er:

Thus a man may go a journey to obtain two different benefits or enjoyments, both which may be agreeable to him in themselves considered, and so both may be what he values on their own account and seeks for their own sake; and yet one may be much more agreeable than the other; and so be what he sets his heart chiefly upon, and seeks most after in his going a journey. Thus a man may go a journey partly to obtain the possession and enjoyment of a bride that is very dear to him, and partly to gratify his curiosity in looking in a telescope, or some new invented and extraordinary optic glass: Both may be ends he seeks in his journey, and the one not properly subordinate or in order to another. One may not depend on another, and therefore both may be ultimate ends; but yet the obtaining his beloved bride may be his chief end, and the benefit of the optic glass, his inferior end. The former may be what he sets his heart vastly most upon, and so be properly the chief end of his journey.

2. An ultimate end is not always the chief end, because some subordinate ends may be more valued and sought after than some ultimate ends. Thus for instance, a man may aim at these two things in his going a journey; one may be to visit his friends, and another to receive a great estate, or a large sum of money that lics ready for him at the place to which he is going. The latter, viz. his receiving the sum of money may be but a subordinate end: He may not value the silver and gold on their own account, but only for the pleasure, gratifications and honor; that is the ultimate end, and not the money which is valued only as a means of the other. But yet the obtaining the money, may be what is more valued, and so an higher end of his journey, than the pleasure of see ing his friends; though the latter is what is valued on its own account, and so is an ultimate end.

But here several things may be noted:

First, That when it is said, that some subordinate ends may be more valued than some ultimate ends, it is not supposed that ever a subordinate end is more valued than that ultimate end or ends to which it is subordinate; because a subordinate end has no value, but what it derives from its ultimate end

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For that reason it is called a subordinate end, because it is val ued and sought, not for its own sake, or its own value, but only in subordination to a further end, or for the sake of the ultimate end, that it is in order to. But yet a subordinate end may be valued more than some other ultimate end that it is not subordinate to, but is independent of it, and does not belong to that series, or chain of ends. Thus for instance: If a man goes a journey to receive a sum of money, not at all as an ultimate end, or because he has any value for the silver and gold for their own sake, but only for the value of the pleasure, and honor that the money may be a means of. In this case it is impossible that the subordinate end, viz. his having the mon-. ey should be more valued by him than the pleasure and honor, for which he values it. It would be absurd to suppose that he values the means more than the end, when he has no value for the means but for the sake of the end, of which it is the means: But yet he may value the money, though but a subordinate end, more than some other ultimate end, to which it is not subordinate, and with which it has no connexion. For instance, more than the comfort of a friendly visit; which was one end of his journey.

Secondly, Not only is a subordinate end never superior to that ultimate end, to which it is subordinate; but the ultimate end is always (not only equal but) superior to its subordinate end, and more valued by the agent; unless it be when the ultimate end entirely depends on the subordinate: So that he has no other means by which to obtain his last en and also is looked upon as certainly connected with it...then the subordinate end may be as much valued as the last end; because the last end, in such a case, does altogether depend upon, and is wholly and certainly conveyed by it. As for instance, if a pregnant woman has a peculiar appetite to a cer tain rare fruit that is to be found only in the garden of a particular friend of her's, at a distance; and she goes a journey to go to her friend's house or garden, to obtain that fruit....the ultimate end of her journey, is to gratify that strong appetite: The obtaining that fruit, is the subordinate end of it. If she looks upon it, that the appetite can be gratified by no other

means than the obtaining that fruit; and that it will certainly be gratified if she obtains it, then she will value the fruit as much as she values the gratification of her appetite. But otherwise, it will not be so: If she be doubtful whether that fruit will satisfy her craving, then she will not value it equally with the gratification of her appetite itself; or if there be some other fruit that she knows of, that will gratify her desire, at least in part; which she can obtain without such inconvenience or trouble as shall countervail the gratification; which is in effect, frustrating her of her last end, because her last end is the pleasure of gratifying her appetite, without any trouble that shall countervail, and in effect destroy it. Or if it be so, that her appetite cannot be gratified without this fruit, nor yet with it alone, without something else to be compounded with it....then her value for her last end will be divided between these several ingredients as so many subordinate, and no one alone will be equally valued with the last end.

