Book I.

Affenting as

foon as prounderstood, proves them

pofed and

not innate.

§16. A CHILD knows not that three and four are equal to feven, till he comes to be able to count feven, and has got the name and idea of equality: and then, upon explaining those words, he presently affents to, or rather perceives the truth of that propofition. But neither does he then readily affent, because it is an innate truth, nor was his affent wanting till then, because he wanted the use of reason; but the truth of it appears to him, as soon as he has fettled in his mind the clear and distinct ideas, that these names ftand for: and then he knows the truth of that propofition, upon the fame grounds, and by the fame means, that he knew before, that a rod and cherry were not the same thing; and upon the fame grounds also, that he may come to know afterwards, "that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be;" as fhall be more fully fhewn hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general ideas, about which thofe maxims are; or to know the fignification of thofe general terms that stand for them; or to put together in his mind the ideas they stand for the later alfo will it be before he comes to affent to those maxims, whose terms, with the ideas they stand for, being no more innate than those of a cat or a weesel, he muft ftay till time and obfervation have aquainted him with them; and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of these maxims upon the first occafion, that shall make him put together thofe ideas in his mind, and obferve whether they agree or disagree, according as is expreffed in those propofitions. And therefore it is, that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty-feven, by the fame self-evidence that he knows one and two to be equal to three: yet a child knows not this fo foon as the other, not for the want of the use of reason, but because the ideas the words eighteen, nineteen, and thirty-seven stand for, are not fo foon got, as thofe which are fignified by one, two, and three.

§17. THIS evafion therefore of general affent, when men come to the use of reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between those fuppofed innate and other truths, that are afterwards acquired and learnt; men have endeavoured to fecure an univerfal affent to thofe they call maxims, by faying, they are generally affented to as foon as propofed, and the terms, they are propofed in, understood: feeing all men, even children, as foon as they hear and understand the terms, affent to these propofitions, they think it is fufficient to prove them innate. For fince men never fail, after they have once understood the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly these propofitions were first lodged in the understanding; If fuch an af- which, without any teaching, the mind, at the very firft propofal, immediately clofes with, and affents to, and after that never doubts again.

fent be a

mark of innate, then

"that one

and two are equal to

§ 18. IN anfwer to this, I demand "whether ready affent, given to a propofition upon first hearing, and understanding the terms, be a certain mark "of an innate principle?" If it be not, fuch a general affent is in vain urged, as three; that a proof of them: if it be faid, that it is a mark of innate, they must then alfweetness is low all fuch propofitions to be innate, which are generally affented to, as soon nefs;" and a as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate printhoufand the ciples. For, upon the fame ground, (viz.) of affent at first hearing and understanding the terms, that men would have those maxims pass for innate,

not bitter

like, must be

innate.

they must also admit feveral propofitions about numbers, to be innate and CHA P. thus, that one and two are equal to three; that two and two are equal to four; II. and a multitude of other the like propofitions in numbers, that every body affents to at first hearing, and understanding the terms, must have a place amongst these innate axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone, and propofitions made about several of them; but even natural philofophy, and all the other sciencès afford propofitions, which are fure to meet with affent as foon as they are understood. That two bodies cannot be in the fame place, is a truth that no-body any more sticks at, than at this maxim, that it is impoflible for the fame thing to be, and not to be; that white is not black; that a fquare is not a circle; that yellowness is not sweetness: these, and a million of other fuch propofitions, as many at least as we have diftinct ideas, every man in his wits, at first hearing, and knowing what the names ftand for, muft neceffarily affent to. If thefe men will be true to their own rule, and have affent at first hearing and understanding the terms, to be a mark of innate, they muft allow not only as many innate propofitions as men have diftinct ideas; but as many as men can make propofitions, wherein different ideas are denied one of another. Since every propofition wherein one different idea is denied of another, will as certainly find affent at first hearing and understanding the terms, at this general one, "it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be; or that which is the foundation of it, and is the easier understood of the two, the fame is not different:" by which account they will have legions of innate propofitions of this one fort, without mentioning any other. But fince no propofition can be innate, unless the ideas about which it is, be innate; this will be to fuppofe all our ideas of colours, founds, taftes, figure, &c. innate; than which there cannot be any thing more oppofite to reafon and experience. Univerfal and ready affent, upon hearing and understanding the terms, is (I grant) a mark of felf-evidence; but felf-evidence depending not on innate impreffions, but on fomething else (as we shall shew hereafter) belongs to several propofitions, which no-body was yet fo extravagant as to pretend to be innate.

