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appearance here, strongly recommended, 'tis said, by one of our delegates now with you, - Braxton. His reasonings upon and distinction between private and public virtue, are weak, shallow, evasive, and the whole performance an affront and disgrace to this country; and, by one expression, I suspect his whiggism.1

Our session will be very long, during which I cannot count upon one coadjutor of talents equal to the task. Would to God you and your Sam Adams were here! It shall be my incessant study, so to form our portrait of government, that a kindred with New England may be discerned in it; and if all your excellencies cannot be preserved, yet I hope to retain so much of the likeness, that posterity shall pronounce us descended from the same stock. I shall think perfection is obtained, if we have your approbation. I am forced to conclude; but first, let me beg to be presented to my ever-esteemed S. Adams. Adieu, my dear sir; may God preserve you, and give you every good thing.

P.S. - Will you and S. A. now and then write?

P. HENRY, Jr.

1 This refers to a small pamphlet published by Dunlap, at Philadelphia, and evidently designed as an answer to "Thoughts on Government." Its title is" An Address to the Convention of the Colony and Ancient Dominion of Virginia, on the subject of Government in general, and recommending a particular Form to their Consideration, by a Native of that Colony." The name of the writer has not been ascertained. Much interest attached to the proceedings of Virginia in framing a constitution, and an apprehension lest the popular features of the form recommended by Mr. Adams should find favor, seems to have led to this effort to counteract it. The address was reprinted in the Virginia Gazette, at Williamsburgh, on the eighth of June, 1776, being the time fixed for the consideration of the declaration of rights by the Convention. The form recommended is in direct conflict with the first principles laid down in "Thoughts on Government." A governor, during good behavior, elected by a house of representatives, renewed but once in three years; a council of twenty-four persons to serve for life, also chosen by the house; and a judiciary and military appointed by the governor, constitute its main features. It is reprinted in the Great Collection made under the authority of Congress by Mr. Force, fourth series, vol. Ivi. cc. 748-754.

On the other hand, the tendency in Pennsylvania was to consider Mr. Adams's theory as not popular enough. In the Collection alluded to, is to be found a paper entitled, "The Interest of America," the purport of which is to recommend a single legislative branch, in which most of the powers are to be vested; a suggestion which was acted upon, as is well known, in the first constitution of Pennsylvania.

In the month of January, 1776, the delegates of North Carolina were authorized by the colonial legislature, to apply to Mr. Adams for his views of the nature of the government it would be proper to form, in case of a final dissolution of the authority of the Crown. The following letter, addressed to Mr. John Penn, one of the number, was the reply. In many parts it is in the very words of the preceding pamphlet, whilst in others it so essentially amplifies the views, as to render its insertion necessary to the full comprehension of the system of the author.

No copy of this letter was retained by Mr. Adams. It was not printed until 1814, when Mr. John Taylor, of Caroline County, Virginia, to whom it had come from the hands of Mr. Penn, inserted it in his work, entitled " An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United States," from whence it is now taken.

TO JOHΝ ΡΕΝΝ.

IF I was possessed of abilities equal to the great task you have imposed upon me, which is to sketch out the outlines of a constitution for a colony, I should think myself the happiest of men in complying with your desire. Because, as politics is the art of securing human happiness, and the prosperity of societies depends upon the constitution of government under which they live, there cannot be a more agreeable employment to a benevolent mind than the study of the best kinds of government.

It has been the will of Heaven that we should be thrown into existence at a period when the greatest philosophers and lawgivers of antiquity would have wished to live. A period when a coincidence of circumstances without example, has afforded to thirteen Colonies, at once, an opportunity of beginning government anew from the foundation, and building as they choose. How few of the human race have ever had any opportunity of choosing a system of government for themselves and their children! How few have ever had any thing more of choice in government than in climate! These Colonies have now their election; and it is much to be wished that it may not prove to be like a prize in the hands of a man who has no heart to improve it.

In order to determine which is the best form of government, it is necessary to determine what is the end of government. And I suppose, that in this enlightened age, there will be no dispute, in speculation, that the happiness of the people, the great end of man, is the end of government; and, therefore, that form of government which will produce the greatest quantity of happiness is the best.

All sober inquirers after truth, ancient and modern, divines, moralists, and philosophers, have agreed that the happiness of mankind, as well as the real dignity of human nature, consists in virtue; if there is a form of government whose principle and foundation is virtue, will not every wise man acknowledge it more likely to promote the general happiness than any other?

