14. What passions all men have.

15, 16. Pleasure and pain, what.

17. Shame.

18. These instances do show how our ideas of the passions are got from sensation and reflection.

SECT.

CHAPTER XXI.

1. This idea how got.

OF POWER.

2. Power active and passive.

3. Power includes relation.

4. The clearest idea of active power had from spirit.

5. Will and understanding, two powers.

6. Faculties.

7. Whence the ideas of liberty and necessity.

8. Liberty, what.

9. Supposes understanding and will.

10. Belongs not to volition.

11. Voluntary opposed to involuntary, not to necessary.
12. Liberty, what.

13. Necessity, what.

14-20. Liberty belongs not to the will.

21. But to the agent or man.

22-24 In respect of willing, a man is not free. 25-27. The will determined by something without it.

28. Volition, what.

29. What determines the will.

30. Will and desire must not be confounded.

31. Uneasiness determines the will.

32. Desire is uneasiness.

33. The uneasiness of desire determines the will.

34. This the spring of action.

35. The greatest positive good determines not the will, but

uneasiness.

36. Because the removal of uneasiness is the first step to

happiness.

37. Because uneasiness alone is present.

38. Because all, who allow the joys of heaven possible, pursue them not. But a great uneasiness is never neglected. 39. Desire accompanies all uneasiness.

40. The most pressing uneasiness naturally determines the will. 41. All desire happiness.

42. Happiness, what.

43. What good is desired, what not.

44. Why the greatest good is not always desired.

45. Why, not being desired, it moves not the will.
46. Due consideration raises desire.

47. The power to suspend the prosecution of any desire, makes way for consideration.

48. To be determined by our own judgment is no restraint to liberty.

49. The freest agents are so determined.

50. A constant determination to a pursuit of happiness no abridgment of liberty.

51. The necessity of pursuing true happiness the foundation of all liberty.

52. The reason of it.

53. Government of our passions the right improvement of

liberty.

54, 55. How men come to pursue

different courses.

56. How men come to choose ill.

57. First, from bodily pains. Secondly, from wrong desires. arising from wrong judgment.

53, 59. Our judgment of present good or evil always right. 60. From a wrong judgment of what makes a necessary part of their happiness.

61, 62. A more particular account of wrong judgments. 63. In comparing present and future.

64, 65. Causes of this.

66. In considering consequences of actions.

67. Causes of this.

68. Wrong judgment of what is necessary to our happiness. 69. We can change the agreeableness or disagreeableness in things.

70. Preference of vice to virtue, a manifest wrong judgment. 71-73. Recapitulation.

3. Sometimes got by the explication of their names.

4. The name ties the parts of the mixed modes into one idea. 5. The cause of making mixed modes.

6. Why words in one language have none answering in another. 7. And languages change.

8. Mixed modes, where they exist.

9. How we get the ideas of mixed modes.

10. Motion, thinking, and power have been most modified.

11. Several words seeming to signify action, signify but the

effect.

12. Mixed modes made also of other ideas.

OF

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

An inquiry into the understanding, pleasant and

useful.

The under

§ 1. SINCE it is the understanding, that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into. standing, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own object. But, whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry; whatever it be, that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves; sure I am, that all the light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage in directing our thoughts in the search of other things.

§ 2. This, therefore, being my purpose; Design. to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion and assent-I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine, wherein its

VOL. I.

B

essence consists, or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do, in their formation, any, or all of them, depend on matter or no. These are speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with: and I shall imagine I have not wholly misemployed myself in the thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if, in this historical, plain method, I can give any account of the ways whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have, and can set down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge, or the grounds of those persuasions, which are to be found amongst men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted, somewhere or other, with such assurance and confidence, that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their opposition, and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained-may perhaps have reason to suspect, that either there is no such thing as truth at all, or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain. knowledge of it.

Method. § 3. It is therefore worth while to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what measures, in things whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent, and moderate our persuasions. In order whereunto, I shall pursue this following method.

First, I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to him