a virtuous man, 'tis fit he should learn to cross his appe'tite, and deny his inclination to riches, finery, or pleasing 'his palate, &c.'

This, sir, is excellently said; but is it not a little too philosophical and abstracted, not only for the generality of children, but for the age he supposes them to be of, if one may guess by the apples and the sugar-plums proposed for the rewards of their well-doing? Would not this, sir, require that memory or reflection in children, which the same author, in another place, calls the concomitant of prudence and age, and not of childhood?

It is undoubtedly very right to check an unreasonable appetite, and that at its first appearance. But if so small and so reasonable an inducement will prevail, surely, sir, it might be complied with. A generous mind takes delight to win over others by good usage and mildness, rather than by severity; and it must be a great pain to such a one to be always inculcating on his children or pupils the doctrine of self-denial, by methods quite grievous to his

own nature.

What I would then humbly propose is, That the encouragements offered to youth should indeed be innocent ones, as the gentleman enjoins, and not such as would lead to luxury, either of food or apparel: but I humbly think it necessary that rewards, proper rewards, should be proposed, as incentives to laudable actions: for is it not by this method that the whole world is influenced and governed? Does not God Himself, by rewards and punishments, make it our interest, as well as our duty, to obey HIM? And can we propose to ourselves, for the government of our children, a better example than that of the Creator?

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This fine author seems, dear sir, to think he had been a little of the strictest, and liable to some exception. I say 'not this,' proceeds he (§ 53), that I would have children 'kept from the conveniences or pleasures of life, that are not injurious to their health or virtue. On the contrary, 'I would have their lives made as pleasant and as agree

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able to them as may be, in a plentiful enjoyment of 'whatsoever might innocently delight them.' And yet,

dear sir, he immediately subjoins a very hard and difficult proviso to the indulgence he has now granted :—' Provided,' says he, 'it be with this caution, That they have 'those enjoyments only as the consequences of the state of esteem and acceptation they are in with their parents and governors.'

I doubt, my dear Mr. B, this is expecting such a distinction and discretion in children as they are seldom capable of in their tender years, and requiring such capacities as are not commonly to be met with: so that it is not prescribing to the generality, as this excellent author intended. 'Tis, I humbly conceive, next to impossible that their tender minds should distinguish beyond facts. They covet this or that plaything; and the parent, or governor, takes advantage of its desires, and annexes to the indulgence which the child hopes for, such or such a task or duty, as a condition; and shows himself pleased with its compliance with it: so the child wins its plaything, and receives the praise and commendation so necessary to lead on young minds to laudable pursuits. But, dear sir, shall it not be suffered to enjoy the innocent reward of its compliance, unless it can give satisfaction, that its greatest delight is not in having the thing coveted, but in performing the task, or obeying the injunctions, imposed upon it as a condition of its being obliged? I doubt, sir, this is a little too strict, and not to be expected from children. A servant, full grown, would not be able to show, that on condition he complied with such and such terms (which, it is to be supposed by the offer, he would not have complied with but for that inducement), he should have such and such a reward; I say, he would hardly be able to show that he preferred the pleasure of performing the requisite conditions to the stipulated reward. Nor is it necessary he should; for he is not the less a good servant, or a virtuous man, if he own the conditions painful, and the reward necessary to his low state in the

world, and that otherwise he would not undergo any service at all. Why, then, should this be exacted from a child?

Let, therefore, if I may presume to say so, innocent rewards be proposed, and let us be contented to lead on the ductile minds of children to a love of their duty, by obliging them with such. We may tell them what we expect in this case; but we ought not, I humbly conceive, to be too rigorous in exacting it; for, after all, the inducement will certainly be the uppermost consideration with the child: 'tis out of nature to suppose it otherwise: nor, as I hinted, had it been offered to it, if the parent himself had not thought so. And therefore we can only let the child know his duty in this respect, and that he ought to give a preference to that; and then rest ourselves contented, although we should discern that the reward is the chief incentive, if it do but oblige to the performance of it. For this, from whatever motive inculcated, may beget a habit in the child of doing it; and then, as it improves in years, one may hope that reason will take place, and enable him, from the most solid and durable motives, to give a preference to the duty.

Upon the whole, then, may I, sir, venture to say, that we should not insist upon it, that the child should so nicely distinguish away its little innate passions, as if we expected it to be born a philosopher? Self-denial is indeed a most excellent doctrine to be inculcated into children, and it must be done early too: but we must not be too severe in our exacting it; for a duty too rigidly insisted upon will make it odious. This Mr. Locke himself excellently observes in another place, on the head of too great severity; which he illustrates by a familiar comparison : 'Offensive circumstances,' says he, 'ordinarily infect 'innocent things which they are joined with. And the very sight of a cup, wherein any one uses to take 'nauseous physic, turns his stomach; so that nothing will ' relish well out of it, though the cup be ever so clean and well-shaped, and of the richest materials.'

Permit me, dear sir, to add, that Mr. Locke proceeds to explain himself still more rigorously on the subject of rewards; which I quote to show I have not misunderstood him: But these enjoyments,' says he, 'should never be 'offered or bestowed on children, as the rewards of this or 'that particular performance that they show an aversion 'to, or to which they would not have applied themselves 'without that temptation.' If, my dear Mr. B—, the minds of children can be led on by innocent inducements to the performance of a duty of which they are capable, what I have humbly offered is enough, I presume, to convince one that it may be done. But if ever a particular study be proposed to be mastered, or a bias to be overcome (that is not an indispensable requisite to his future life or morals), to which the child shows an aversion, I would not, methinks, have him be too much tempted, or compelled to conquer or subdue it, especially if it appear to be a natural or riveted aversion.

For, sir, permit me to observe that the education and studies of children ought, as much as possible, to be suited to their capacities and inclinations. And by this means we may expect to have always useful, and often great men, in different professions: for that genius which does not prompt to the prosecution of one study, may shine in another no less necessary part of science. But if the promise of innocent rewards would conquer this aversion, yet they should not be applied with this view; for the best consequence that can be hoped for, will be tolerable skill in one thing, instead of most excellent in another.

Nevertheless, I must repeat, that if, as the child grows up, and is capable of so much reason, that, from the love of the inducement, one can raise his mind to the love of the duty, it should be done by all means. But, my dear Mr. B I am afraid that that parent or tutor will meet but with little success, who, in a child's tender years, shall refuse to comply with its foibles, till he sees it values its duty, and the pleasure of obeying its commands, beyond the little enjoyment on which its heart is fixed. For, as I

humbly conceive, that mind, which can be brought to prefer its duty to its appetites, will want little of the perfection of the wisest philosophers.

Besides, sir, permit me to say that I am afraid this perpetual opposition between the passions of the child, and the duty to be enforced, especially when it sees how other children are indulged (for, if this regimen could be observed by any, it would be impossible it should become general, while the fond and the inconsiderate parents are so large a part of mankind), will cow and dispirit a child; and will perhaps produce a necessity of making use of severity to subdue him to this temper of self-denial; for if the child refuses, the parent must insist; and what will be the consequence?-Must it not introduce a harsher discipline than this gentleman allows of?-and which, I presume to say, did never yet do good to any but to slavish and base spirits, if to them: a discipline which Mr. Locke everywhere justly condemns.

See here, dear sir, a specimen of the presumption of your girl What will she come to in time? you will perhaps say her next step will be to arraign myself. -No, no, dear sir, don't think so: for my duty, my love, and my reverence, shall be your guards, and defend you from everything saucy in me, but the bold approaches of my gratitude, which shall always testify for me, how much I am

Your obliged and dutiful
P. B-