PRIZE. for to the prize court. This very instance shews it to be a novelty, in the common law courts there; for if it had been known as an old practice, the particular designation of the prize court, would have been unnecessary; and the prohibition would have been granted to the admiralty, generally, as it ever had been in former cases. Acting as we now do in a national, and not a dependent capacity, I can prac Jennings US. Carson's Executors. We are not low the Bri bound to fol tish practice. of our law. not conceive that we are bound to follow the tice in England, more than that of our own, or any other nation.* Customs purely colonial were parts Customs part of our laws even in the times of our connections with Britain. I need instance only one, to wit, that of the mode of conveyance of femme coverts estates, contrary to the laws of England. This is a case at common law, in which we then were, and now are, particularly called to follow their rules and practice in general. The admiralty proceeds by a law which considers all nations as one community, and should not be tied down to the precedent of one nation; though it were more clearly ascertained. I shall therefore conclude that, if the powers of an admiralty and maritime court are delegated by congress to this court, those of a prize court are mixed in the ≈ 1 Dal. p. 11. 17. Prize jurisdic tion is involv ed in the getion of admi ralty and ma neral delega ritimepowers. * This is a general, but not entirely an accurate remark. The practice and laws of the admiralty of England, as they existed before our revolution, were particularly imperative to us. The arrangement of courts may be different; and there are exceptions where our usages, well established, differ from those of that country; wherein the "usages and customs of the admiralty," are not exclusively their own, but adopted from those, in many instances, of other nations. PRIZE. Jennings, Carson's Executors. mass of authority with which it is invested; and requires no particular specification. They are called forth, if generally delegated, by the occasion; and not by repeated and new interferences of government. Nor do I believe that, even in England, any new authority is vésted; though a kind of legal and solemn notice is given of a war, in which subjects for the prize authority of admiralty may occur. It does not begin with their wars, but was preexistent; it does not end with the commencement of peace, for their books shew it to be exercised at any time afterwards. Government never interferes to put an end to it; how then can its power be rePrize jurisdic peatedly necessary to begin it? The fact is, it is inherent in a court of admiralty; and not lost, but tion inherent in a court of admiralty. Admiralty powers vested by Congress in the district court. torpid, like other authorities of the court, when there are no occasions for its exercise. But here the question arises...." Have congress, by their judiciary laws, vested this court with general or special admiralty powers?" Congress have authority delegated by the people in the constitution in "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." The words of that part of the judiciary law affecting this subject, in which the authorities of this court are described, will be seen in the ninth section of that law....It "shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including seizures under laws of impost, navigation, or trade of the United States." It is said, prize or no prize is a question of a military, not a civil nature. But I find no such distinction in the books: Blackstone in his divisions of courts, does a Blackstone's Com. vol. iii, p. 69. PRIZE. Jennings, Carson's No military character in miralty; they are maritime, nizance of all on the sea. courts of ad and have cog transactions not class that of the admiralty as a military, but a maritime court; and it will appear, that the jurisdiction of prize is within its powers; though he points Executors. out, in cases of prizes in the then colonies, that appeals were to members of the privy council and others, in consequence of treaties and domestic arrangements. But he says, "The original court, to which this question is committed in England, is the court of admiralty, without any distinction as to the nature of its powers, whether instance or prize, military or civil. In Book iii, p. 108, he mentions the exclusive and undisturbed jurisdiction of the court of admiralty, in cases of prize, and that court determines not according to British laws or practice, but, "according to the laws of nations." Should I confine myself merely to the enquiry, whether this could be classed under the description of a "civil cause," I should think there were grounds to support the idea of its being comprehended. In the case of Atcheson and Everitt, some light is thrown this view of the subject; because it appears, that a civil suit may, in substance, but not form, partake of criminal ingredients. So, by parity of reason, may a civil case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction be mixed with or grounded in transactions of a military nature; but I do not think it necessary nicely to fix this point.* What is, perhaps, of most a a Cowper, 382. * The period elapsed since this decision has been abundantly productive of events, which centuries, in past times, would have been occupied in evolving. We have been too intimately acquainted with the British prize courts, to have any doubts now about their arrangement. They are, however, part, of the admiralty jurisdiction. Their subjects are "maritime acquisitions, с Courts of admiralty decording to termine ac laws of na tions. Civil and maritime suits may with it, mili have mixed tary ingre dients. PRIZE. Jennings, Carson's Executors. tion of the act consequence, is to ascertain the intention of Congress in distributing a power, clearly in them, to their judiciary department; and what was said by one of the advocates for the libellant strikes me as Interpreta- being just and proper, viz. that the construction of Congress. should be made from a consideration of all the laws on the subject in pari materia. "The court shall also have cognizance, &c." that is, being invested with criminal powers in certain cases, it shall also have civil powers as opposed to criminal in admiralty and maritime cases. By recurring to the 12th, 13th, 19th, 21st & 30th sections of the judiciary laws, it will appear that Congress meant to convey all the powers, and in the words of the constitution, as they possessed them in admiralty cases; and This court actions or suits in these cases can originate only in vested with powers in questions of prize. earned and become due on the high seas," and their jurisdiction attaches "ob causam à re maritima ortum." Being the only department of their judiciary not entitled to our admiration, they furnish instances in which judicial decisions are directed, and varied by executive interferences, in the form of arrettes, or orders of the king in council. They do not determine as they ought, in all cases, "according to the laws of nations," as Blackstone asserts; but, in too many points, according to the ebbs and flows of executive policy and opinion. These originate, are multiplied, or diminished, with the chances producing adverse or prosperous events in wars; and, by sudden and unexpected changes and severities, after relaxations of the rigors of their own regulations, neutrals are plunged into unforeseen difficulties, and frequent ruin. To them....who must become belligerent, or submit....the British law maxim is degradingly applicable, however indignantly felt. Misera est servitus, ubi jus est vagum, aut incognitum. Their Instance court is still properly separated from that of Prize. And, being occupied only in private transactions, it preserves its purity; and administers impartial justice. PRIZE. the district courts. For the foregoing reasons, and some others which might be added, I am of opinion Jennings, / 08. Carson's Plea in a batement that this court possesses all the powers of a court of Executors. admiralty, and that the question of prize is cognizable before it. I have gone thus far into the discussion of this point, because I believe it is the first time it has been agitated in a federal court. I do, overruled. therefore, decree, adjudge and determine, that the plea to the jurisdiction of the court, as not being competent to determine prize questions, be, and the same is, hereby overruled. As to the question on the legality, equity and propriety of the court's interference in the present suit to effectuate the decree of the court of appeals, and all other questions save that on which I have determined, I give no opinion, but hold them under advisement (unless the parties agree that I shall proceed under the present defect of proof in some points, and under some doubts I entertain concerning them) that an appeal may be lodged in the superior court, wherein I confess I should prefer an ultimate decision in a cause said to be important in itself and extensive in its consequences.* * This case on the point of jurisdiction went up, by consent, to the circuit court. The judgment of the district court being affirmed, it came back, for decision upon its merits. But no decision was ever had, on the merits, by the district court. By consent it returned to the circuit court, which gave a decision in favour of the libellant; from which there is now an appeal depending, in the supreme court of the United States. This decision is now published, to shew that all the powers of a court of admiralty are vested in the district court. Some of the cases which follow have circumstances of a mixed character, requiring the jurisdiction to be complete on both the prize and instance sides of the admiralty court. |