To face page1.or Feti An ANALYSIS of Mr. LOCKE's Doctrine of IDEAS, in The Word Idea comprehends whatsoever is the Object of the 1. BECAUSE 'tis of no use to suppose them so. Book 1. chap. 2. § 1. chap. 3. § 21. 2. The Steps to Knowledge discoverable. Ibid. and $15.B.2. c.1. $6.20. B. 3. c. 5. $28. 3. Not perceived in a State of Infancy. B.1. c.2.5. 4. Reason necessary to their Discovery. Ibid. $9. 5. Idea of God, not innate. c. 4. $8. Therefore no other. $17. 6. Principles not innate, because Ideas are not so. c. 4. $1, 6, 19. 7. Self-evidence not sufficient to prove them so. 8. Nor universal afsent. Ibid. $3.8. C. 2. $ 10, 20, 23. Speculative. c. 2. $4,24. or 9. Afsent not truly universal in Principles Practical. c.3 per tot. and c.4. $7. Of all these, Men may justly demand a Reafon. c.3. 04. 10. Men think not always. B.2. c.1. $10. &c. c.19. $4. To suppose the contrary would be making different Persons in the same Being. B. 2. c. 1. $12. II. The Origin of our IDEAS. Motion, 1. Perception. III. IDEAS, considered with regard to their Objects. IV. IDEAS, considered with regard to their Qualities. 1. What meant by them. B.2.c.29. $2.4. See also the Preface. 1. Such uncompounded. Appearances, as are mentioned in Part II Motion, Rest, &c. c.5. (Sounds, Tastes, &c.B.2. c.3. CLEAR and 7. Not fictions of our Fancies, but real. c.30. 2.B.4.c.4. 4. tho they don't answer to 8. Positive Ideas from privative Causes. B.2.c.8. $1.6. Aprobable Reason of it. Ibid. § 4. 1. Simple 1. Number Indefinite. B. 2. c.16.5 8. 2. Space. Not actually infinite.c.17. $8. Relative to the situation of Bodies. c.13.$7. 1. Modes. 4. Infinity. AMode of Quantity. c.17.1. Why not applicable An imaginary Addibility without end. $4. 5. Modes of Motion, Sounds, Colours, Tastes, &c. c. 18. 1. Voluntary Combinations of Ideas Vices Relative. c.28. § 15. C. 22. 2. B.3. c.5.5 3. Absolute or Actions Relative. Ibid. 2. Preserved by Names. B.2. c. 22.5 8.B.3. c. 5. $ 10. 3. Exist only in the Mind. B.2. c. 31. 3. 2. Mixt. 4. All adequate Ibid. Except with reference to Names. $ 4. or to the Ideas in other Men's Minds. 5. Real, if made of consistent Ideas. B.2. c. 30. $4. 6. Acquired by Invention. c.22.9. Observation Ibid. Use of Words. Ibid. and B. 3. c.5.15. 1. Collection of Qualities existing together. c.23.89. 2. Applied differently to God, Spirit, and Body. c. 13. § 18. 3. Ranked according to their nominal Essences. B.3. c.3.2.&c. 2. Substances 4. No Substratum beyond the Qualities. B. 2. c.13. 18. 20. c.23.23. 5. Material and immaterial, their Ideas equally clear. c.13. 15. c.23.05. 6. Their Ideas inadequate. c.31.8. 7. Collective Ideas of them what? c. 24. 1. Betwixt two things at least. c. 25. $1.6. 2. All things capable of Relation. Ibid. 7. c. 28. 17. 3. Terminate in simple Ideas. c. 28. 18. c.25.8.9. 4. Often clearer than the things related. c. 28. 19. c.25. 58. Absolute Terms often stand for them. c. 25. 3. c. 26. 4.6. Often without cor relative Terms. c.25.8 2. All Terms relative which lead the Mind be- 5. May alter, and the things remain the same. c.25. $5,10. 6. Proportional, as bigger, equal, &c. c. 28. $1. 7. Natural, as Father, Son. Ibid. § 2. 8. Civil or instituted. Ibid. 3. From Sight and Touch. c.5. 3. Ideas of Sensation often altered by the Judgment.c.g. $8.9.10. 1. The first step towards Knowledge. c.9.15. 2. Employed about Ideas. c. 9. $1. 3. Distinguished from naked or passive Perception. Ibid. and. $4. 4. Not necessary upon the Action of Objects on our Organs. $3. 5. Common to all Animals. $11, 12. 6. Distinguished into 3 Kinds with respect to its Objects. c. 21. $5. 1. Contemplation. c.10.1. (Afsisted by Attention and Repetition $3. 2. Memory. 2. The Mind often active in it. $7. Belongs to Brutes. $10. Cause of Antipathies. $7. Errors. 9. 18. Clear Ideas necessary to it. c.11. $3. 2. Wit lies in assembling Ideas. $2. 3. Judgment in separating them. Ibid. 5. Compounding Hence Ideas of Numbers and other simple Modes. $6. 7. Volition. 2. Makes particular Ideas become general. $9. 3. Hence Genus and Species How made. B.3. c. 3. $6,7,8. Entia Rationis. Ibid. 11. 4. Essences. B.3. c.3. 15. c.6. $38. 5. Language Nominal c.6.5,6. (1. Arbitrary Signs. B.3. c. 2. $8. 2. Signs of Ideas, not of Things. Ibid. 53. 3. Its Use. Recording Ideas. c. 9. $2. Communicating them. Ibid. 3. Imperfect, why. c.9. Its several Abuses. c.10. Their Remedies. c.11. Conversant about; (Most Words so. $1. 1. General Terms. c.3. 2. Names of simple 4 . Names of Substan ces. c.6. 5. Particles. c.7. Why made. $2,3. How made. $6,7 Intimate real Existence. $2,17. Can't be defined. 4. Why. 7 Least doubtful of any. 15. andc.918. Tie several Ideas together. $10. Got before their Ideas. $15. Doubtful, why. c.9.