none can stay his hand, or say unto him, what doest thou?" (Dan. iv. 35.)

It is pretended, that "none are doomed to final ruin, till God has previously done every thing for their salvation, which, consistently with his attributes, he can do; and that, therefore, the endless misery of the damned involves no reflection on the divine goodness.” Supposing this true, does it involve no reflection on his goodness to have called them into being, under circumstances which rendered their endless misery certain? But it is not true; the weight of Christ's authority stands against it; he testifies that God did much more for Chorazin, and Bethsaida, than he had done for Tyre, and Sidon; and that had he done as much for the latter places, "they would long ago have repented, sitting in sackcloth and ashes," (Mat. xi. 20.) And addressing Capernaum, he says, "If the mighty works which are done in thee, had been done in Sodom, it would have remained unto this day," (ibid.) Now it certainly must be considered a singular fact, that God desires the salvation of all, and yet permits thousands to sink to endless woe, who could have been saved by his doing merely as much for them, as he saw fit to do for others! How is this? Universalists maintain, that God's love is as strong beyond, as on this side the grave; and that what it fails of accomplishing here, it will infallibly accomplish hereafter; at least, the ultimate salvation of all men cannot fail from a lack of divine power; if at all it must be from a lack of his goodness. But 6. GOD IS GOOD.—(Psa. lxxxvi. 5.)—Goodness is opposed to evil, it seeks to overcome it, hence the injunction, "Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good," (Rom. xii. 27.) This, undoubtedly, is according to the divine conduct, for God would certainly not enjoin on his creatures a virtue which he will not practice himself; and if the divine goodness shall eventually overcome our evil, then the existence of evil must forever cease; and, by consequence, the existence of misery also. "The Lord is good to all, and his tender mercy is over all his works," (Psl. cxlv. 9.) But how God can be good to all, and yet torment countless millions without any regard to their good, is more than can be comprehended! How his tender mercy can be over all his works, and yet a large portion of those works be abandoned to infinite ruin, is also more than can be comprehended! Indeed,

there are many things in the scriptures which we must not pretend to understand in accordance with the notion of endless misery, inasmuch as they are utterly repugnant to that doctrine. If the mercy of God does extend to the damned, without alleviating their miseries, or eventually bringing them to a salutary termination, then there is no difference between mercy and cruelty-it is as well to be the object of the one as of the othersince they both produce the same effects. For how can cruelty be better defined than by saying, it is the infliction of torment on an object, without designing any good to that object from that torment? and if infinite mercy will do this, then it is not distinguishable from infinite cruelty. If, on the other hand, the mercy of God does not extend to the damned, then it is not "over all his works," neither is it infinite, which signifies without bounds or limits.

To me it seems that the question of endless misery can be settled in few words, as follows-The unhappy subjects of endless damnation, is their existence, so far as respects themselves, a good? or an evil? You will not hesitate to answer, an evil. I again ask, Can an absolute evil emanate from a Being who is infinitely good? NO, is the only answer of which this question will fairly admit, and it answers equally well the question, whether the dogma of unceasing suffering can possibly, in this view of the case, be true?

7. GOD IS JUST.-(Deut. xxxii. 4.)-We are brought into existence by the mere will of our creator; we are compelled to accept of that existence on his own terms, our will is not consulted in the matter; if the terms on which we receive our being are as dreadful as represented by the doctrine of endless misery, it seems but just that we should be voluntary parties in the compact; but such we are not, and, therefore, cannot justly be held to the terms.

A powerful nobleman settles by deed of conveyance a small farm upon one of his tenants; while the latter is rejoicing in his newly acquired property, he is informed, that the conditions of the gift are, that not a single weed must be allowed to grow upon the premises; that if, at any moment when it may suit the donor to call him to account, there shall be found any such within the limits of the farm, he shall answer for it with his life, and be put

to death in the most horrid manner. The poor man in great alarm hastens to inform the nobleman that he cannot accept of the property on such fearful terms; but he is told in reply that it is now too late; the compact is settled, and sealed, and cannot be cancelled. "Whether you were acquainted with the conditions or notwhether a party in the bargain or not—it is my will that the matter should be as it is, and you must abide the issue." Reader, is the conduct of that nobleman just?

