PRIZE. the ship William. Courts for trial of prizes made by belligerents cannot legally be neutral coun erected in a try. generally styled courts of admiralty; and, that it Findlay et al. never was attempted, before the subject of that controversy happened, to erect in a neutral state courts for the trial of prizes, taken by belligerent powers, even where neutrals were concerned; and that, of course, no court of one sovereign has a right to try the prizes taken by the ships, public or private, of another. A dispute of this nature, in which the king of Prussia could not prevail, who, though weak at sea, was powerful at land, and had a propensity for war, would not very well suit us. We have, indeed, shewn that we know how to make war, but it is now our interest and inclination to cultivate the arts of peace. Much has been said, on both sides, to shew the importance of this cause, and the necessity of caution in its determination. I am sufficiently impressed with those considerations; but I feel myself at ease in this view of the subject. I am persuaded that any thing which affects the sovereignty and rights of our country will not be passed unnoticed by those who have the power to regulate our national concerns. On my own account, I have no disquietude; for no error of mine can affect the nation. There is an appeal, from any determination I may give, to a superior tribunal. I am anxious for the peace and dignity of my country; but not deeming myself authorized to decide in a matter growing *See on this point the case of " the Flad Oyen, Martenson, master. 1 Rob. Adm. Rep. 114, Philadelphia ed. 137 English ed. In the case the question is discussed with great learning and ingenuity by Sir William Scott. See also the case "The Kierlighett Spoerwig" 3 Rob. Adm. Rep. 82, Philadelphia ed English ed. 29.-E. PRIZE. Findlay et al. out of the contests between belligerent powers, nor VS. the ship William. considering this court, in this instance, the vindicator of the rights of our nation, I leave in better. hands the discussion on the subject of national insult, and the remedy for any invasion of territorial rights.* *The Instance side of this court seems to * When this cause was decided, no territorial limits were established by any national act. The facts were not accurately investigated. On the exhibition of the testimony, it did not appear to me to be clearly ascertained that the place of capture was left without doubt, as to its distance from the shore. The whole of the case was novel in the United States. There is no point on which the writers on maritime laws and privileges so much disagree, as on that of the extent of the territorial rights of the sovereign possessing the shores, into the contiguous sea. All maritime people deem the nation in rightful possession of the coast, sovereign of the adjacent sea; yet there is no general agreement as to the nature or extent of this sovereignty. Time has not matured or settled opinions on this subject among jurists; nor have particular compacts established any general principle. From the period of the compilation of the digest of Justinian, to this day, the point has been uncertain, and open to controversy. Some early commentators on that work assert that the territorial sea extended 60 miles from the shore. A majority of ancient writers carry it to 100 miles. Valin endeavours to ascertain it by the sounding lead; whether the coast be composed of extensive shallows and flats, or bold and deep shores! Others fix the distance at the point capable of being defended from the shore. Hubner, the champion of neutral rights, thinks the limit ought to be the range of a cannon shot; and of this opinion is Bynkershoek, Vattel and other eminent civilians, and among them Azuni; who, in vol. i, p. 193 to 208, discusses the point, and cites many authors, and some treaties and documents. It seems to be a claim of power in extent, though of justice in its origin: and when viewed according to the contradictory opinions of writers, it appears difficult, doubtful, and often visionary. It is even left by some to the de PRIZE. the ship William. have other objects; and a Prize court, called Findlay et al. into activity when a nation is at peace, appears to be a solecism in jurisprudence. I do, therefore, decree, order and adjudge, that the libel in this termination of those, whose wants, or convenience, require a greater or less distance from the shore. Some have need of more sea room for fishing; and it suits others to distinguish between extent for operation of revenue laws, and that for protection of neutral trade; the latter, these say, must be at the greatest distance. The range of a cannot shot is generally accounted about a sea league. Our act of Congress [vol. iii, p. 91.] fixes that distance, on the maritime territorial limits, for our nation: and gives the district courts jurisdiction to that extent, of captures made in violation of our territorial rights; by the law, passed after the foregoing decree, to wit, in June 1794, as opinions were various on that point, the extent might have been declared greater, without violating the pretensions or just claims of others. There is no doubt of the right (if they have the power) of any nation, to forbid and prevent captures, at a greater distance than the sea league from their coast. Nor can it be fairly questioned that, where coasts are indented, or firths or bays are included in the territory of a nation, what are called chambers, by Sir L. Jenkyns, may be established. These are parts of the ocean included within lines drawn from promontory to promontory, or perhaps from points a league distant from each. And it is not a question to be made by any other nation, whether some parts of the space included be or not more than a sea league from the shore. It seems, on the whole, a point for treaty or compact, or one left to the discretion of sovereign states. But, in fixing extent of maritime territory, they must not invade the rights of others; or pass into, so as to disturb or obstruct, the common path-way of nations, in its freedom of navigation. To this freedom all are entitled on the high seas, which are called the high road, through an expanse given by the creator, to be held in common; indivisible and incapable of allottment, in separate ownership, or propriety. In a case of similar circumstance, this subject was, at the time, discussed more at large. But the notes of that case (the Fanny) are mislaid. Ship discharged; and plea to jurisdiction rele vant. PRIZE. Findlay et al. cause be dismissed; and that the ship therein mentioned be discharged from the arrest, the plea in this case being relevant. the ship William. The case of the ship William became a subject of diplomatic discussion, which may be seen in the publications of that period, containing the correspondence between the then secretary of state, Mr. Jefferson, and the ministers of France and England. THE state of the case will appear in the libel, and the testimony and exhibits in this cause.* The testimony, though in some points contradictory, and in many irrelevant, will shew, from a general view 1792. A French vessel La Belle Creole, on her passage from the West Indies home, was found by a Philadel Phia ship, the sea, in a pehopeless con rishing and dition. The Amiable remained by the Creole at some risque, and with considerable delay; and took out the French officers and crew, who as sisted in sav ing a part of the ship's furniture, and certain articles of the cargo, which were brought into this port; but the vessel * The libel states that, on the 10th day of November, 1792, the Amiable being 'on a voyage from Charleston, South Carolina, for Philadelphia, a ship was discovered in distress; upon which the Amiable shortened sail, changed her course, and found said ship to be La Belle Creole, commanded by Davor, bound to Bordeaux. La Belle Creole was declared to be sinking, and the master of the Amiable requested to remain by her, which was done by making light sail on board the Amiable. The distress of La Belle Creole continued; the weather was tempestuous, and on the 12th, after repeated solicitations from the master and crew of La Belle Creole, they were received on board the Amiable; and, before they left La Belle Creole, a proposition was made by them to burn her. On the master and crew of La Belle Creole leaving their ship, they declared they relinquished and abandoned her, and every thing on board of her. La Belle Creole was left without a living person on board of her. On the following morning she was again boarded by the master and crew of the Amiable, and a large quantity of merchandise taken from her. On the evening of one third of the same day, at the request of captain Davor, she was set on fire. The Amiable afterwards arrived in Philadelphia. The libel prays a reasonable salvage may be allowed. was abandoned and left at sea. The claimed as degoods were relict, but this claim was dismissed, and the gross amount of sales decreed as salvage. |