to express by the terms putting together and separating. But this action of the mind, which is so familiar to every thinking and reasoning man, is easier to be con ceived by reflecting on what passes in us when we affirm or deny, than to be explained by words. When a man has in his head the idea of two lines, viz. the side and diagonal of a square, whereof the diagonal is an inch long, he may have the idea also of the division of that line into a certain number of equal parts; v. g, into five, ten, an hundred, a thousand, or any other number, and may have the idea of that inch line being divisible, or not divisible, into such equal parts, as a certain number of them will be equal to the side-line. Now whenever he perceives, believes, or supposes such a kind of divisibility to agree or disagree to his idea of that line, he, as it were, joins or separates those two ideas, viz. the idea of that line, and the idea of that kind of divisibi lity; and so makes a mental proposition, which is true or false, according as such a kind of divisibility, a divisibility into such aliquot parts, does really agree to that line or no. When ideas are so put together, or sepa rated in the mind, as they or the things they stand for do agree or not, that is, as I may call it, mental truth. But truth of words is something more; and that is the affiming or denying of words one of another, as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree: and this again is twofold; either purely verbal and trifling, which I shall speak of, chap. viii. or real and instructive, which is the object of that real knowledge which we have spoken of already. Objection against ver

bal truth.

§. 7. But here again will be apt to occur the same doubt about truth, that did about knowledge and it will be objected, that that thus it if truth be nothing but the joining and sepamay all be chimerical. rating of words in propositions, as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree in men's minds, the knowledge of truth is not so valuable a thing, as it is taken to be, nor worth the pains and time men employ in the search of it; since by this account it amounts to no, more than the conformity of words to

the chimeras of men's brains. Who knows not what odd notions many men's heads are filled with, and what strange ideas all men's brains are capable of? But if we rest here, we know the truth of nothing by this rule, but of the visionary words in our own imaginations; nor have other truth, but what as much concerns harpies and centaurs, as men and horses. For those, and the like, may be ideas. in our heads, and have their agreement and disagreement there, as well as the ideas of real beings, and so have as true propositions made about them, And it will be altogether as true a proposition to say all centaurs are animals, as that all men are animals; and the certainty of one as great as the other. For in both the propositions, the words are put together ac cording to the agreement of the ideas in our minds; and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur is as clear and visible to the mind, as the agree ment of the idea of animal with that of man; and so these two propositions are equally true, equally certain. But of what use is all such truth to us?

§. 8. Though what has been said in the Answered, foregoing chapter, to distinguish real from real truth is imaginary knowledge, might suffice here, about ideas in answer to this doubt, to distinguish real agreeing to truth from chimerical, or (if you please) things. barely nominal, they depending both on the same foundation; yet it may not be amiss here again to consi der, that though our words signify nothing but our ideas, yet being designed by them to signify things, the truth they contain when put into propositions, will be only verbal, when they stand for ideas in the mind, that have not an agreement with the reality of things. And therefore truth, as well as knowledge, may well come under the distinction of verbal and real; that being only verbal truth, wherein terms are joined according to the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for, without regarding whether our ideas are such as really have, or are capable of having an existence in nature. But then it is they contain real truth, when these signs are joined, as our ideas agree; and when

our ideas are such as we know are capable of having an existence in nature: which in substances we cannot know, but by knowing that such have existed.

Falsehood is

of names otherwise than their ideas agree.

§. 9. Truth is the marking down in words the joining the agreement or disagreement of ideas as it is. Falsehood is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas otherwise than it is. And so far as these ideas, thus marked by sounds, agree to their archetypes, so far only is the truth real. The knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what ideas the words stand for, and the perception of the agreement or disagreement of those ideas, according as it is marked by those words.

more at

large.

Generalpro- §. 10. But because words are looked on positions to as the great conduits of truth and knowbe treated of ledge, and that in conveying and receiving of truth, and commonly in reasoning about it, we make use of words and propositions ; I shall more at large inquire, wherein the certainty of real truths, contained in propositions, consists, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to show in what sort of universal propositions we are capable of being certain of their real truth or falsehood.

I shall begin with general propositions, as those which most employ our thoughts, and exercise our contemplation. General truths are most looked after by the mind, as those that most enlarge our knowledge; and by their comprehensiveness, satisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our view, and shorten our way to knowledge.

Moral and §. 11. Besides truth taken in the strict metaphysi- sense before mentioned, there are other sorts cal truth. of truth; as, 1. Moral truth; which is speaking of things according to the persuasion of our own minds, though the proposition we speak agree not to the reality of things. 2. Metaphysical truth, which is nothing but the real existence of things, conformable to the ideas to which we have annexed their names. This, though it seems to consist in the very beings of things,

yet, when considered a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit proposition, whereby the mind joins that particular thing to the idea it had before settled with a name to it. But these considerations of truth, either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our present purpose, it may suffice here only to have mentioned them.

CHAP. VI.

Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.

§. 1. THOUGH the examining and judg- Treating of ing of ideas by themselves, their names be- words ne ing quite laid aside, be the best and surest cessary to knowledge. way to clear and distinct knowledge; yet through the prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas, I think it is very seldom practised. Every one may observe how common it is for names to be made use of, instead of the ideas themselves, even when men think and reason within their own breasts; especially if the ideas be very complex, and made up of a great collection of simple ones. This makes the consideration of words and propositions so necessary a part of the treatise of knowledge, that it is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other.

butin verbal

§. 2. All the knowledge we have, being General only of particular or general truths, it is truths hard evident, that whatever may be done in the ly to be unformer of these, the latter, which is that derstood, which with reason is most sought after, can propositions. never be well made known, and is very sel dom apprehended, but as conceived and expressed in words. It is not therefore out of our way, in the exa mination of our knowledge, to inquire into the truth and certainty of universal propositions,

Certainty §. 3. But that we may not be misled in two-fold, of this case, by that which is the danger every truth, and of where, I mean by the doubtfulness of terms, knowledge. it is fit to observe, that certainty is twofold; certainty of truth, and certainty of knowledge. Certainty of truth is, when words are so put together in propositions as exactly to express the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for, as really it is. Certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas, as expressed in any proposition. This we usually call knowing, or being certain of the truth of any proposition.

No proposition can be known to be true, where the essence of

each species mentioned is

not known.

§. 4. Now because we cannot be certain of the truth of any general proposition, unless we know the precise bounds and extent of the species its terms stand for, it is necessary we should know the essence of each species, which is that which constitutes and bounds it. This, in all simple ideas and modes, is not hard to do. For in these, the real and nominal essence being the same; or, which is all one, the abstract idea which the general term stands for, being the sole essence and boundary that is or can be supposed of the species; there can be no doubt, how far the species extends, or what things are comprehended under each term which, it is evident, are all that have an exact conformity with the idea it stands for, and no other. But in substances wherein a real essence distinct from the nominal is supposed to constitute, determine, and bound the species, the extent of the general word is very uncertain: because not knowing this real essence, we cannot know what is, or what is not of that species; and consequently what may, or may not with certainty be affirmed of it. And thus speaking of a man, or gold, or any other species of natural substances, as supposed constituted by a precise and real essence, which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind, whereby it is made to be of that species, we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation made of it. For man, or gold, taken in this sense, and used