubftances, if they are certain, are for the most part but trifling; and if they are inftructive, are uncertain, and fuch as we can have no knowledge of their real truth, how much foever constant observation and analogy may affift our judgment in guefling. Hence it comes to pass, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent difcourfes, that amount yet to nothing. For it is plain, that names of fubftantial beings, as well as others, as far as they have relative fignifications affixed to them, may, with great truth, be joined negatively and affirmatively in propofitions, as their relative definitions make them fit to be fo joined; and propofitions confifting of fuch terms, may, with the fame clearnefs, be deduced one from another, as thofe that convey the most real truths and all this, without any knowledge of the nature or reality of things existing without us. By this method one may make demonstrations and undoubted propofitions in words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things; v. g. he that having learnt these following words, with their ordinary mutually relative acceptations annexed to them; v, g. fubftance, man, animal, form, foul, vegetative, fenfitive, rational, may make feveral undoubted propofitions about the foul, without knowing at all what the foul really is: and of this fort, a man may find an infinite number of propofitions, reasonings, and conclufions, in books of metaphyficks, school-divinity, and fome fort of natural philofophy; and, after all, know as little of God, fpirits, or bodies, as he did before he fet out. § 10. HE that hath liberty to define, i. e. to determine the fignification of his, names of fubftances (as certainly every one does in effect, who makes them ftand for his own ideas) and makes their fignifications at a venture, taking them from his own or other men's fancies, and not from an examina tion or enquiry into the nature of things themselves; may, with little CHA P. trouble, demonftrate them one of another, according to those feveral refpects VIII. and mutual relations he has given them one to another; wherein, however things agree or disagree in their own nature, he needs mind nothing but his own notions, with the names he hath bestowed upon them: but thereby no more increases his own knowledge, than he does his riches, who, taking a bag of counters, calls one in a certain place a pound, another in another place a fhilling, and a third in a third place a penny; and fo proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right, and cast up a great fum, according to his counters fo placed, and standing for more or lefs as he pleases, without being one jot the richer, or without even knowing how much a pound, fhilling, or penny is, but only that one is contained in the other twenty times, and contains the other twelve: which a man may alfo do in the fignification of words, by making them, in refpect of one another, more, or lefs, or equally compre henfive. varibufly is § 11. THOUGH yet concerning moft words ufed in difcourfes, equally ar- Thirdly, gumentative and controverfial, there is this more to be complained of, which ufing words is the worst fort of trifling, and which fets us yet farther from the certainty of trifling with knowledge we hope to attain by them, or find in them; viz. that most them. writers are so far from inftructing us in the nature and knowledge of things, that they use their words loosely and uncertainly, and do not, by ufing them constantly and steadily in the fame fignifications, make plain and clear deductions of words one from another, and make their discourses coherent and clear (how little foever they were instructive) which were not difficult to do, did they not find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obftinacy, under the obfcurity and perplexedness of their terms: to which, perhaps, inadvertency and ill cuftom do in many men much contribute. § 12. To conclude; barely verbal propofitions may be known by these following marks: FIRST, all propofitions, wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the fignification of founds. For fince no abftract idea can be the fame with any other but itself, when its abftract name is affirmed of any other term, it can fignify no more but this, that it may or ought to be called by that name, or that these two names fignify the fame idea. Thus fhould any one fay, that parfimomy is frugality, that gratitude is juftice, that this or that action is or is not temperate; however fpecious thefe and the like propofitions may at firft fight feem, yet when we come to prefs them, and examine nicely what they contain, we shall find that it all amounts to nothing but the fignification of thofe terms. 13. SECONDLY, all propofitions wherein a part of the complex idea, which any term ftands for, is predicated of that term, are only verbal; V. g. to say that gold is a metal or heavy. And thus all propofitions, wherein more comprehenfive words, called genera, are affirmed of fubordinate or less comprehenfive, called fpecies, or individuals, are barely verbal.. WHEN by these two rules we have examined the propofitions that make up the discourses we ordinarily meet with both in and out of books, we shall, perhaps, find that a greater part of them, than is usually suspected, are D dd 2 purely Marks of ver bal propofitions: 1. Predication in ab ftract. 