BOOK II.

Joy.

Sorrow.

Hope.

Fear.

Despair.

Anger.

Envy.

§7. Joy is a delight of the mind, from the confideration of the prefent or affured approaching poffeffion of a good; and we are then poffeffed of any good when we have it fo in our power, that we can use it when we please. Thus a man almoft ftarved has joy at the arrival of relief, even before he has the pleasure of ufing it: and a father, in whom the very well-being of his children causes delight, is always, as long as his children are in such a state, in the poffeffion of that good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that pleasure.

§8. SORROW is uneafinefs in the mind, upon the thought of a good loft, which might have been enjoyed longer; or the sense of a prefent evil.

§ 9. HOPE is that pleasure in the mind, which every one finds in himself, upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight him.

§ 10. FEAR is an uneafinefs of the mind, upon the thought of future evil likely to befal us.

§ II. DESPAIR is the thought of the unattainableness of any good, which works different in men's minds, fometimes producing uneafinefs or pain, fometimes reft and indolency.

§ 12. ANGER is uneafinefs or difcompofure of the mind, upon the receipt of any injury, with a prefent purpose of revenge.

§ 13. ENVY is an uneafiness of the mind, caufed by the confideration of a good we defire, obtained by one we think should not have had it before us. What paffions 8 14. THESE two laft, envy and anger, not being caufed by pain and pleaall men have. fure fimply in themselves, but having in them fome mixed confiderations of ourfelves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men, because those other parts of valuing their merits, or intending revenge, is wanting in them: but all the rest terminated purely in pain and pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all men. For we love, defire, rejoice and hope, only in respect of pleafure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in refpect of pain ultimately in fine, all these paffions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure and pain, or to have pleasure or pain fome way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our hatred usually to the subject (at least if a sensible or voluntary agent) which has produced pain in us, because the fear it leaves is a constant pain: but we do not so constantly love what has done us good; because pleasure operates not fo ftrongly on us as pain, and because we are not fo ready to have hope it will do fo again. But this by the bye.

Pleasure and pain what.

Shame.

§ 15. By pleasure and pain, delight and uneafiness, I must all along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily pain and pleafure, but whatsoever delight or uneafiness is felt by us, whether arifing from any grateful or unacceptable fenfation or reflection.

16. IT is farther to be confidered, that in reference to the paffions, the removal or leffening of a pain is confidered, and operates as a pleasure; and the lofs or diminishing of a pleasure, as a pain.

§ 17. THE paffions too have moft of them in moft perfons operations on the body, and caufe various changes in it; which not being always fenfible, do not make a neceffary part of the idea of each paffion. For fhame, which is an uneafinefs

XXI.

uneafinefs of the mind upon the thought of having done fomething which CHA P. is indecent, or will leffen the valued efteem which others have for us, has not always blufhing accompanying it.

how our ideas

fenfation and

$18. I WOULD not be miftaken here, as if I meant this as a difcourfe of Thefe inftanthe paffions; they are many more than those I have here named: and thofe I ces to fhew have taken notice of would each of them require a much larger, and more of the paffions accurate discourse. I have only mentioned these here as fo many inftances of are got from modes of pleasure and pain refulting in our minds from various confidera- reflection. tions of good and evil. I might perhaps have instanced in other modes of pleasure and pain more fimple than thefe, as the pain of hunger and thirst, and the pleasure of eating and drinking to remove them; the pain of tender eyes, and the pleasure of mufick; pain from captious uninftructive wrangling, and the pleasure of rational conversation with a friend, or of well-directed study in the fearch and discovery of truth. But the paffions being of much more concernment to us, I rather made choice to inftance in them, and fhew how the ideas we have of them are derived from fenfation and reflection.

T

CHAPTER XXI.

Of power.

XXI.

