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1. What truth is. 2. A right joining, or feparating of figns; i. e. ideas or words.
3. Which make mental, or
verbal propofitions. 4. Mental propofitions are. very hard to be treated of. 5. Being nothing but joining, or feparating ideas, without words.
6. When mental propofitions contain real truth, and when verbal.
7. Objection against verbal truth, that thus it may be all chimerical.
8. Answered, real truth is about ideas agreeing to things.
9. Falfhood is the joining of
names, otherwife than their ideas agree. 10. General propofitions to be treated of more at large. 11. Moral and metaphysical truth.
Of univerfal propofitions, their truth and certainty.
1. Treating of words, neceffary to knowledge.
2. General truths hardly to
8, 9. Inftance in gold.
11, 12. The qualities, which make our complex ideas of fubftances, depend mostly on external, remote, and unperceived causes.
13. Judgment may reach farther, but that is not knowledge.
14. What is requifite for our knowledge of fubstances. 15. Whilft our ideas of fubftances contain not their real conftitutions, we can make but few general, certain propofitions concerning them.
16. Wherein lies the general certainty of propofitions.
Of the existence of a God. SECT.
1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God.
2. Man knows that he himfelf is.
3. He knows also, that no-
4. That eternal being muft
8. Something from eternity,
1. Is to be had only by fen-, fation.
2. Inftance, whiteness of this paper.
3. This, though not fo certain as demonftration, yet may be called knowledge, and proves the existence of things without us. 4. Firft, because we cannot have them but by the inlets of the fenfes. 5. Secondly, because an idea. from actual fenfation, and another from memory, are very diftinct perceptions. 6. Thirdly, pleasure or pain, which accompanies actual fenfation, accompanies not the returning of thofe ideas, without the external objects.
7. Fourthly; our fenfes affift one another's teftimony of the existence of outward things.
12. But muft beware of hypothefes and wrong principles.
3. Being that, which makes us prefume things to be true, before we know them to be fo.
4. The grounds of probability are two; conformity with our own experience, or the teftimony of others experience.
5. In this all the arguments, pro and con, ought to be examined, before we come to a judgment.
6. They being capable of great variety.
CHA P. XVI.
Of the degrees of affent. SECT.
1. Our affent ought to be re-
2. These cannot be always
5. Probability is either of
6. The concurrent experience of all other men with ours produces affurance approaching to knowledge. 7. Unquestionable teftimony. and experience for the moft part produce confidence.
8. Fair teftimony, and the nature of the thing indifferent, produces also confident belief,
1. Various fignifications of
8. We reafon about particu-
13. Fifthly, because of doubt-