§.6. How made. Referred to 44 Real Essences. c.9.12. Shew their Relation. 3, 4. Marks of an Action of the Mind. Ted. 6. Abstract Terms. c. 8. Not predicable of one another. $1. 1. Power of acting. Man free. $21. B. 2. c. 21. $15. 2. Power of chusing Man not free. $23. Determined by anxiety. $33. (1.Pleasure necessarily desirable. B.1.c.3. 83.B.2. c. 20. $1. 2. Pain necessarily hateful. Ibid. 3. Existence. c.7.7. 4. Unity. Ibid. 5.Power. (Active from Spirit. B. 2. c. 21. § 4. Passive from Body. Ibid (Not from Motion. c.14. $6. 6. Succefsion. From the Train of our Ideas. Ibid. 9. A Forensick Term. 26. does not consist in the Person Consists in Sameness of Conscience. $ 10.16.19. Is annexed to one individual Substance. $ 25. 11. Cause and Effect. c. 26. The former that which makes some other Thing begin to be: the latter that which J. Ellis feulp! From Creation. Ibid. (Defind. 1. Want of a sufficient Number of simple Ideas in the complex one. $7. 3. Causes of this Confusion 2. Want of Order in the Disposition of them. $8. 3. Want of Steadings in the Application of Names. $9. 4. Distinct in some Respects, confused in others. $13,14,15. 1. All simple Ideas real. c.30. $2. 2. Ideas of Substances may be either. $5. 3. And Modes or Relations. $3,4. 4. With respect to Names. $4. 1. All true in a metaphysical Sense. c.32. $2,3, 20. 2. Simple Ideas true. $16. 3. And Modes. $17. 4. Substances, when not true. $18. Other Men's Ideas. $21. 5. Ideas may be so either with refpect to Some real Existence. $22. 1. Simple Ideas. c. 31. $2,12. 2. Modes. $3,14. 3. Relations. Ibid. 4. Substances always. $6,10) The Efsence of Things. $24. Adequate. 5. Modes may be with respect Inadequate. to Names. $4. equate. Of Knowledge, Reason, Faith, Judgment. 1. Mental.B. 4. C.5. $3,5. 2. Verbal. Ibid. How known. c. 8. $12. 3. Identical teach nothing. Ibid. $2. Conversant 4. General. 1. Proposi tions. As to simple Ideas and Modes easily had. $4. Not so as to Substances. Ibid. &c. Often Trifling. c. 8. $9. Concern not Existence. c.9 $1. Their Certainty in what. c. 6. $16. 5. Moral, capable of Demonstration. c.3. $8.c.12. $8. 3. Real and Visionary, how distinguished.c.4. Afsociation vid Retention. Par II.2. 1. Supplies the want of Knowledge.c.11.13. 2. Conversant about Probabilities. 4. and c.15. Concerning Facts. c.16. $6. C. 20. 2. 3. Regulates the Degrees of Afsent. c. 16. matters of Speculation $12. Proper Measures or Rules of Probability. $7. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION. INCE it is the understanding, that fets man above the rest of fenfible An enquiry beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion, which he has into the understanding, over them; it is certainly a fubject, even for its noblenefs, worth our pleafant and labour to enquire into. The understanding, like the eye, whilft it makes ufeful. us fee, and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to fet it at a distance, and make it its own object. But, whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this enquiry; whatever it be, that keeps us fo much in the dark to ourselves; fure I am, that all the light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, will not only be very pleafant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the fearch of other things. §2. THIS, therefore, being my purpofe, to enquire into the original, Defign. certainty, and extent of human knowledge; together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion and affent: I fhall not at prefent meddle with the phyfical confideration of the mind, or trouble myfelf to examine, wherein its effence confifts, or by what motions of our fpirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any fenfation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether thofe ideas do in their formation, any, or all of them, depend on matter or no. Thefe are fpeculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I fhall decline, as lying out of my way, in the defign I am now upon. It shall fuffice to my prefent purpofe, to confider the difcerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects, which they have to do with: And I fhall imagine, I have not wholly mifemployed myfelf, in the thoughts I fhall have on this occafion, if in this hiftorical, plain method, I can give any account of the ways, whereby our understandcome to attain thofe notions of things we have, and can fet down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge, or the grounds of thofe perfuafions, which are to be found amongst men, fo various, different, and wholly VOL. I. B contra 1 Book I. contradictory; and yet afferted, fomewhere or other, with fuch affurance