Persons, even in Trifles. For they, who take the Liberty of asking any Questions, that may serve their Turn, will commonly discover almost as much from the Silence of one, who is usually communicative to them, as from his speaking. And whenever, after all our Precaution, Silence will not conceal a Thing, which ought to be concealed, it must be allowable to speak upon the Subject in such a Manner, as to leave that Part of it involved in Obscurity, which is not fit to be revealed. Nay, though we foresee it to be probable, that any one, provided he hath no Title to Information from us, will take our Words in a Sense, in which we do not use them; yet if that, in which we do use them, be a fair and natural one, and Nothing but his own Rashness leads him into Error; though, as I faid before, Charity bids us hinder it, if we conveniently can, yet Veracity requires it not. For when we design only to keep him ignorant of a Fact, it is his own Fault, if he will also believe a Fancy. But if we go further and lay Snares for him; if we give Afsurances, which, in their obvious and universal Acceptation, are false, but only have a latent forced Construction, in which, after all, they just may be

true: this is Equivocation; and cannot be defended, unless the grossest Violations of Sincerity can be defended too. For the Intent of using Language to deceive is equally evident in both: and the Contrivance of couching the Deceit in Phrafes liable to no Suspicion, adds to the Crime greater Deliberation, and consequently more heinous Guilt.

We are now therefore led to confider, II. The Pleas, which are urged to justify fome Sorts of direct Lying.

For more than a few speculative, and some pious Men, have imagined, that this Practice in certain Cafes may do much Good, and can do no Hurt: and then is both allowable and commendable. Speech, they say, was given to Mankind solely for their common Benefit: nor consequently is it ever used amiss, when it contributes to that End. And this Opinion they endeavour to confirm by several Instances of Falsehoods, which good Persons are recorded in Scripture to have uttered knowingly. But, befides that some Instances, which they produce, are not Falsehoods, or were directed by an express Authority, which can supersede ordinary Obligations: good Perfons may too possibly both say and do what they VOL. V. ought

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ought not, through Ignorance of their Duty, or Infirmity, and their Commission of known and great Sins is not always related with Cenfure, it being unnecessary: to which it must be added, that some of their Actions may be praised in holy Writ on the Whole, without - the least Intention of approving the Circumstances of Insincerity, or other Imperfections, with which they were accompanied.

Another Argument in Favour of their Notion they draw, somewhat surprisingly, from the Apostle's Words: putting away Lying, Speak every Man Truth with his Neighbour : for we are Members one of another d. The Precept, they say, must not be extended further, than the Reason of it extends: which being only, that because of our mutual Relation, we ought to confult our mutual Advantage; where adhering to Truth will not promote this, Falfehood may be justly substituted. But, though mutual Advantage is a very strong Tie upon us to speak Truth, St. Paul hath not told us here, that it is the only -one. And we experience ourselves to be under another more immediate. We feel a natural Reluctance in our Confciences to lying d Eph. iv. 25.

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and deceiving, as such, without looking forward to Consequences: and even they who have perfuaded themselves that doing it is, in some Instances, lawful, cannot do it however, without an inward Sense of Shame and Guilt. Now it deserves to be well confidered, whether tranfgreffing, in order to attain some supposed End of general Utility, this Dictate of our moral Nature, the Principle of which God hath planteth there, be any more allowable, than tranfgreffing the Dictates of Justice or any other moral Obligation, with the same View: whether, in short, it be not, what the Apostle himself mentions with Abhorrence, and that in the very Cafe of a Lie, Doing Evil, that Good may come .

Or, though still any one should think, that our native Antipathy to speaking Falsehood, no more proves it to be always forbidden, than our Unwillingness to give others Pain, which notwithstanding we may and must give them sometimes, for the Sake of a Benefit more confiderable: yet it must be observed, that the Scripture both allows and requires Pain and even Death to be inflicted in some Cafes: but uniformly forbids Lying,

without intimating in any one Precept or Declaration concerning it, the Possibility of an Exception. But were the Confideration of Scripture to be set aside, which it never ought; still on the Footing of mere Reason and Experience, a most important Question would remain, what those Instances are, in which, on balancing the two Sides of the Account, Violation of Truth is more beneficial than detrimental to Mankind. For supposing any such can be found, it must be violated in them only. But if none such can be found, or if the Advantage be at all doubtful, or not exceeding great, or attainable any other Way, in the fame or but nearly the same Degree: the plain and the safe Rule evidently is, that of Simplicity and godly Sincerity in all Cafes.

The Cafe indeed of an Attack upon our own or our Neighbours Property, or Life, may seem a very favourable one to the Opinion, which we are now examining. For here it is argued, that affuredly no one hath a Right to rob or to murder; nor consequently suffers any Wrong, when he is prevented from doing either. And if telling him a Falsehood be the likeliest Method of Prevention : hath he