a 2003 da § 8, page 319, line 28. AND thofe being all either— Sc. all ideas in general are Simple or complex: not that the ideas of relation here treated of can ever be fimple ones, for he hath before made them a fpecies of complex ones. CHAP. XXVI. Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations. § 1, page 321. CAUSE and effest are only the names of fubftances given them for active or paffive qualities in one or the other. The final caufe, being only in intelligent agents, cannot be any thing more than modally diftinct from the efficient (as action from agent). The material cause, being only in corporeal fubftances, cannot be any thing distinct from the effect; nor the formal from the efficient effect, being the combination of thofe properties or qualities in the active substance to operate, or the paffive substance to receive any new modification. For inftance, in a watch, the conveniencies of knowing the hour, &c. defigned by an artift is the final caufe; the brafs, filver, &c. is the material caufe; the powers and qualities exercised by the artist denominate him the efficient; and the new modification fuperinduced in the materials, when fitly put together, are its formal caufe.* * Lee, p. 118. VOL. I. CHAP. 1 HAP CHAP. XXVII. Of Identity and Diverfity. § 3, page 327. Miduationis. Tojudge whether a ERE exiftence is not the Principium thing be the fame with itfelf at different times, a man must have fome conception of what that is at one time, that he may compare it with itfelf at another: but that he cannot poffibly have, that has no object for his thoughts, but bare exiflence. The Prin. Ind. therefore in any body is its figure, pofition, bulk, motion, or reft of all its particles, and not its bare exiftence. The fuppofition here made of an immutable atom is not only impoffible, but fuppofes that every thing it was to prove, for if it be immutable, it must be the fame, without all question. What is the Principium Ind. ? Or what is it that makes any one thing the fame as it was fome time before? This is too large and laborious an inquiry to dwell upon here, yet I cannot forbear mentioning this hint, viz. fince our own bodies muft rife at the laft day, &c. there may be perhaps fome original fibres of each human body, fome ftamina vitæ or primæval feeds of life, which may have reinained unchanged through all the ftages of life, death, and the grave; thefe may become the fprings and principles of a refurrection and fufficient to denominate it the fame body. But if there be any fuch conftant and vital atoms which diftinguifh every human body, they are known to God only." S4, page 328. The continual fucceffive, though infenfible, appofition and union of new particles of the fame contexture and configuration, helped by the folar and central heat, is fufficient for plants being called the fame, *Watts Log. p. 111. I young and old, without a common principle of life, as well as it does of minerals. $5, page 328. The fuppofition is here again impoffible; for though the comparing animals to machines be a good fimilitude, as that of filly men to affes, yet it is no proof of its poffibility. Animal, therefore, may more properly be faid to be the fame by having its parts united to the fame inward principle or caufe of life.* §6, page 329, line 3. Nothing but a participation. This participation of the fame continued life may be called the animal identity, but it is not in this alone that the identity of man confifts, but in this and the identity of the foul joined together: fo that if either of these two identities be wanting, the identity of man is loft; ex. gr. If the fame foul fhould fucceffively inform thofe we call the bodies of Seth, Ifmael, &c. they would all be the fame man, for want of the animal identity; and if those we call the fouls of Seth, Ifmael, &c. fhould fucceffively inform any one body, they would not be the fame man for want of the identity of the foul. The identity of man confifts fomething more than matter organized in the fame manner, in the fame principle of intellectual actions, or in the fame individual Spirit united to the fame body, however the feveral parts of that body may have infenfibly changed in the feveral fucceffive moments and ftates of life. And this we find certain in matter of fact; but we never yet heard of one foul being united to two complete bodies of human shape. The fuppofition therefore of its poffibility must be looked upon as fictitious and very unphilofophical. Since God has neither given us any evidence to believe it is fo, by what he has done, nor revealed to us he ever will; and we have no meafure of poffibility but that.f VOL. I *Watts Log. p. 122. + Lee, p. 124 §8, page 330. Inferences grounded on fuch fuppolitions as thefe of the cat and parrot, are mere ro mance. $9, page 333, line 20. And as far as this confcioufnefs. The meaning of this, and fome following expreffions of this nature, is not that perfonal identity that reaches no further than the memory of our paft actions: for we may have perfectly forgot fome of them, which yet certainly were the actions of our very felves. That which is here afferted therefore is, that fuppofing any paft actions return to our minds, either by the power of remembrance, or external fuggeftion, if we have the fame confcioufnefs of them that we had of them at firft, and which we have of prefent actions, we are the fame perfons that did them, and not otherwife, § 10, page 333. Confcioufnefs is only the repeated and fucceffive acts of the mind, by which it takes notice of its former and fucceffive actions; but actions cannot unite themfelves, and therefore that which muft make thefe diftinct and fucceffive acts of consciousness to be the actions of one being, muft be fomething diftin&t from the actions themfelves, and that muft and can be only the mind itself. Ergo, it is that and not confcioufnefs that denominates the perfon the fame with himfelf at different times. Page 334, line 27. Different fubftances.-The author's method feenis not to be good here; for in this place he takes that for granted, which a little lower in thefe wards, "Or can be continued in a fucceffion," he fpeaks doubtfully of, and § 12, page 335, debates as a question. Ibid. line 29. As different bodies, by the fame life. Sc. Different particles of matter falling as faft as they come, into the difpofition, or organization that fime * Loc, p. 124: 2 + Ibich p. 125. one original mass had, are fill efteemed the fame vegetable or animal body. Ibid. line 36. For as far as any intelligent being.He feems to fuppofe there may be an intelligent being. (meaning, I believe, his perfon) fubfifting of itself, independent of all thinking fubftances, which one after another may be joined to it; a ftrange thought.* Ibid. line 48. The fame confeioulnefs uniting.-He fuppofes two fubftances, one which hath the fame consciousness of the other's paft actions that it hath of its own prefent ones, to be the fame perfon. § 11, page 335, line 7. Are a part of ourselves, &c. -and fubftance whereof perfonal felf confifted.-The author feems to have forgot his definitions of perfon § 9, page 333, a thinking intelligent being, of which certainly matter cannot be a part, and indeed this is not at all a fit inftance, nor does it come up to the matter in hand, though he ufes it feveral times afterwards. The limb, whilft it is vitally united to the body, was no more a part of our confcious felves, than our blood is. No part, nor indeed the whole body, is any more than the foul's inftruments in its operations, does not think, is not confcious of any of its actions. The eye does not fee, nor the ear hear, &c. This then feems rather an argument to prove, that animus cujufq. eft is quifq. becaule the man is the fame after the limb is cut off, then the contrary. § 12, page 335, line 1. And to this I anfwer. This paragraph feems very obfcure, and confufed, and little or nothing to the purpose. Ibid. line 6. It is plain. They feem to make it the fame with animal identity. Ibid. line 10. Before they can come to deal with thefe men. For thefe men inaking animal and perfonal * Vide § 25. VOL. I. + Lee, p. 128. K 2 identity |