II. A for the fame thing to be, and not to be," that it fo firmly affents to thefe, CHA P. and other parts of its knowledge? Or that the child has any notion or apprehenfion of that propofition at an age, wherein yet it is plain, it knows a great many other truths? He that will fay, Children join these general abstract speculations with their fucking-bottles and their rattles, may, perhaps with juftice, be thought to have more paflion and zeal for his opinion, but lefs fincerity and truth, than one of that age. 26. THOUGH therefore there be feveral general propofitions, that meet And fo not with conftant and ready affent, as foon as propofed to men grown up, who innate. have attained the use of more general and abstract ideas, and names standing for them; yet they not being to be found in those of tender who neyears, vertheless know other things, they cannot pretend to universal affent of intelligent perfons, and fo by no means can be fuppofed innate; it being impoffible that any truth which is innate (if there were any fuch) fhould be unknown, at least to any one who knows any thing elfe: fince, if they are innate truths, they must be innate thoughts; there being nothing a truth in the mind that it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any innate truths, they must neceffarily be the first of any thought on, the first that appear there. appear least, fhews itself § 27. THAT the general maxims, we are difcourfing of, are not known Not innate, to children, idiots, and a great part of mankind, we have already fufficiently because they proved; whereby it is evident they have not an univerfal affent, nor are ge- where, what neral impreffions. But there is this farther argument in it against their be- is innate, ing innate; that these characters, if they were native and original impreffions, cleareft. fhould appear fairest and cleareft in thofe perfons, in whom yet we find no foot-steps of them: and it is, in my opinion, a strong prefumption that they are not innate, fince they are least known to thofe, in whom, if they were innate, they must needs exert themselves with most force and vigour. For children, idiots, favages, and illiterate people, being of all others the leaft corrupted by custom or borrowed opinions; learning and education having not caft their native thoughts into new moulds, nor by fuper-inducing foreign and ftudied doctrines, confounded those fair characters nature had written there: one might reasonably imagine, that in their minds these innate notions should lie open fairly to every one's view, as it is certain the thoughts of children do. It might very well be expected, that thefe principles fhould be perfectly known to naturals; which, being stamped immediately on the foul (as these men fuppofe) can have no dependance on the conftitutions, or organs of the body, the only confeffed difference between them and others. One would think, according to these men's principles, that all thefe native beams of light (were there any fuch) fhould in those who have no referves, no arts of concealment, fhine out in their full luftre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of pleasure, and abhorrence of pain. But alas! amongst children, idiots, favages, and the grofly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found? What univerfal principles of knowledge? Their notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from those objects they have had most to do with, and which have made upon their fenfes the fre quenteft Book I. quenteft and strongest impreffions. A child knows his nurfe and his cradle, and by degrees the play-things of a little more advanced age: and a young favage has, perhaps, his head filled with love and hunting, according to the fashion of his tribe. But he that from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant of the woods, will expect these abstract maxims and reputed principles of sciences; will, I fear, find himself mistaken. Such kind of general propofitions are feldom mentioned in the huts of Indians, much less are they to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impreffions of them on the minds of naturals. They are the language and business of the schools and academies of learned nations, accustomed to that fort of conversation, or learning, where difputes are frequent: these maxims being fuited to artificial argumentation, and useful for conviction; but not much conducing to the discovery of truth, or advancement of knowledge. But of their small use for the improvement of knowledge, I fhall have occafion to speak more at large, B. iv. c. 7. tion. Recapitula- § 28. I KNOW not how abfurd this may feem to the masters of demonftration; and probably it will hardly down with any body at first hearing; I must therefore beg a little truce with prejudice, and the forbearance of cenfure, till I have been heard out, in the fequel of this difcourfe; being very willing to fubmit to better judgments. And fince I impartially fearch after truth, I fhall not be forry to be convinced that I have been too fond of my own notions; which I confefs we are all apt to be, when application and study have warmed our heads with them. UPON the whole matter, I cannot fee any ground to think these two famed fpeculative maxims innate, fince they are not univerfally affented to; and the affent they fo generally find, is no other than what feveral propofitions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in with them: and fince the affent, that is given them is produced another way, and comes not from natural infcription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following discourse. And if thefe first principles of knowledge and science are found not to be innate, no other fpeculative maxims can (I fuppofe) with better