1. What truth is. 2. A right joining, or feparating of figns; i. e. ideas or words.

3. Which make mental, or

verbal propofitions. 4. Mental propofitions are. very hard to be treated of. 5. Being nothing but joining, or feparating ideas, without words.

6. When mental propofitions contain real truth, and when verbal.

7. Objection against verbal truth, that thus it may be all chimerical.

8. Answered, real truth is about ideas agreeing to things.

9. Falfhood is the joining of

names, otherwife than their ideas agree. 10. General propofitions to be treated of more at large. 11. Moral and metaphysical truth.

CHAP. VI.

Of univerfal propofitions, their truth and certainty.

SECT.

1. Treating of words, neceffary to knowledge.

2. General truths hardly to
be understood, but in ver-
bal propofitions.
3. Certainty two-fold, of
truth, and of knowledge.
4. No propofition can be
known to be true, where
the effence of each species
mentioned, is not known.
5. This more particularly
concerns fubftances.
6. The truth of few univerfal
propofitions concerning
fubftances, is to be known.
7. Becaufe co-existence of
ideas in few cafes is to be
known.

8, 9. Inftance in gold.
10. As far as any such co-ex-
iftence can be known, fo
far univerfal propofitions
may be certain. But this
will but a little way,
go
because,

11, 12. The qualities, which make our complex ideas of fubftances, depend mostly on external, remote, and unperceived causes.

13. Judgment may reach farther, but that is not knowledge.

14. What is requifite for our knowledge of fubstances. 15. Whilft our ideas of fubftances contain not their real conftitutions, we can make but few general, certain propofitions concerning them.

16. Wherein lies the general certainty of propofitions.

СНАР. Х.

Of the existence of a God. SECT.

1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God.

2. Man knows that he himfelf is.

3. He knows also, that no-
thing cannot produce a
being, therefore fome-
thing eternal.

4. That eternal being muft
be most powerful.
5. And moft knowing.
6. And therefore God.
7. Our idea of a most perfect
being, not the fole proof
of a God.

8. Something from eternity,
9. Two forts of beings, co-
gitative and incogitative.

1

1. Is to be had only by fen-, fation.

2. Inftance, whiteness of this paper.

3. This, though not fo certain as demonftration, yet may be called knowledge, and proves the existence of things without us. 4. Firft, because we cannot have them but by the inlets of the fenfes. 5. Secondly, because an idea. from actual fenfation, and another from memory, are very diftinct perceptions. 6. Thirdly, pleasure or pain, which accompanies actual fenfation, accompanies not the returning of thofe ideas, without the external objects.

7. Fourthly; our fenfes affift one another's teftimony of the existence of outward things.

12. But muft beware of hypothefes and wrong principles.

13. The

3. Being that, which makes us prefume things to be true, before we know them to be fo.

4. The grounds of probability are two; conformity with our own experience, or the teftimony of others experience.

5. In this all the arguments, pro and con, ought to be examined, before we come to a judgment.

6. They being capable of great variety.

CHA P. XVI.

Of the degrees of affent. SECT.

1. Our affent ought to be re-
gulated by the grounds of
probability.

2. These cannot be always
actually in view, and then
we must content ourselves
with the remembrance,
that we once faw ground
for fuch a degree of affent.
3. The ill confequence of this,
if our former judgment
were not rightly made.
4. The right use of it, is
mutual charity and for-
bearance.

5. Probability is either of
matter of fact, or fpecula-

tion.

6. The concurrent experience of all other men with ours produces affurance approaching to knowledge. 7. Unquestionable teftimony. and experience for the moft part produce confidence.

8. Fair teftimony, and the nature of the thing indifferent, produces also confident belief,

SECT.

Of reafon.

1. Various fignifications of
the word reafon.

2. Wherein reasoning con-

fifts.

3. Its four parts.

4. Syllogifm, not the great

inftrument of reafon.

5. Helps little in demonstra-

tion, lefs in probability.

6. Serves not to increase our

knowledge, but fence

with it.

7. Other helps fhould be

fought.

8. We reafon about particu-
lars.

9. First, reafon fails us for

want of ideas.

10. Secondly, because of ob-

fcure and imperfect ideas.

11. Thirdly, for want of in.

termediate ideas.

12. Fourthly, because of wrong

principles.

13. Fifthly, because of doubt-

ful terms.

14. Our highest degree of

knowledge is intuitive,

without reafoning.