2. A part of predicated of any term. the definition BooK purely about the fignification of words, and contain nothing in them, but IV. the ufe and application of thefe figns. THIS, I think, I may lay down for an infallible rule, that wherever the distinct idea any word ftands for is not known and confidered, and fomething not contained in the idea is not affirmed or denied of it; there our thoughts ftick wholly in founds, and are able to attain no real truth or falsehood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might fave us a great deal of useless amufement and difpute, and very much shorten our trouble and wandering, in the fearch of real and true knowledge. CHAP. SI. H CHAPTER IX. Of our knowledge of exiftence. ITHERTO we have only confidered the effences of things, which being only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts General cer- from particular exiftence (that being the proper operation of the mind, in tain propofiabstraction, to confider an idea under no other existence, but what it has in not existence. the understanding) gives us no knowledge of real existence at all. Where tions concern A threefold existence. by the way we may take notice, that univerfal propofitions, of whose truth or falfehood we can have certain knowledge, concern not existence; and farther, that all particular affirmations or negations, that would not be certain if they were made general, are only concerning existence; they declaring only the accidental union or feparation of ideas in things existing, which, in their abstract natures, have no known neceffary union or repug nancy. § 2. BUT, leaving the nature of propofitions and different ways of prediknowledge of cation to be confidered more at large in another place, let us proceed now to enquire concerning our knowledge of the existence of things, and how we come by it. I fay then, that we have the knowledge of our own existence by intuition; of the existence of God by demonftration; and of cther things by fenfation. Our know ledge of our is intuitive. own existence : § 3. As for our own existence, we perceive it fo plainly, and fo certainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evident to us, than our own existence; I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain can any of these be more evident to me, than my own existence? if I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not fuffer me to doubt of that. For if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my own existence, as of the existence of the pain I feel: or if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt. Experience then convinces us, that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are. In every act of sensation, reasoning or thinking, we are confcious to ourselves of our own being; and, in this matter, come not short of the highest degree of certainty. CHAP CHAPTER X. Of our knowledge of the existence of a God. T We are ca tainly that HOUGH God has given us no innate ideas of himself; though CHA p. he has stampt no original characters on our minds, wherein we may X. read his being; yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without witnefs: fince we have fenfe, pable of perception and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we knowing cercarry ourselves about us. Nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in there is a this great point, fince he has fo plentifully provided us with the means to God. discover and know him, fo far as is neceffary to the end of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But though this be the most obvious truth that reafon difcovers; and though its evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty: yet it requires thought and attention, and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it from fome part of our intuitive knowledge, or elfe we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other propofitions, which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration. To fhew therefore that we are capable of knowing, i. e. being certain that there is a God, and how we may come by this certainty, I think we need go no farther than ourselves, and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own exiftence. felf is. §2. I THINK it is beyond question, that man has a clear idea of his own Man knows being; he knows certainly he exifts, and that he is fomething. He that that he himcan doubt, whether he be any thing or no, I speak not to, no more than I would argue with pure nothing, or endeavour to convince non-entity, that it were fomething. If any one pretends to be fo fceptical, as to deny his own existence (for really to doubt of it is manifeftly impoffible) let him for me enjoy his beloved happiness of being nothing, until hunger, or fome other pain, convince him of the contrary. This then, I think, I may take for a truth, which every one's certain knowledge affures him of, beyond the liberty of doubting, viz. that he is something that actually exists. alfo that no fore fome §3. In the next place, man knows by an intuitive certainty, that bare He knows nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right thing cannot angles. If a man knows not that non-entity, or the abfence of all being, produce a becannot be equal to two right angles, it is impoffible he should know any de- ing, theremonstration in Euclid. If therefore we know there is fome real being, and thing eterthat non-entity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonftra- nal. tion, that from eternity there has been fomething; fince what was not from eternity had a beginning; and what had a beginning must be produced by fomething else. be moft §4. NEXT, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from That eternal another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its being, from being muft another too. All the powers it has must be owing to, and received from, the erful. fame fource. This eternal fource then of all being must also be the source and |