SECT.

CHAP. V.

Of truth in general.

1. What truth is.

2. A right joining, or sepa-

rating of signs, i. e. ideas

or words.

3. Which make mental, or

verbal propositions.

4. Mental propositions are

very hard to be treated of.

5. Being nothing but joining,

or separating ideas, with-

out words.

6. When mental propositions

contain real truth, and

when verbal.

7. Objection against verbal

truth, that thus it may be

all chimerical.

8. Answered, real truth is

about ideas agreeing to

things.

9. Falsehood is the joining of

names, otherwise than

their ideas agree.

10. General propositions to be

treated of more at large.

11. Moral and metaphysical

truth.

2. General truths hardly to

be understood, but in ver-

bal propositions.

3. Certainty two-fold, of

truth, and of knowledge.

4. No proposition can be

known to be true, where

the essence of each species

mentioned, is not known.
5. This more particularly

concerns substances.

6. The truth of few universal

propositions concerning

substances, is to be known.

7. Because, co-existence of

ideas in few cases is to be

known.

8, 9. Instance in gold.

10. As far as any such co-ex-

istence can be known, so

far universal propositions

may be certain. But this

will go but a little way,

because,

11, 12. The qualities, which make

our complex ideas of sub-

stances, depend mostly on

external, remote, and un-

perceived causes.

13. Judgment may reach far-

ther, but tha tis not know-

ledge.

14. What is requisite for our
knowledge of substances.
15. Whilst our ideas of sub-
stances contain not their
real constitutions, we can
make but few general,

1. They are self-evident.

2. Wherein that self-evidence

consists.

3. Self-evidence not peculiar

to received axioms.

4. First, as to identity and

diversity, all propositions

are equally self-evident.

5. Secondly, in co-existence,

we have few self-evident

propositions.

6. Thirdly, in other relations

we may have.

7. Fourthly, concerning real

existence, we have none.

8. These axioms do not much

influence our other know-

ledge.

9. Because they are not the

truths the first known.

10. Because on them the other

parts of our knowledge

do not depend.

11. What use these general

maxims have.

12. Maxims, if care be not

taken in the use of words,

may prove contradictions.

13: Instance in vacuum.

14. They prove not the exist-

ence of things without us.

15. Their application danger-

ous about complex ideas.

16-18. Instance in man.

19. Little use of these maxims,

in proofs, where we have

clear and distinct ideas.

20. Their use dangerous,

where our ideas are con-

fused.

CHAP. VIII.

Of trifling propositions.

SECT.

1. Some propositions bring

no increase to our know-

ledge.

2, 3. As, first, identical propo-
sitions.

4. Secondly, when a part of

any complex idea is pre-
dicated of the whole.

5. As part of the definition

of the term defined.
6. Instance, man and palfry.

7. For this teaches but the
signification of words.

8. But no real knowledge.

9. General propositions, con-

cerning substances, are

often trifling.

10. And why.

11. Thirdly, using words va-

riously, is trifling with

them.

12, Marks of verbal proposi-

tions. First, predication

in abstract.

13. Secondly, a part of the

definition, predicated of

any term.

CHAP. IX.*

Of our knowledge of existence,

SECT.

1. General, certain proposi-

tions concern not exist-

ence.

2. A threefold knowledge of

existence.

3. Our knowledge of our own

existence, is intuitive.

CHAP. X.

Of the existence of a God.

SECT.

1. We are capable of know-

ing certainly that there is

a God.

2. Man knows that he him-

self is.

3. He knows also, that no-

thing cannot produce a

being, therefore

thing eternal.

some-

4. That eternal being must

be most powerful.

5. And most knowing.

6. And therefore God.

7. Our idea of a most perfect

being, not the sole proof

of a God.

8. Something from eternity.

9. Two sorts of beings, co-

gitative and incogitative.

10. Incogitative being cannot

produce a cogitative.

11, 12. Therefore there has been

an eternal wisdom.

13. Whether material, or no.

14. Not material, first, be-

cause every particle of

matter is not cogitative.

15. Secondly, one particle

alone of matter cannot be

cogitative.

16. Thirdly, a system of in-

cogitative matter cannot

be cogitative.

17. Whether in motion or at

rest.

18, 19. Matter not co-eternalwith

an eternal mind.

CHAP. XI.

Of the knowledge of the existence

of other things.

SECT.

1. Is to be had only by sen-
sation.

2. Instance, whiteness of this

paper.

3. This, though not so cer-

tain as demonstration, yet

may be called knowledge,

and

proves the existence

of things without us.

4. First, because we cannot

have them but by the in-

lets of the senses.

5. Secondly, because an idea

from actual sensation, and

another from memory, are

very distinct perceptions.

6. Thirdly, pleasure or pain,

which accompanies actual

sensation, accompanies not

the returning of those

ideas, without the external

objects.

7. Fourthly, our senses assist

one another's testimony of

the existence of outward

things.

8. This certainty is as great

as our condition needs.

9. But reaches no farther

than actual sensation:

10. Folly to expect demon-
stration in every thing.

11. Past existence is known

by memory.

12. The existence of spirits

not knowable.

13. Particular propositions con-

cerning existence

knowable.

are

14. And general propositions

concerning abstract ideas,

CHAP. XII.

Of the improvement of our

knowledge.

SECT.

1. Knowledge is not from

maxims.

2. (The occasion of that opi-

nion.)

3. But from the comparing

clear and distinct ideas.

4. Dangerous to build upon

precarious principles.

5. This no certain way to

truth.

6. But to compare clear,
complete ideas under stea-
dy names.

1. Probability is the appear-

ance of agreement, upon

fallible proofs.

2. It is to supply the want

of knowledge.

3. Being that, which makes

us presume things to be

true, before we know

them to be so.

4. The grounds of probabi-

lity are two; conformity
with our own experience,

or the testimony of others

experience.

5. In this all the arguments,

pro and con, ought to be

examined,before we come

to a judgment.

6. They being capable of

great variety.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the degrees of assent.
SECT.

1. Our assent ought to be
regulated by the grounds

of probability.

2. These cannot be always

actually in view, and then

we must content ourselves

with the remembrance,
that we once saw ground

for such a degree of as-

sent.

3. The ill consequence of

this, if our former judg-

ment were not rightly

made.

4. The right use of it, is

mutual charity and for-
bearance.