Hence it rarely happens among mankind, that a subordinate end is equally valued with its last end; because the obtaining of a last end rarely depends on one single, uncompounded means, and is infallibly connected with that means: Therefore, men's last ends are commonly their highest ends.

Thirdly, If any being has but one ultimate end, in all that he does, and there be a great variety of operations, his last end may justly be looked upon as his supreme end: For in such a case, every other end but that one, is an end to that end; and therefore no other end can be superior to it. Because, as was observed before, a subordinate end is never more valued, than the end to which it is subordinate.

Moreover, the subordinate effects, events, or things brought to pass, which all are means of this end, all uniting to contribute their share towards the obtaining the one last end, are very various; and therefore, by what has been now observed, the ultimate end of all must be valued, more than any one of the particular means. This seems to be the case with the works of God, as may more fully appear in the sequel.

From what has been said, to explain what is intended by an ultimate end, the following things may be observed concerning ultimate ends in the sense explained.

Fourthly, Whatsoever any agent has in view in any thing he does, which he loves, or which is an immediate gratification of any appetite or inclination of nature; and is agreea-, ble to him in itself, and not merely for the sake of something else, is regarded by that agent as his last end. The same may be said, of avoiding of that which is in itself painful or disagreeable: For the avoiding of what is disagreeable is agrecable. This will be evident to any bearing in mind the meaning of the terms. By last end being meant, that which is regarded and sought by an agent, as agreeable or desirable for its own sake ; ‘a subordinate that which is sought only for the sake of something else.

Fifthly, From hence it will follow, that, if an agent in his works has in view more things than one that will be brought to pass by what he does, that are agreeable to him, considered in themselves, or what he loves and delights in on their own account....then he must have more things than one that he regards as his last ends in what he does. But if there be but one thing that an agent seeks, as the consequence of what he does that is agreeable to him, on its own account, then there can be but one last end which he has in all his actions and operations.

But only here a distinction must be observed of things which may be said to be agreeable to an agent, in themselves considered in two senses. (1.) What is in itself grateful to an agent, and valued and loved on its own account, simply and absolutely considered, and is so universally and originally, antecedent to, and independent of all conditions, or any supposition of particular cases and circumstances. And (2.) What may be said to be in itself agreeable to an agent, hypothetically and consequentially: Or, on supposition or condition of such and such circumstances, or on the happening of such a particular case. Thus, for instance: A man may originally love society. An inclination to society may be implanted in his very nature: And society may be agreeable to him antecedent to all presupposed cases and circumstances: And this may cause him to seek a family. And the comfort of society may be originally his last end, in seeking a family. But after he has

a family, peace, good order and mutual justice and friendship in his family, may be agreeable to him, and what he de lights in for their own sake; and therefore these things may be his last end in many things he does in the government and regulation of his family. But they were not his original end with respect to his family. The justice and peace of a family was not properly his last end before he had a family, that induced him to seek a family, but consequentially. And the case being put of his having a family, then these things wherein the good order and beauty of a family consist, be、 come his last end in many things he does in such circumstances. In like manner we must suppose that God before he created the world, had some good in view, as a consequence of the world's existence that was originally agreeable to him in itself considered, that inclined him to create the world, or bring the universe, with various intelligent creatures into existence in such a manner as he created it. But after the world was created, and such and such intelligent creatures actually had existence, in such and such circumstances, then a wise, just regulation of them was agreeable to God, in itself considered. And God's love of justice, and hatred of injustice, would be sufficient in such a case to induce God to deal just ly with his creatures, and to prevent all injustice in him towards them. But yet there is no necessity of supposing, that God's love of doing justly to intelligent beings, and hatred of the contrary, was what originally induced God to create the world, and make intelligent beings; and so to order the occasion of doing either justly or unjustly. The justice of God's nature makes a just regulation agreeable, and the contrary disagreeable, as there is occasion, the subject being supposed, and the occasion given: But we must suppose something else that should incline him to create the subjects or order the occasion.

So that perfection of God which we call his faithfulness, or his inclination to fulfil his promises to his creatures, could not properly be what moved him to create the world; nor could such a fulfilment of his promises to his creatures, be his last end, in giving the creatures being. But yet after the