SI. HE mind being every day informed, by the fenfes, of the alteration CHA P. of those fimple ideas it obferves in things without, and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceafes to be, and another begins to exift which was not before; reflecting alfo on what paffes within itself, and ob- This idea how ferving a conftant change of its ideas, fometimes by the impreffion of outward objects on the fenfes, and fometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding from what it has fo conftantly obferved to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the fame things by like agents, and by the like ways; confiders in one thing the poffibility of having any of its fimple ideas changed, and in another the poffibility of making that change; and fo comes by that idea which we call power. Thus we fay, fire has a power to melt gold, i. e. to deftroy the confiftency of its infenfible parts, and confequently its hardness, and make it fluid; and gold has a power to be melted that the fun has a power to blanch wax, and wax a power to be blanched by the fun, whereby the yellowness is deftroyed, and whiteness made to exift in its room. In which, and the like cafes, the power we confider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas : for we cannot observe any alteration to be made in, or operation upon, any thing, but by the obfervable change of its fenfible ideas; nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving a change of some of its ideas.

$2. POWER, thus confidered, is two-fold, viz. as able to make, or able to receive, any change: the one may be called active, and the other paffive power. Whether matter be not wholly deftitute of active power, as its author God is truly above all paffive power; and whether the intermediate ftate of created

S 2

fpirits

Power active and paffive

Book II. fpirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and paffive power, may be worth confideration. I fhall not now enter into that enquiry; my prefents bufinefs being not to fearch into the original of power, but how we come by the idea of it. But fince active powers make fo great a part of our complex ideas of natural fubftances (as we shall fee hereafter) and I mention them as fuch according to common apprehenfion; yet they being not perhaps fo truly active powers, as our hafty thoughts are apt to reprefent them, I judge it not amifs, by this intimation, to direct our minds to the confideration of God and fpirits, for the clearest idea of active powers.

Power in

tion.

$3. I CONFESS power includes in it fome kind of relation, (a relation to cludes rela- action or change) as indeed which of our ideas, of what kind foever, when attentively confidered, does not? For our ideas of extenfion, duration, and number, do they not all contain in them a fecret relation of the parts? Figure and motion have fomething relative in them much more vifibly: and fenfible qualities, as colours and fmells, &c. what are they but the powers of different bodies, in relation to our perception? &c. And if confidered in the things themselves, do they not depend on the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts? All which include fome kind of relation in them. Our idea therefore of power, I think, may well have a place amongst other fimple ideas, and be confidered as one of them, being one of those that make a principal ingredient in our complex ideas of substances, as we shall hereafter have occafion to observe.

The cleareft

idea of active power had from fpirit.

§4. WE are abundantly furnished with the idea of paffive power by almoft all forts of fenfible things. In most of them we cannot avoid obferving their fenfible qualities, nay, their very fubftances, to be in a continual flux: and therefore with reason we look on them as liable still to the fame change. Nor have we of active power (which is the more proper fignification of the word power) fewer inftances: fince whatever change is obferved, the mind must collect a power fomewhere able to make that change, as well as a poffibility in the thing itself to receive it. But yet, if we will confider it attentively, bodies, by our fenfes, do not afford us fo clear and diftinct an idea of active power, as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds. For all power relating to action, and there being but two forts of action, whereof we have any idea, viz. thinking and motion; let us confider whence we have the clearest ideas of the powers which produce these actions. 1. Of thinking, body affords us no idea at all, it is only from reflection that we have that. 2. Neither have we from body any idea of the beginning of motion. A body at reft affords us no idea of any active power to move; and when it is fet in motion itself, that motion is rather a paffion, than an action in it. For when the 'ball obeys the stroke of a billiard-stick, it is not any action of the ball, but bare paffion: alfo when by impulse it sets another ball in motion that lay in its way, it only communicates the motion it had received from another, and lofes in itself fo much as the other received; which gives us but a very obscure idea of an active power of moving in body, whilft we obferve it only to transfer, but not produce any motion. For it is but a very obfcure idea of power, which reaches not the production of the action, but the continuation of the paffion.

For

For fo is motion in a body impelled by another: the continuation of the CH a P. alteration made in it from reft to motion being little more an action than XXI. the continuation of the alteration of its figure by the fame blow, is an action. The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what paffes in ourselves, where we find by experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies, which were before at reft. So that it seems to me, we have from the observation of the operation of bodies by our fenfes but a very imperfect obfcure idea of active power, fince they afford us not any idea in themselves of the power to begin any action, either motion or thought. But if, from the impulfe bodies are obferved to make one upon another, any one thinks he has a clear idea of power, it ferves as well to my purpose, senfation being one of those ways whereby the mind comes by its ideas: only I thought it worth while to confider here by the way, whether the mind doth not receive its idea of active power clearer from reflection on its own operations, than it doth from any external fenfation.

two powers.