tions known,

$ 19. NOR let it be faid, that thofe more particular felf-evident propo- Such lefs gefitions which are affented to at first hearing, as, that one and two are equal to neral propofi three; that is not red, &c. are received as the confequences of thofe before the fe green more univerfal proportions, which are looked on as innate principles: fince univerfal any one who will but take the pains to obferve what paffes in the understand- maxims. ing, will certainly find, that these and the like lefs general propofitions, are certainly known and firmly affented to, by those who are utterly ignorant of thofe more general maxims; and fo, being earlier in the mind than those (as they are called) first principles, cannot owe to them the affent, wherewith they are received at first hearing.

&c. not ge

§ 20. IF it be faid, that these propofitions, viz. two and two are equal to One and one four; red is not blue, &c. are not general maxims, nor of any great ufe:" equal to two, I answer, that makes nothing to the argument of univerfal affent, upon hearing neral nor and understanding. For if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever pro- ufeful, anpofition can be found, that receives general affent as foon as heard and under- fwered. ftood, that must be admitted for an innate propofition, as well as this maxim,

C 2

that

Thefe max

known fome

times till pro

nate.

Book I. that "it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be;" they being upon this ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this maxim more remote from being innate; thofe general and abftract ideas being more ftrangers to our first apprehenfions, than those of more particular felf-evident propofitions; and therefore it is longer before they are admitted and affented to by the growing understanding. And as to the usefulness of these magnified maxims, that perhaps will not be found fo great as is generally conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully confidered.. § 21. BUT we have not yet done with affenting to propofitions at first ims not being hearing and understanding their terms; it is fit we first take notice, that this, instead of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary: fince pofed, proves it fuppofes, that feveral who understand and know other things, are ignorant them not in- of these principles till they are propofed to them; and that one may be unacquainted with thefe truths till he hears them from others. . For if they were innate, what need they be propofed in order to gaining affent; when by being in the understanding, by a natural and original impreffion (if there were any fuch) they could not but be known before? Or doth the propofing them, print them clearer in the mind than nature did? If fo, then the confequence will be, that a man knows them better after he has been thus taught them, than he did before. Whence it will follow, that these principles may be made more evident to us by others teaching, than nature has made them by impreffion: which will ill agree with the opinion of innate principles, and give but little authority to them; but on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowledge, as they are pretended to be. This cannot be denied, that men grow first acquainted with many of these felf-evident truths, upon their being proposed: but it is clear, that whofoever does fo, finds in himself, that he then begins to know a propofition, which he knew not before, and which from thenceforth he never queftions; not because it was innate, but because the confideration of the nature of the things contained in those words, would not suffer him to think otherwife; how, or whenfoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is affented to at first hearing and understanding the terms, must pass for an innate principle; every well grounded observation, drawn from particulars into a general rule, must be innate. When yet it is certain, that. not all, but only fagacious heads light at firft on these observations, and reduce them into general propofitions; not innate, but collected from a preceding acquaintance and reflection on particular inftances. Thefe, when obferving men have made them, unobferving men, when they are propofed to them, cannot refuse their affent to.

Implicitly known be

fore propo

§ 22. IF it be faid," the understanding hath an implicit knowledge of thefe principles, but not an explicit, before this first hearing," (as they fing, fignifies muft, who will fay, "that they are in the understanding before they are that the mind known") it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle imprinted is capable of underftand- on the understanding implicitly; unless it be this, that the mind is capable ing them, or of understanding and affenting firmly to fuch propofitions. And thus all elle fignifies mathematical demonftrations, as well as first principles, must be received

nothing.

as

II.

as native impreffions on the mind; which I fear they will fearce allow C H A P. them to be, who find it harder to demonftrate a propofition, than affent to it when demonftrated. And few mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the diagrams they have drawn, were but copies of thofe innate characters, which nature had engraven upon their minds.

