we also maintain that they are most inconsistent and most unjustifiable in declining to do an admitted duty. The tendency of the doctrine of instruction must now appear to be, even in its most qualified forms, that of degrading a legislative assembly. It is not easy to see why men of ability should wish to sit in a body upon which eloquence and argument are wasted; where they can not expect to persuade and ought not them selves to be persuaded. Upright men, again, will not be returned, if they hold the principle for which we have been contending. There remain then only the second rate politicians, with a part of the weaker sort of honest men, to compose a house, the proceedings of which may affect the civil interests of millions and the relations of a country to the world beside. And is this the place from which intelligence or uprightness ought to be driven? Such a body would not probably long have the power to do great good or evil. There is an inconsistency between its capacity and the constitutional powers left to it, which would make itself felt. Or penalties might reasonably come in to prevent disobedience to instructions; for surely the judge is no more justly impeached and punished for a breach of his main duty, to decide according to law, than the representative would be for violating his chief obligation to express by his vote the popular will for the present time. And, with this, clear specific instructions must be written out to guide the whole course of the representative. He certainly would have a right to demand them, lest he might be punished for mistakes as if they were misdemeanors. Freighted with documents which revealed to him his duty, his great aim would be to make himself master of their contents; and if doubts or new cases arose, the constituents must again be consulted and relieve him from his embarrassment. If he venture to sug

gest views which they oppose, or argue with them in his communications, they will suspect him of a disobedient spirit, and perhaps remove him to put a more pliant man in his place. Thus the few honest men that might remain in such an assembly would leave it, and be succeeded by those who would not dare to rebuke or give advice, who would sit quiet spectators of the mistakes of their employers, anxious only to avoid their wrath. It would be idle to speculate upon the ultimate effect on political institutions, when this principle had had its perfect work: the probability is that a new wheel would be added to the machine, rendering it only more complex; that a body constituting itself the people's representatives, would meet in caucus to decide what measures the people should approve and what condemn; and that thus, in the place of one body gathered in the center with the ability to compare and adjust the interests of the whole nation, would arise in every quarter knots of local politicians, who, if honest, could not have looked beyond the bounds of their own horizons.

And how widely do the two theories separate from one another, when viewed with reference to a whole country. To the man who feels bound to pursue the public good, it is no matter who elects him; he feels that his duties have a permanent form. It is the same to him, whether he is chosen by a district or by a general ticket, or whether the whole union should choose all its representatives in a body. In all cases, he regards himself as the representative of the whole nation; appointed indeed to take care of the interests of a certain section, but still bound-as the section itself is bound-to make those interests yield to more important ones, when they are inconsistent. He perceives that in his person and that of his fellow representatives, the country virtually meets together;

that there is no other place where the interests of all can be compared and adjusted; and that to make so sacred a body, created to promote the common good, powerless it may be in that respect, and only powerful to carry out the selfish plans of a petty district, is to poison legislation at its source. This being his temper, his ear is not closed to any suggestions that may come from any quarter, east, west, or south; and as his pledge is not given to oppose the best measures, he can view every proposition with candor and accept of it freely. The people too, feeling that this is the aim of legislation, will select men who can best secure the public weal, men who have looked abroad over the whole of the country, who understand every interest, and most clearly those of their constituents. They will be confident that such men will not deceive them, nor basely sacrifice their substantial wel fare. And they will soon find out that the good of all the parts is so linked together, that their representative, who seeks that good and secures it, will secure their own.

But upon the other theory, unless the interests of all the districts shall be seen obviously to coincide, there can be no broad or generous legis lation. Until the selfish interests of the parts, by some magical system of balances, shall turn into the good of the whole; until then will a country under such lawgivers, fail of prosperity and true progress. A kind of feudal principle will prevail over the principles of free republics, to keep the parts in a state of isolation, and split that into fragments whose excellence consists in being undivided. The nearest approach to an enlarged system possible under such a theory, is that of log-rolling, as it is significantly called; which has tended to burden some of the United States with use less public works, ruinous expenses, and disgrace; or the still worse

system of parties as at present carried out in practice; under which the majority who choose the representative, are his only constituents; the party arrange the measures for the state or country; the members of the party in the district are dragged into those measures by force; and the representative himself is like the men in some armies, who are chained together to fight for their masters.

