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Of Simple Modes; and firft, of the Simple Modes of Space. § 1, page 147, line 8. MODIFICATIONS of the fame idea. The modifications of
any thing are only the different modi exiftendi, or manners of exifting belonging to that thing: that is, when a thing exifts in different ftates or conditions, degrees or quantities, &c. thefe may be called different modi exiftendi, or modifications of a thing.
§5, page 148. Figure, in fewer words, is nothing but the determination of fpace or body.*
§ 12, page 153. The idea we have of fpace is of extenfion in the abftract, not of a concrete extended fubftance.
The extenfion of body implies a particular action exerted, but the extenfion of fpace implies no fuch thing. Space has all the true marks of neceffary extenfion, matter has all the contrary. To fay, once pace was not extended implies a contradiction: it is impaffive, without figure, location, divifion, motion.‡
$ 16, page 154. This dilemma is avoidable only by owning space to be fubftance (though not body,) neither material, nor cogitative.§
*Watts Log. p. 71. Baxt. p. 350. Watts Log. p. 13, 17. Baxt. p. 351 §'Lee, p. 73. Cartef. Princ Phil. p. 2, $ 20. Newt. Princ. Math. Schol. Generale ad Fin, ejufdem Optic. Qu. 20, p. 315. Dr. Clarke Dem. Prop. 2, his Letters to Leibnitz, P. 1, 11, 41, 55, 77, 101, 125, 181, 299, &c.-Ralphton de Spa, Reali. c. 5.-Jac. Ode. Princ. Nat. Philof. p. 22, 48.-Notes or Or. of Ev. Cudworth, Intell. Syft. 644, 766.-Green's Prin. Phil. b. 1, . 4, §8, 18. Bayle Dict. p. 2790, 3083.-Colliber's Enquiry into the Being and Attrib. of God.-Gretton a priori, c. 6, 7.-Watts Philof. Eff. 1, p. 21,
$21, page 157. The controverfy about a vacuum cannot be directly ended; unless it could be proved either, that there is no space, but where there is fuch a body in it as does produce fome fenfible effect: or that there is fome space, where there is no body that can affect our fenfes; both which are equally impoffible to be proved.
Stretch his hand beyond his body? Yes; if there is Space which is not body; but this is begging the queftion: otherwife, I anfwer, No; except there come fo much matter from beyond the confines, as to fill that Space which the hand left.
§ 24, page 159. This is the best argument to prove a vacuum, viz. because we can fo naturally conceive Space diftinct from body.
Of Duration, and its Simple Modes.
HOUGHTS cannot be measured
§ 12, page 167. Tin Ungth any more than they can
be described by figures or colours; fo that measuring duration by them feems like measuring pain by the inch or foot. And therefore we may have fome notion of duration or time by our consciousness merely of the fucceffion of our thoughts; yet they cannot come near the being a proper standard, or adequate measure of it. §
§18, page 169. Time is defined by Leibnitz, to be the order of fucceffion of created beings.
§ 31, page 178. External objects cannot operate upon the mind any otherwife than by prefent impreffion, and therefore the knowledge or notion we have of duration, time, and eternity, is gained by the exercife of our natural faculties of imagining and reafoning, and not by fenfation only.*
Of Duration and Expanfion confidered together. $12, page 188. these two particulars, wherein •T space and duration differ, may be
added a third, viz. that space is fométhing real, and diftinct from the mind conceiving it; but duration is only a mode of the mind's conception concerning the existence of itself, and other things.
§ 1, page 189. NUMBER, abstracted from the thing
numbered, and from the names and figures by which it is expreffed, is nothing but a thought or mode of conception, and is improperly called an idea.t
$ 6, page 197, line 16.
BUT in other ideas it is not fo.Thele words feem to fuphave an idea of the greateft whitenefs that can be; but this we can no more have, than
pofe that we can
of the greatest degree of extenfion that can be. We may indeed fuppofe a thing fo white, that, if adding a greater degree to it, will make a different idea in our fancy or imagination; but this he hath alfo obferved of the addition of space and duration, when the ideas under confideration are very big or fmall. But notwithstanding this, we add to any degrees of whiteness, ftill greater degrees of it, which, though lefs or equal will not, will increase it in infinitum, juft as the increase is made in extenfion.
$7, page 198. Every idea is finite or limited, and therefore to fay the idea of infinity is limited, is a flat contradiction; and to fay that it is a continual growing idea, does not mend the matter. A perfon of fixteen years old is a growing perfon, but the number is not fo, for that will be immutably the fame; and the attributing that to the number which is a fixed limited mode of our conception, which is proper only to the thing numbered, creates all the confufion.†
$13, page 202. Though we have no complete and adequate idea of infinite, this does not prove that our notion or knowledge of infinity is not pofitive; for we may have a pofitive notion, or rationally grounded knowledge, of that which we do not comprehend.
$14, page 202, line 4. He that confiders that the end is body. This feems not a fufficient anfwer to the argument alledged; for though the end, i. e. the extreme parts of any thing be as much parts, and as pofitive beings as the middle parts, yet they may allo be confidered, as they are in this argument, fc. as the negation of further extenfion. But an an fwer may be fetched from the argument itself. For
granting what was demanded in the argument, that the end of space is nulla extenfio ulterior, an infinite space therefore is quod non habet nullá ulterioré extenfionem; now because we know not how much this aliqua ulterior extenfio is, which, as he elsewhere expreffes it, is a confufed, incomprehenfible remainder, we cannot have a clear, complete pofitive idea of infinite space. We have no idea of infinite space for this reafon, when I have not the idea of all the parts of any thing, I have no perfect idea of the whole thing; and fince infinite space is made up of infinite parts, fc. fuch parts as I can come to no end of, I have not a complete idea of infinite space; for if I had, I should have an idea of all the parts of it, and then the mind would come to an end of thofe have no end at all; which is abfurd.
$15, page 204, line 2. This is plain negative, &c.What a negative idea is, or how part of an idea can be faid to be negative, is to me unintelligible. I underftand what a negative propofition is, as a horfe is not a ftone; but I have no idea of what is not a ftone, But yet I have no pofitive reafon to believe that propofition A negative idea therefore is very obfcure, unlimited, or rather no idea at all.*
is very true.
Of the other Simple Modes.
OF other fimple modes.It is not evident from the defcription here given, whether they be thofe he calls fimple modes, or thofe he calls mixed; but they feem to be fuch fimple modes as are va riations of the fame fimple idea.