§ 5. THIS at least I think evident, that we find in ourselves a power to be- Will and ungin or forbear, continue or end feveral actions of our minds, and motions of derstanding. our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing fuch or fuch a particular action. This power which the mind has thus to order the confideration of any idea, or the forbearing to confider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its reft, and vice verfa, in any particular instance; is that which we call the will. The actual exercife of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is that which we call volition or willing. The forbearance of that action, confequent to fuch order or command of the mind, is called voluntary. And whatsoever action is performed without fuch a thought of the mind, is called involuntary. The power of perception is that which we call the understanding. Perception, which we make the act of the understanding, is of three forts: 1. The perception of ideas in our mind. 2. The perception of the fignification of figns. 3. The perception of the connexion or repugnancy, agreement or difagreement, that there is between any of our ideas. All these are attributed to the understanding, or perceptive power, though it be the two latter only that use allows us to fay we understand.

$6. THESE powers of the mind, viz. of perceiving, and of preferring, are Faculties. ufually called by another name: and the ordinary way of speaking is, that the understanding and will are two faculties of the mind; a word proper enough, if it be used as all words should be, fo as not to breed any confufion in men's thoughts, by being fuppofed (as I fufpect it has been) to ftand for some real beings in the foul that performed those actions of understanding and volition. For when we say the will is the commanding and fuperior faculty of the foul; that it is, or is not free; that it determines the inferior faculties that it follows the dictates of the understanding, &c. though thefe, and the like expreffions, by those that carefully attend to their own ideas, and conduct their thoughts more by the evidence of things, than the found of words, may be understood in a clear and diftinct fenfe; yet I fufpect, I say,

Book II. that this way of speaking of faculties has milled many into a confused notion of fo many diftinct agents in us, which had their feveral provinces and authorities, and did command, obey, and perform feveral actions, as fo many diftinct beings; which has been no small occafion of wrangling, obfcurity, and uncertainty in queftions relating to them.

Whence the

and neceffity.

87. EVERY one, I think, finds in himself a power to begin or forbear, idea of liberty continue or put an end to feveral actions in himself. From the confideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man, which every one finds in himself, arise the ideas of liberty and neceffity.

Liberty, what.

Suppofes the understanding and will.

Belongs not to volition.

§8. ALL the actions that we have any idea of, reducing themfelves, as has been faid, to these two, viz. thinking and motion; so far as a man has power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind; fo far is a man free. Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man's power; wherever doing or not doing, will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it; there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary. So that the idea of liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty; that agent is under neceffity. So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty. A little confideration of an obvious inftance or two may make this clear.

89. A TENNIS ball, whether in motion by the ftroke of a racket, or lying, still at reft, is not by any one taken to be a free agent. If we enquire into the reason, we fhall find it is because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think, and confequently not to have any volition, or preference of motion to rest, or vice verfa; and therefore has not liberty, is not a free agent; but all its both motion and reft come under our idea of neceffary, and are so called. Likewise a man falling into the water (a bridge breaking under him) has not herein liberty, is not a free agent. For though he has volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling; yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power, the stop or ceffation of that motion follows not upon his volition; and therefore therein he is not free. So a man ftriking himself, or his friend, by a convulfive motion of his arm, which it is not in his power, by volition or the direction of his mind, to stop, or forbear; no-body thinks he has in this liberty; every one pities him, as acting by neceffity and constraint.

§ 10. AGAIN, fuppofe a man be carried, whilft fast asleep, into a room, where is a perfon he longs to fee and speak with; and be there locked fast in, beyond his power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to find himself in fo defirable company, which he ftays willingly in, i. e. prefers his stay to going away; I afk, Is not this ftay voluntary? I think no-body will doubt it; and yet being locked faft in, it is evident he is not at liberty not to stay, he has not freedom to be gone. So that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition, or preferring; but to the perfon having the power of doing, or forbearing to do,

according