right pre tend to be fo. SI. CHAPTER III. No innate practical principles. No moral principles fo clear, and fo generally re fore-men F thofe fpeculative maxims, whereof we difcourfed in the foregoing chapter, have not an actual univerfal affent from all mankind, as we there proved, it is much more vifible concerning practical principles, that ceived, as the they come short of an univerfal reception: and I think it will be hard to instance any one moral rule, which can pretend to fo general and ready an affent, as, "what is, is;" or to be fo manifeft a truth as this, "that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be." Whereby it is evident, that they are farther removed from a title to be innate; and the doubt of tioned fpeculative maxims. III. their being native impreffions on the mind, is ftronger against thofe moral CHA P. principles than the other. Not that it brings the truth at all in queftion. They are equally true, though not equally evident. Those fpeculative maxims carry their own evidence with them: but moral principles require reasoning and discourse, and fome exercise of the mind, to discover the certainty of their truth. They lie not open as natural characters ingraven on the mind; which, if any fuch were, they muft needs be vifible by themselves, and by their own light be certain and known to every body. But this is no derogation to their truth and certainty, no more than it is to the truth or certainty of the three angles of a triangle being equal to two right ones; because it is not fo evident, as, the whole is bigger than a part; nor fo apt to be affented to at first hearing. It may fuffice, that these moral rules are capable of demonstration: and therefore it is our own fault, if we come not to a certain knowledge of them. But the ignorance wherein many men are of them, and the flownefs of affent wherewith others receive them, are manifeft proofs, that they are not innate, and fuch as offer themselves to their view without fearching. owned as principles §2. WHETHER there be any fuch moral principles, wherein all men do Faith and agree, I appeal to any, who have been but moderately converfant in the juftice not hiftory of mankind, and looked abroad beyond the fmoak of their own chimneys.. Where is that practical truth, that is univerfally received with- by all men. out doubt or queftion, as it must be if innate? Juftice, and keeping of contracts, is that which most men seem to agree in. This is a principle, which is thought to extend itself to the dens of thieves, and the confederacies of the greatest villains; and they who have gone fartheft towards the putting off of humanity itself, keep faith and rules of juftice one with another. I grant that our out-laws themselves do this one amongst another: but it is without receiving these as the innate laws of nature. They practise them as rules of convenience within their own communities: but it is impoffible to conceive, that he embraces justice as a practical principle, who acts fairly with his fellow-high-way-men, and at the fame time plunders or kills the next honest man he meets with. Juftice and truth are the common ties of fociety; and therefore even out-laws, and robbers, who break with all the world befides, muft keep faith and rules of equity amongst themselves, or elfe they cannot hold together.. But will any one fay, that those who live by fraud and rapine, have innate principles of truth and juftice, which they allow and affent to ? in their §3. PERHAPS it will be urged, that the tacit affent of their minds agrees Objection. to what their practice contradicts. I answer, firft I have always thought the Though men actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts. But fince it is cer- deny them in tain, that most men's practice, and fome men's profeffions, have either quef- tice, yet they tioned or denied thefe principles, it is impoffible to establish an univerfal admit them confent (though we fhould look for it only amongst grown men) without thoughts, which, it is impoffible to conclude them innate. Secondly, it is very ftrange answered. and unreasonable, to fuppofe innate practical principles, that terminate only in contemplation. Practical principles derived from nature, are there for operation, and muft produce conformity of action, not barely fpeculative affent to their truth; or elfe they are in vain diftinguished from specula VOL. I. D tive Book I. tive maxims. Nature, I confefs, has put into man a defire of happiness, and an averfion to mifery: thefe, indeed, are innate practical principles, which (as practical principles ought) do continue conftantly to operate and influence all our actions, without ceafing. Thefe may be observed in all perfons and all ages, fteady and univerfal; but thefe are inclinations of the appetite to good, not impreffions of truth on the understanding. I deny not, that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men; and that, from the very first inftances of fenfe and perception, there are fome things that are grateful, and others unwelcome to them; fome things that they incline to, and others that they fly: but this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind, which are to be principles of knowledge, regulating our practice. Such natural impreffions on the understanding, are fo far from being confirmed hereby, that this is an argument against them; fince if there were certain characters imprinted by nature on the understanding, as the principles of knowledge, we could not but perceive them conftantly operate in us, and influence our knowledge, as we do thofe others on the will and арpetite; which never ceafe to be constant springs and motives of all our actions, to which we perpetually feel them strongly impelling us. Moral rules ergo