Nor is it of any use to say, that by the doctrine of instruction you obtain representatives who will not be faithless to the interests of their constituents. For whether they are pledged or not, the fact still continues the same, that they can vote on which side they please, and under the influence of any kind of motives. The impulse to follow the wishes of one's constituents, is surely stronger in ordinary cases than any other; and many a man, who has discarded the doctrines of obedience to them, has obeyed them in practice even against the convic tions of his own judgment. The possibility now remains on the one hand, that men professing to have the highest interests of the whole country in view, will act from base motives, when they disregard the interests of their constituents; and on the other, that men who promise to mind their constituents in all things, will desert their cause for the sake of filthy lucre or of office. If what we have said above is true respecting the kind of representatives which the two theories in question would bring into legislative assemblies, there can not be much doubt on which side the greater evil would lie.

The principle which we have been advocating, but not the opposite one, can be reconciled with the provis ions of the Constitution. This in strument does not indeed, in express words, set forth the relation which it regards the representative as holding. Our argument from it can only

reach the point of showing, that the practice of obedience to constituents tends to results certainly not looked for by the constitution, and is opposed to its spirit, so far as can be argued from the analogies of other provisions. We will give the considerations which have occurred to us, without much regard to order. It is expressly provided, that the members of neither house shall be questioned in any other place for any speech or debate. (Art. I, sect. 6.) But if so plain a thing as obedience to the express will of constituents is a duty, resulting from the only true theory of government, the opposite is a crime and ought to be punished as such by statutes, and not, as now, simply by the loss of public favor. Such a course tends too, to change the term of office allowed under the constitution. And this it does the more effectually, because the same reason which requires obedience from the representative during his office, will more imperatively call on him to lay down his office if the people of his district should so wish. And hence, every oscillation of the majority, every change of a few voices, which in these days, like the clouds, are banked up and scattered by alternate blasts of wind, must require a resignation and a new election. The constitution again allows the two houses to place themselves in a situation where they can neither consult or guess at the will of the people, by permitting secret ses sions and the suppression of such parts of their journals, as in their judgments may require secrecy. (Art. I, sect. 5.) Why should it increase or even make insurmountable, the difficulty of finding out that, upon which the duties of legislators depend? It gives Congress also the power to "provide for the general welfare of the United States," (Art. I, 8,) within certain limits, which it attempts distinctly to mark out. May it not be fairly Vol. I.

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argued, that they who receive such a power become obligated to use it; that, as it requires the highest judg ment and oftentimes a disregard of local interests, they are bound to act accordingly? And which is most consistent with the spirit of an instrument which was framed for union and for the general welfare, to keep that welfare in view as the most important thing in every vote, or to keep it in view only when the selfish wishes of the parts do not oppose? Our position again receives some support, from the discretionary and advisory power of the President. This officer being chosen by a majority of the people, is bound according to the principles of the doctrine of instruction, so far as his relations to legislation are concerned,* equally with the representatives, to obey the voice of the people in every measure. But when he is required "to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient," it is no doubt presumed, that he will afterwards also judge concerning the necessity and expediency of measures, when they are presented to him for his sanction; that is, that he will accept or reject them, as he shall think the public good demands. (Art. I, sect. 7.) And so much weight is given to his objections, that he has the questionable power of impeding legislation by his veto; nay, in most cases, of preventing it altogether.

We believe that this principle is distinctly recognized in the constitutions of some of the states, but we have no leisure to enquire whether this is really the case. It is rather amusing, that when one party in one of the houses of the legislature

of Georgia was lately endeavoring to instruct one of the state senators in Congress out of his seat, and the minority seceded so as to prevent a quorum, the seceding members were charged with a breach of their oath, which required them on all questions and measures, so to give their vote and conduct themselves, as should in their judgment appear most conducive to the interest and prosperity of the state. A very

proper oath, and one which originated in a clear perception of the principles which ought to govern the representative. But if the oath. was founded in reason and was taken merely to confirm a previous duty, was not their senator also in a very similar relation, and had he not like duties? Nay, does not every consideration subordinate to the main one of the principle, which is the same in both cases, press with far greater weight on the senator in Congress, than on the representative in the state legislature? And yet-such is the effect of politicians giving in to false principles-these very men, who call a representative at home perjured for not voting as his judgment dictates, call the representative in the senate of the United States all but a knave, for doing just the contrary.