and confidence, that he, that fhall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their oppofition, and at the fame time confider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the refolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained; may perhaps have reafon to fufpect, that either there is no fuch thing as truth at all; or that mankind hath no fufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it. Method. Ufeful to tent of our hion. §3. In is, therefore, worth while to fearch out the bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what measures, in things, whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our affent, and moderate our perfuafions. In order whereunto. I fhall purfue this following method. FIRST, I fhall enquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever elfe you please to call them, which a man obferves, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways, whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them: SECONDLY, I fhall endeavour to fhew, what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it. THIRDLY, I fhall make fome enquiry into the nature and grounds of faith, or opinion; whereby I mean that affent which we give to any propofition as true, of whofe truth yet we have no certain knowledge and here we shall have occafion to examine the reafons and degrees of affent. $4. IF, by this enquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover know the ex- the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things they are in any decomprehen- gree proportionate, and where they fail us; I fuppofe it may be of ufe to prevail with the bufy mind of man, to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehenfion; to ftop, when it is at the utmoft extent of its tether; and to fit down in a quiet ignorance of thofe things, which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We fhould not then perhaps be fo forward, out of affectation of an univerfal knowledge, to raife queftions, and perplex ourselves and others with difputes about things; to which our understandings are not fuited; and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or diftinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps. too often happened) we have not any notions at all. If we can If we can find out, how far the understanding can extend its view; how far it has faculties to attain certainty; and in what cafes it can only judge and guefs, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this ftate. Our capacity fuited to our ftate and con cerns. $5. FOR, though the comprehenfion of our underftandings comes exceeding fhort of the vaft extent of things; yet we fhall have caufe enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our being, for that portion and degree of knowledge he has bestowed on us, fo far above all the reft of the inhabitants of this our manfion. Men have reafon to be well fatisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, fince he has given them (as St. Peter fays) warta wpds (wn'v ny voelaar, whatsoever is neceflary for the conveniences of life, and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their difcovery the comfortable provifion for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How fhort, foever their knowledge may come, of an univerfal or perfect comprehenfion I henfion of whatsoever is, it yet fecures their great concernments, that they CHAP. I. have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the fight of their own duties. Men may find matter fufficient to bufy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and fatisfaction; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own conftitution, and throw away the bleffings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grafp. every thing. We shall not have much reafon to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of ufe to us; for of that they are very capable: and it will be an unpardonable, as well as childish peevishnefs, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it, to the ends for which it was given us, becaufe there are fome things that are fet out of the reach of it. It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward fervant, who would not attend his business by candlelight, to plead that he had not broad fun-fhine. The candle, that is fet up in us, thines bright enough for all our purposes. The difcoveries we can make with this, ought to fatisfy us and we fhall then use our understandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion, that they are fuited to our faculties; and upon thofe grounds they are capable of being propofed to us; and not peremptorily, or intemperately require