cannot be spoken of as "playing fast and loose," may they not fitly be styled as being at once "fast and loose;" "bond and free;" or, as the

phrase goes, "free and easy;" and, of course, in

this and in other cases, some freer and easier than others?

Now, while it may at all times be justly said, in the words of Paul, "why is my liberty-my Christian liberty-judged by another man's conscience;" and also, why is another man's liberty judged by my conscience, may we not ask, was the expediency of Paul of the preceding nature? While he thought it expedient that he should not act in a certain way, so as to discountenance idolatrous customs, did he also think it expedient that his brethren in the Lord should act in a different way in regard to these same customs-although he left them free to judge for themselves? Was this the nature of his expediency, when, in regard to meat offered to idols, he said, “if meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh-no such flesh, at least -while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend?" Or, while he asserted his own Christian liberty in "having power to eat and to drink," and yet acted strietly on expediency in abstaining from meat offered to idols, and also, it may be, from wine, did he provide for

others, or present to others, the means by which they might act differently from himself, either in private or public? Or, when he did not regard the not taking of certain meat and drink any want of Christian courtesy and Christian love towards his professing Christian brethren, did he, in the exigencies of these times, consider the not giving of certain kinds of meat and drink any violation of the rites of "hospitality," or inconsistent with Christian "courteousness," when these things were likely to prove a stumbling-block to weak brethren, or an occasion of sin? In other words, while he did not deny the Christian liberty of others, or attempt to coerce them, did he surrender to others the keeping of his own conscience; or, on their account, did he, in any sense, sacrifice his principle of expediency? On the contrary, did he not say for himself, "all things are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient; all things are lawful for me, but all things edify not?" In regard, also, to others in these times of abounding idolatrous customs, while he said, "if any of them that believe not bid you to a feast, and ye be disposed to go, whatsoever is set before you eat, asking no question, for conscience' sake;" did he not add, "but if any man-any of the guests -say unto you," as to any thing on the table,

"this is offered to idols"in such circumstances, what was to be done?" eat not ;" and why?"for his sake that showed it," or pointed this out to you, "and for conscience' sake; conscience, I say, not thine own, but of the other."

Here, indeed, Paul first says, "whatsoever is set before you eat." But, this was to be done when no observation was made as to the idolatrous customs of the day in connection with the meat presented, as well as when no conscientious scruple was entertained by any of the company. In such circumstances, as all true believers, as well as Paul, knew that "an idol was nothing," and that "to the pure all things were pure," they could freely partake of what was placed before them; and the more so, as the quality of the food, although it had been offered to an idol, was not changed; but especially, because its nature was such that it could not readily prove injurious. However, had the question then been as to intoxicating drink, and particularly such drink as is common in our country, we have no authority to suppose, that Paul, in these circumstances, would have said, "drink what is set before you," unless it had been medicinally needed. We are rather warranted to conclude that he would have said, what he elsewhere does, "it is good neither to eat flesh,

nor drink wine, nor any thing, whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak." And why?-because the nature of intoxicating drink is altogether different from meat; and not only in its essence, but in its effects. Or, in the words of another, “the Apostle says, 'eat,' not 'drink;' and the principle will not authorize us to drink whatsoever is set before us, asking no questions for conscience' sake. For, while it was a matter of indifference in regard to eating, whether the meat had been sacrificed to idols or not, it is not a matter of indifference whether a man may drink intoxicating liquor. That is a point on which the conscience should have much to do; and on which its honest decisions, and the will of the Lord, should be faithfully and honestly regarded." The point, however, now before us chiefly is should those, who, on the principle of expediency, abstain from intoxicating drink, set that drink before others, otherwise than medicinally? Is it expedient for them not to take that drink themselves, and yet expedient for them to give it to others? If so, is not such expediency a strange thing, passing strange; quite a Proteus; a perfect Chameleon?

But further, agreeably to the letter, as well as the spirit, of what has now been stated, Paul

says in the same passage,

"eat not."

This, again, is to be done when the meat presented is spoken of as that which has been offered to idols; when conscientious scruples are entertained; and when sin is likely to follow. So far, therefore, from encouraging professing believers, in any manner, to identify themselves with the idolatrous customs of these days, he calls upon them, not on their account, but from a regard to others, to abstain from these customs. Consequently, the express precept of Paul, as well as the implied principle of his reasoning, is evidently in favour of not presenting to others the things from which we ourselves deem it expedient to abstain; and much more, in favour of not purveying for them these things.

Thus, it clearly appears, that, as to these idolatrous customs, Paul not only intended that the expediency principle should be acted upon by others, as well as himself; but that he did not set himself against himself, or neutralize his conduct, by furnishing to others that from which he abstained. In short, while he was "all things to all men" in things indifferent, so that, in his burning zeal for souls, "he might by all means save some," when he adopted the principle of expediency, we have no