We will add but one thought more, and that is, that the doctrine of instruction tends to prevent one of the chief good results of the representative system. The main uses of this system which now occur to us, are the following: 1. It tends to equalize the parts of a country, and to enlarge the borders of freedom. When the assembly was composed of all the citizens, those on the outskirts could not attend to their civil duties with the same regularity as the inhabitants of the center. Hence, a central power would arise, into whose hands the management of the state would fall, while the borderers would suffer a loss of their civil rights. But the

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system of representation renders perfect equality possible, over an unlimited extent of country. It is also, almost essential to free insti tutions, when they are brought into contact with despotism. For as long as free states could not grow beyond the limits of vicinity to some capital, while despotism could enclose any bounds whatsoever, the contest between the two principles was unequal. 2. It tends to check the occasional excesses of freedom, and to promote that control of rea son in government, without which government becomes an evil. volume of illustrations of this remark, might be drawn from the history of unrepresented democracies. But it is presumed that they will not be needed by those who know by what means great crowds are often swayed, and with what speed feeling passes from man to man, increasing as it goes, until it may rise to phrenzy. Of this, Athens, the freest among the ancient states, was well aware; the citizens of that fierce democratie,' in order to check themselves, prevented the passage of laws, properly so called, in the ordinary assemblies of the people; and required that every bill should have been previously subjected to the debates of the

senate.

Now it is this last object of a representative government, which the doctrine of instruction defeats. It creeps into the legislature, carrying there every prejudice which should have died in its native soil, every partial view which the reason of the whole community, if it could have been collected together, would have discarded. The fortress which reason the reason of a peoplebuilt for itself, is seized upon by discordant passions. Every agitation of the mass is perpetuated, and they who were withdrawn from home that they might deliberate in quiet, are put into a great whispering gallery, where the multitude of

noises deafen the ear and drive reason from its seat.

And as if this were not enough, this doctrine gives birth to a class of politicians, who, incompetent to represent the reason of a country, strive to gain favor by feeding every wish of a people or a party, without regard to the highest good. This, if the scene were transferred to the breast of a single man, if in him the gratification of desire unregulated by reason carried the day, we should call criminal and ruinous. What is there to alter its character, when it takes place throughout a country. The habit once begun, grows fast, and is not soon laid aside. Arbitrary will becomes every

thing; it absorbs all the juices, so to speak, of the political body, until reason and conscience are obliterated and disappear. A nation under such politicians resembles the geese of Strasburg, which are kept before a fire until their livers acquire an enormous size for the sake of the epicures of Paris. And to whose benefit does this turn? To that of the politicians. For, as they are well aware, a master-calling himself a servant, perhaps will become necessary to men who are guided by passion and ignorance, to men who think that the rule and end of government should be to have their wishes fulfilled, and not the true interests of the whole body promoted.

MR. DOWNING has published two works of late, the titles of which may be found below, both of a character novel to the reading public. True our professional architects had books, full of designs, from those of Inigo Jones to that of Mr. Upjohn; and our head-mechanics have long been beholden to letter-press and printed diagrams for the perfecting of their homely 'elevations.' The reading world, however, save some few over-curious ones, seem to have regarded such works as the tools of the trade, with which they had little or nothing to do. But we have here, volumes bound for the library or the boudoir, teaching, in quite intelligible terms, of mullions, and tracery, and peaked gables, and terraces, and fountains, &c. Not intended, either, is this last volume before us,

as a closet counselor for contractors, but to render "in some degree conversant with domestic architecture, every one who lives in the country, and in a country house.” Quisque sui domi faber-every man his own carpenter, would seem to be its motto. But perhaps we wrong Mr. Downing in supposing that he would make his readers so far acquainted with architectural details as to supersede the necessity of employing an architect; since he has politely furnished in one of his closing pages a 66 general list of professional terms."

But if not to make his readers their own builders, why are they taught of the 'bracketted mode' and of pilasters, that the minaret belongs to the Saracenic and the turret to the Tudor style? Mr. D. is ready with an answer: "He wishes to inspire in the minds of his readers and countrymen, more lively perceptions of the BEAUTIFUL, in every thing that relates to their houses and grounds." He wishes