for

any

no

§ 23. THERE is, I fear, this farther weakness in the foregoing argument, The arguwhich would perfuade us, that therefore thofe maxims are to be thought in- ment of af nate, which men admit at first hearing, because they affent to propofitions first hearing, fenting on which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any argument is upon a or demonftration, but a bare explication or understanding of the terms. Under tion of falfe fuppofiwhich there feems to me to lie this fallacy, that men are fuppofed not to be precedent taught, nor to learn any thing " de novo;" when in truth they are taught, teaching. and do learn fomething, they were ignorant of before. For firft it is evident, that they have learned the terms and their fignification; neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquired knowledge in the cafe; the ideas themselves, about which the propofition is, are not born with them, no more than their names, but got afterwards. So that in all propofitions that are affented to, at first hearing, the terms of the propofition, their standing for fuch ideas, and the ideas themselves that they ftand. being neither of them innate; I would fain know what there is remaining in fuch propofitions that is innate. For I would gladly have one name that propofition, whofe terms, or ideas, were either of them innate. We, by degrees, get ideas and names, and learn their appropriated. connexion one with another; and then to propofitions made in fuch terms, whofe fignification we have learnt, and wherein the agreement or difagreement we can perceive in our ideas, when put together, is expreffed, we at first hearing affent: though to other propofitions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning ideas, not fo foon or fo eafily got, we are at the fame time no way capable of affenting. For though a child quickly affents to this propofition, that an apple is not fire," when by familiar acquaintance, he has got the ideas of thofe two different things diftinctly imprinted on his mind, and has learnt that the names apple and fire ftand for them; yet it will be fome years after, perhaps, before the fame child will affent to this propofition," that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be." Because that though, perhaps, the words are as eafy to be learnt yet the fignification of them being more large, comprehenfive, and abstract, than of the names annexed to thofe fenfible things the child hath to do with ; it is longer before he learns their precife meaning, and it requires more time. plainly to form in his mind thofe general ideas they ftand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any child affent to a propofition made up of fuch general terms; but as foon as ever he has got thofe ideas,, and learned their names, he forwardly clofes with the one as well as the other of the forementioned propofitions: and with both for the fame reafon, (viz.) becaufe he finds the ideas he has in his mind to agree or difagree, according as the words ftanding for them, are affirmed, or denied. one of another in the propofition. But if propofitions be brought to him in

words,

Book I. words, which stand for ideas he has not yet in his mind; to fuch propofitions, however evidently true or falfe in themselves, he affords neither affent nor diffent, but is ignorant. For words being but empty founds any farther than they are figns of our ideas, we cannot but affent to them, as they correspond to those ideas we have, but no farther than that. But the shewing by what steps and ways knowledge comes into our minds, and the grounds of feveral degrees of affent being the business of the following discourse, it may fuffice to have only touched on it here, as one reason, that made me doubt of those innate principles.

Not innate, because not univerfally affented to.

Thefe max

first known.

§ 24. To conclude this argument of universal confent, I agree with these defenders of innate principles, that if they are innate, they muft needs have universal affent. For that a truth should be innate and yet not afsented to, is to me as unintelligible as for a man to know a truth, and be ignorant of it at the fame time. But then by these men's own confeffion, they cannot be innate; fince they are not affented to by those who understand not the terms, nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet never heard, nor thought of those propofitions; which, I think, is at least one half of mankind. But were the number far lefs, it would be enough to destroy univerfal affent, and thereby fhew these propofitions not to be innate, if children alone were ignorant of them.

any

§ 25. BUT that I may not be accufed, to argue from the thoughts of ims not the infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude, from what paffes in their understandings before they express it; I fay next, that these two general propofitions are not the truths that firft poffefs the minds of children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions; which, if they were innate, they must needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time when children begin to think; and their words and actions do affure us that they do fo. When therefore they are capable of thought, of knowledge, of affent, can it rationally be supposed, they can be ignorant of thofe notions that nature has imprinted, were there fuch? Can it be imagined with any appearance of reafon, that they perceive the impreflions from things without; and be at the fame time ignorant of those characters which nature itself has taken care to ftamp within? Can they receive and affent to adventitious notions, and be ignorant of those which are supposed woven into the very principles of their being, and imprinted there in indelible characters, to be the foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge, and future reafonings? This would be to make nature take pains to no purpofe, or at least to write very ill; fince its characters could not be read by thofe eyes which faw other things very well; and thofe are very ill fuppofed the cleareft parts of truth and the foundations of all our knowledge, which are not firft known, and without which the undoubted knowledge of several other things may be had. The child certainly knows that the nurse that feeds it, is neither the cat it plays with, nor the blackmoor it is afraid of; that the wormfeed or muftard it refufes, is not the apple or fugar it cries for; this it is certainly and undoubtedly affured of: but will any one say, it is by virtue of this principle, "that it is impoffible

for