Fear, which is said, by Montesquieu and other political writers, to be the foundation of some governments, is so sordid and brutal a passion, that it cannot possibly be called a principle, and will hardly be thought in America a proper basis of government.

Honor is a principle which ought to be sacred; but the Grecians and Romans, pagan as well as Christian, will inform us that honor, at most, is but a part of virtue, and therefore a feeble basis of government.

A man must be indifferent to sneer and ridicule, in some companies, to mention the names of Sidney, Harrington, Locke, Milton, Nedham, Neville, Burnet, Hoadly; for the lines of John Milton, in one of his sonnets, will bear an application, even in this country, upon some occasions:

"I did but prompt the age to quit their clogs
By the known rules of ancient liberty,
When straight a barbarous noise environs me,
Of owls and cuckoos, asses, apes, and dogs."

These great writers, however, will convince any man who has the fortitude to read them, that all good government is republican; that the only valuable part of the British constitution is so; for the true idea of a republic is an empire of laws, and not of men; and, therefore, as a republic is the best of governments, so that particular combination of power which is best contrived for a faithful execution of the laws, is the best of republics.

There is a great variety of republics, because the arrangements of the forms of society are capable of many variations. As a good government is an empire of laws, the first question is, how shall the laws be made?

In a community consisting of large numbers, inhabiting an extensive country, it is not possible that the whole should assemble to make laws. The most natural substitute for an assembly of the whole, is a delegation of power from the many to a few of the most wise and virtuous. In the first place, then, establish rules for the choice of representatives; agree upon the number of persons who shall have the privilege of choosing one. As the representative assembly should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason, and act like them, great care should be taken in the formation of it, to prevent unfair, partial, and corrupt elections. That it may be the interest of this assembly to do equal right and strict justice, upon all occasions, it should be an equal representation of their constituents; or, in other words, equal interests among the people should have equal interests in the representative body.

That the representatives may often mix with their constituents, and frequently render them an account of their stewardship, elections ought to be frequent :

"Like bubbles on the sea of matter borne,

They rise, they break, and to that sea return."

These elections may be septennial or triennial; but, for my own part, I think they ought to be annual; for there is not in all science a maxim more infallible than this, where annual elections end, there slavery begins.

But all necessary regulations for the method of constituting this assembly may be better made in times of more quiet than the present, and they will suggest themselves naturally, when the powers of government shall be in the hands of the people's friends. For the present, it will be safest to go on in the usual way.

But we have as yet advanced only one step in the formation of a government. Having obtained a representative assembly, what is to be done next? Shall we leave all the powers of government to this assembly? Shall they make, and execute, and interpret laws too? I answer, No; a people cannot be long free, and never can be happy, whose laws are made, executed, and interpreted by one assembly. My reasons for this opinion are these:

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A single assembly is liable to all the vices, follies, and frailties of an individual; subject to fits of humor, transports of passion, partialities of prejudice; and, from these and other causes, apt to make hasty results and absurd judgments; all which errors ought to be corrected, and inconveniences guarded against, by some controlling power.

A single assembly is apt to grow avaricious, and in time would not scruple to exempt itself from burdens, which it would lay upon its constituents without sympathy.

A single assembly will become ambitious, and after some time will vote itself perpetual. This was found in the case of the Long Parliament; but more remarkably in the case of Holland, whose assembly first voted that they should hold their seats for seven years, then for life, and after some time, that they would fill up vacancies as they should happen, without applying to their constituents at all.

The executive power cannot be well managed by a representative assembly for want of two essential qualities, secrecy and despatch.

Such an assembly is still less qualified to exercise the judicial power; because it is too numerous, too slow, and generally too little skilled in the laws.

But shall the whole legislative power be left in the hands of such an assembly? The three first, at least, of the foregoing reasons will show that the legislative power ought not to be wholly entrusted to one assembly.

Let the representative body, then, elect from among themselves, or their constituents, or both, a distinct assembly, which we will call a council. It may consist of any number you please, say, twenty or thirty. To this assembly should be given a free and independent exercise of its judgment upon all acts of legislation, that it may be able to check and arrest the errors of the other.

But there ought to be a third branch of the legislature; and wherever the executive power of the state is placed, there the third branch of the legislature ought to be found.

Let the two houses, then, by joint ballot, choose a governor. Let him be chosen annually. Divest him of most of those badges of slavery called prerogatives, and give him a negative upon the legislature. This, I know, is liable to some objections, to obvi

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