demonstration, and demand certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which is fufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will difbelieve every thing, becaufe we cannot certainly know all things; we fhall do much what as wifely as he, who would not ufe his legs, but fit ftill and perish, because he had no wings to fly. city, a cure of $6. WHEN we know our own ftrength, we fhall the better know what Knowledge to undertake with hopes of fuccefs: and when we have well furveyed the of our capapowers of our own minds, and made fome eftimate what we may expect fcepticifm from them, we shall not be inclined either to fit ftill, and not fet our thoughts and idleness. on work at all, in defpair of knowing any thing; or, on the other fide, queftion every thing, and disclaim all knowledge, because fome things are not to be understood. It is of great ufe to the failor, to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at fuch places as are neceffary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon fhoals that may ruin him. Our bufinefs here is not to know all things, but thofe which concern our conduct. If we can find out those measures, whereby a rational creature, put in that ftate which man is in this world, may, and ought to govern his opinions and actions depending thereon, we need not to be troubled that fome other things efcape our knowledge. $7. THIS was that which gave the firft rife to this Effay concerning the Occafion of understanding. For I thought that the first step towards fatisfying feveral this Effay. enquiries, the mind of man was very apt to run into, was, to take a furvey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and fee to what things they were adapted. Till that was done, I fufpected we began at the wrong end, and in vain fought for fatisfaction, in a quiet and fure poffeffion of truths that moft concerned us, whilft we let loofe our thoughts into the vaft ocean of Book I. being; as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted poffeffion of our understanding, wherein there was nothing exempt from its decifions, or that efcaped its comprehenfion. Thus men, extending their enquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no fure footing; it is no wonder that they raise queftions, and multiply difputes, which never coming to any clear refolution, are proper only to continue and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect fcepticism. Whereas, were the capacities of our underftandings well confidered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered, and the horizon found, which fets the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things, between what is, and what is not comprehenfible by us; men would perhaps with lefs fcruple acquiefce in the avowed ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and difcourfe with more advantage and fatisfaction in the other. What Idea ftands for. The way fhewn how we come by any know. ledge, fuffici ent to prove §. 8. THUS much I thought neceffary to fay concerning the occafion of this enquiry into human understanding. But, before I proceed on to what I have thought on this fubject, I must here in the entrance beg pardon of my reader for the frequent ufe of the word " Idea," which he will find in the following treatise. It being that term, which, I think, ferves beft to stand for whatfoever is the object of the understanding, when a man thinks; I have used it to exprefs whatever is meant by Phantafm, Notion, Species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently ufing it. I PRESUME it will be easily granted me, that there are fuch ideas in men's minds; every one is confcious of them in himself, and men's words and actions will fatisfy him, that they are in others. OUR firft enquiry then fhall be, how they come into the mind? 8.1. I εννοιαι, T is an established opinion amongst fome men, that there are in the understanding certain innate principles; fome primary notions, zorrai characters, as it were, ftamped upon the mind of man, which the foul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would if not innate. be fufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falfenefs of this fuppofition, if I fhould only fhew (as I hope I fhall in the following parts of this difcourfe) how men, barely by the ufe of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impreffions; and may arrive at certainty, without any fuch original notions, or principles. For I imagine, any one will eafily grant, that it would be impertinent to fuppofe the ideas of colours innate in a creature, to whom God hath given fight, and a power to receive them by the eyes, from external objects; and |