not in-. nate. § 4. ANOTHER reafon that makes me doubt of any innate practical prinneed a proof, ciples, is, that I think there cannot any one moral rule be propofed, whereof a man may not justly demand a reason: which would be perfectly ridiculous and abfurd, if they werè innate, or so much as felf-evident; which every innate principle must needs be, and not need any proof to ascertain its truth, nor want any reafon to gain it approbation. He would be thought void of common fenfe, who asked on the one fide, or on the other fide went to give a reason, why it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be. It carries its own light and evidence with it, and needs no other proof: he that understands the terms, affents to it for its own fake, or elfe nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it. But fhould that most unshaken rule of morality, and foundation of all social virtue, "that one should do as "he would be done unto," be proposed to one who never heard it before, but yet is of capacity to understand its meaning; might he not without any abfurdity ask a reason why? and were not he that propofed it, bound to make out the truth and reasonableness of it to him? which plainly fhews it not to be innate for if it were, it could neither want nor receive any proof; but must needs (at least as foon as heard and understood) be received and affented to, as an unquestionable truth, which a man can by no means doubt of. So that the truth of all these moral rules plainly depends upon fome other antecedent to them, and from which they must be deduced; which could not be, if either they were innate, or so much as felf-evident. Inftance in pacts. 85. THAT men fhould keep their compacts, is certainly a great and unkeeping com- deniable rule in morality: but yet, if a Chriftian, who has the view of happinefs and mifery in another life, be asked why a man must keep his word, he will give this as a reafon; because God, who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us. But if an Hobbit be asked why, he will anfwer, because the public requires it, and the Leviathan will punish you, if you do not. And if one of the old philofophers had been asked, he would Virtue ge nate, but be have anfwered; because it was difhoneft, below the dignity of a man, and CHA P. oppofite to virtue, the highest perfection of human nature, to do otherwise. III. §6. HENCE naturally flows the great variety of opinions concerning moral rules, which are to be found amongst men, according to the different forts nerally apof happiness they have a prospect of, or propose to themselves: which could proved, not not be, if practical principles were innate, and imprinted in our minds im- becaufe inmediately by the hand of God. I grant the existence of God is fo many caufe profitways manifeft, and the obedience we owe him fo congruous to the light of able. reason, that a great part of mankind give testimony to the law of nature: But yet I think it must be allowed, that several moral rules may receive from mankind a very general approbation, without either knowing or admitting the true ground of morality; which can only be the will and law of a God, who fees men in the dark, has in his hands rewards and punishments, and power enough to call to account the proudeft offender. For God having, by an infeparable connexion, joined virtue and public happiness together, and made the practice thereof neceffary to the prefervation of fociety, and visibly beneficial to all with whom the virtuous man has to do; it is no wonder, that every one should not only allow, but recommend and magnify thofe rules to others, from whofe obfervance of them he is sure to reap advantage to himfelf. He may, out of intereft, as well as conviction, cry up that for facred; which if once trampled on and profaned, he himself cannot be fafe nor fecure. This, though it takes nothing from the moral and eternal obligation which these rules evidently have, yet it fhews that the outward acknowledgment men pay to them in their words, proves not that they are innate principles; nay, it proves not so much, as that men affent to them inwardly in their own minds, as the inviolable rules of their own practice: fince we find that felf-intereft and the conveniences of this life make many men own an outward profeffion and approbation of them, whofe actions fufficiently prove, that they very little confider the law-giver, that prescribed these rules, nor the hell that he has ordained for the punishment of those that tranfgrefs them. that the rule not their internal prin ciple. §7. FOR, if we will not in civility allow too much fincerity to the profef- Men's actions fions of moft men, but think their actions to be the interpreters of their convince us, thoughts, we shall find, that they have no fuch internal veneration for thefe of virtue is rules, nor fo full a perfuafion of their certainty and obligation. The great principle of morality," to do as one would be done to," is more commended than practifed; but the breach of this rule cannot be a greater vice than to teach others, that it is no moral rule, nor obligatory, would be thought madnefs, and contrary to that intereft men facrifice to, when they break it themfelves. Perhaps confcience will be urged as checking us for fuch breaches. and fo the internal obligation and establishment of the rule be preferved. §8. To which I anfwer, that I doubt not but, without being written on Confcience their hearts, many men may, by the fame way that they come to the know- no proof of ledge of other things, come to affent to several moral rules, and be convinced any innate of their obligation. Others alfo may come to be of the fame mind, from their education, company, and customs of their country; which perfuafion, D 2 however |