Justice requires, that when an article of value is entrusted to any one's keeping, he should be clearly apprised of its full worth, and the consequences of its loss, and should be provided with means of security in proportion. Now conceive man charged with the keeping of an immortal spirit, and that his sins during this brief existence, will subject it through unending duration to the dreadful heritance of its almighty maker's frowns. I ask, if man is so clearly apprised of his situation as the magnitude of the matter at stake requires he should be? I ask further, are his means of security in proportion to the inconceivably dreadful issue of the cast? On the contrary if the system which supposes this state of things be true, myriads of invisible spirits are constantly seeking opportunities to deceive and ruin him, and his own depraved nature-with which he is born without his own consent is ever ready to second their malignant efforts! In addition, the way of safety is so dim and uncertain, that a thousand different paths are sincerely mistaken for it, and by no possibility can it certainly be determined, that any one is right to the exclusion of all the rest! There are innumerable wants and anxieties to which man is unavoidably subject, and which tend to divert his mind from the business of his soul's salvation! Surely they must deem but meanly of the justice of heaven, who imagine that he thus trifles with the eternal interests of his creatures!

Justice also requires, that there should be an equal proportion between crime and punishment; and who will pretend that such proportion exists betwixt the crimes of even the most abandoned of our race, and the ceaseless sufferings of eternity? sufferings which shall inconceivably long endure, when as many millions of ages shall have passed away, as there are stars in the firmament of night-multiplied by as many more as there are

particles of light in the sun-and these by as many as there are atoms of matter in the universe-and the whole together by as many as the moments of duration which have elapsed, since the almighty put forth the first exertion of his omnipotence! Must it not be admitted, that in damning to all eternity one immortal spirit, God would inflict a greater evil, than all the sins of all mankind, from the commencement till the close of time, ever have or ever can accomplish? With what justice then can endless misery be inflicted?

I may be told that "the sin of man is infinite, and, therefore, deserving of infinite punishment." But the notion of the infinity of sin destroys all idea of proportion between one sin and another, and, consequently, the slightest idle word is equal to "the blasphemy against the holy ghost." Besides this notion proves one sin to be infinite, and, therefore, a million of sins is a million of infinities! and if one deserve infinite punishment, how can a million ever be justly punished? There is no end to the absurd consequences deducible from this position.

Sin is a voluntary violation of the divine requirements, "To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin," (Jam. iv. 17.) Does God exact infinite performances of finite creatures? If so, he requires of us as much as he can do himself! and if not, sin is a violation of but finite obligations, and is consequently but finite in itself, and in proportion to the amount he commits will be the quantity of the sinner's punishment.

We set un no claim to eternal life on the ground of justice, we would not be understood as demanding this as a matter of right, we hope for it as "the gift of God, through Jesus Christ." But we do claim in justice to be returned to our original unconsciousness, except it shall please God to prolong our existence for objects of benevolence; we do too firmly rely upon his justice to believe, that he would obtrude on us a being by which he knew we should be infinitely the losers! and we conceive, therefore, that we have a large interest in this attribute of his character. God is too just to be unmerciful, as well as too merciful to be unjust; there is the utmost harmony between these perfections of his nature. God is not divided against himself, and as the unending misery of millions of mankind, cannot be agreeable to his mercy, it cannot for the same reason be agreeable to his justice.

Would it be just in God to subject the sinner to the necessity of remaining unjust to all eternity? Does justice, in requital for a temporary violation of its requirements, demand that those requirements should continue eternally to be violated? The doctrine of endless misery certainly involves an affirmative answer to these questions!

8. GOD IS HOLY.-(Lev. xix. 2.)-From the opposition between this principle and sin, we argue that the latter must eventually be brought to a period; which, to be sure, is a very different idea from that which is commonly entertained, viz. that God, who is a being of infinite purity, will cause sin, or at least permit it, to co-endure with his own eternity! If sin shall always exist, it will be owing either to a want of power in God to destroy it, or to a want of disposition. To the former it cannot be, for he is almighty; neither can it be to the latter, for it is a thousand times declared in his word, in one form or other, that sin is utterly odious to him. How then can it be supposed, that he will doom those who die unholy, eternally to remain so? Either, 1st,-Sin, and the divine holiness, shall exist in eternal opposition to each other-or 2ndly, they shall exist in eternal union—or, 3dly, the greater of the two shall eventually overcome, and destroy the other. If the 1st is true, the parties must be equal, and so neither of them can be infinite! If the 2nd is true, all that the scriptures and moral philosophy teach respecting the deity, must be false! We must therefore conclude the 3rd to be true; And now, which shall prevail, infinite purity, or sin? If the former, the whole universe shall be reconciled to God, and be happy. If the latter, the whole universe shall be subjected to the devil, and be miserable. Can common sense be at a loss for a decision in this case? The scriptures, at least, have not left the matter in doubt, "For it pleased the Father, that in him all fulness should dwell, and (having made peace by the blood of the cross) by him to reconcile all things unto himself; by him, I say, whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven." (Col. i. 20.) According to very respectable commentators, things in earth, and things in heaven," is a common Hebrew phrase for expressing the whole intelligent universe.

An objector may here inquire, "Why, since it is so opposed to his nature, does not God exterminate sin at once? and, since

F