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CHAP. XXV.

Of RELATION.

§ 8, page 319, line 28. AND those being all either Sc. all ideas in general are Simple or complex: not that the ideas of relation here treated of can ever be fimple ones, for he hath before made them a species of complex ones.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations.

§ 1, page 321. CAUSE and effect are only the names of fubftances given them for active or paffive qualities in one or the other. The final cause, being only in intelligent agents, cannot be any thing more than modally diftinct from the efficient (as action from agent). The material cause, being only in corpo · real substances, cannot be any thing diftinct from the effect; nor the formal from the efficient effect, being the combination of thofe properties or qualities in the active fubftance to operate, or the paffive fubftance to receive any new modification. For inftance, in a watch, the conveniencies of knowing the hour, &c. defigned by an artist is the final caufe; the brass, filver, &c. is the material caufe; the powers and qualities exercised by the artist denominate him the efficient; and the new modification fuperinduced in the materials, when fitly put together, are its formal caufe.*

* Lee, p. 118.

VOL. I.

CHAP.

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Of Identity and Diverfity.

§3, page 327. MERE exiftence is not the Principium Individuationis. Tojudge whethera

thing be the fame with itfelf at different times, a man must have fome conception of what that is at one time, that he may compare it with itfelf at another: but that he cannot poffibly have, that has no object for his thoughts, but bare exiflence. The Prin. Ind. therefore in any body is its figure, pofition, bulk, motion, or reft of all its particles, and not its bare exiftence. The fuppofition here made of an immutable atom is not only impoffible, but fuppofes that every thing it was to prove, for if it be immutable, it must be the fame, without all queftion.

What is the Principium Ind. ? Or what is it that makes any one thing the fame as it was fome time before? This is too large and laborious an inquiry to dwell upon here, yet I cannot forbear mentioning this hint, viz. fince our own bodies muft rife at the last day, &c. there may be perhaps fome original fibres of each human body, fome ftamina vitæ or primæval feeds of life, which may have remained unchanged through all the ftages of life, death, and the grave; thefe may become the fprings and principles of a refurrection and fufficient to denominate it the fame body. But if there be any fuch conftant and vital atoms which diftinguifh. every human body, they are known to God only.

§4, page 328. The continual fucceffive, though infenfible, appofition and union of new particles of the fame contexture and configuration, helped by the folar and central heat, is fufficient for plants being called the fame,

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young and old, without a common principle of life, as well as it does of minerals.

$5, page 328. The fuppofition is here again impoffible; for though the comparing animals to machines be a good fimilitude, as that of filly men to affes, yet it is no proof of its poffibility. Animal, therefore, may more properly be faid to be the fame by having its parts united to the fame inward principle or caufe of life.*

§ 6, page 329, line 3. Nothing but a participation. This participation of the fame continued life may be called the animal identity, but it is not in this alone that the identity of man confifts, but in this and the identity of the foul joined together: fo that if either of these two identities be wanting, the identity of man is loft: ex. gr. If the fame foul fhould fucceffively inform thofe we call the bodies of Seth, Ifmael, &c. they would all be the fame man, for want of the animal identity; and if those we call the fouls of Seth, Ifmael, &c. fhould fucceffively inform any one body, they would not be the fame man for want of the identity of the foul.

The identity of man confifts fomething more than matter organized in the fame manner, in the fame principle of intellectual actions, or in the fame individual fpirit united to the fame body, however the feveral parts of that body may have infenfibly changed in the feveral fucceffive moments and ftates of life. And this we find certain in matter of fact; but we never yet heard of one foul being united to two complete bodies of hu man shape. The fuppofition therefore of its poffibility must be looked upon as fictitious and very unphilofophical. Since God has neither given us any evidence to believe it is fo, by what he has done, nor revealed to us he ever will; and we have no meafure of poffibility but that.f

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one original mafs had, are ftill efteemed the fame vegetable or animal body.

Ibid. line 36. For as far as any intelligent being.He feems to fuppofe there may be an intelligent being (meaning, I believe, his perfon) fubfifting of itfelf, independent of all thinking fubftances, which one after another may be joined to it; a ftrange thought.*

Ibid. line 48. The fame confeioulnefs uniting.-He fuppofes two fubftances, one which hath the fame consciousness of the other's paft actions that it hath of its own present ones, to be the fame perfon.

§ 11, page 335, line 7. Are a part of ourselves, &c. and fubftance whereof perfonal felf confifted. The author feems to have forgot his definitions of perfon $9, page 333, a thinking intelligent being, of which certainly matter cannot be a part, and indeed this is not at all a fit inftance, nor does it come up to the matter in hand, though he ufes it feveral times afterwards.

The limb, whilft it is vitally united to the body, was no more a part of our confcious felves, than our blood is. No part, nor indeed the whole body, is any more than the foul's inftruments in its operations, does not think, is not confcious of any of its actions. The eye does not fee, nor the ear hear, &c. This then feems rather an argument to prove, that animus cujufq. eft is quifq. because the man is the fame after the limb is cut off, then the contrary.

§ 12, page 335, line 1. And to this I answer. This paragraph feems very obfcure, and confufed, and little or nothing to the purpose.

Ibid. line 6. It is plain. They feem to make it the fame with animal identity.

Ibid. line 10. Before they can come to deal with thefe men. For thefe men inaking animal and perfonal

* Vide § 25.

† Lee, p. 128.

VOL. I.

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identity

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