not to exist. The reason or cause of the existence of a being, who has not derived his existence from any other being (whether we can form an idea of such a being or not) the cause of his existence must be in himself: for though the mere proofs, by which we demonstrate that such a being must necessarily exist, do not give us a distinct apprehension of the nature of that existence, which is self-depending only, yet when we have discovered the reasors à posteriori, which convince us that the thing is, it follows, by an inevitable consequence, that there are in nature reasons apriori for the existence of this thing which we already know must necessarily exist; and this is true, whether the reasons or causes of such existence are known to us, or we remain quite ignorant of them. Now, since the reason or cause of the existence of the Being who derives not his existence from any thing foreign to himself, must necessa. rily be in himself; and since it is an absolute contradiction, to suppose that his own mere will is the reason of his existence as an efficient cause, it follows, that an absolute necessity (that is to say, the same necessity

which is the cause of the immutable proportion between the two numbers 2 and 4) must be the efficient cause of this existence. And this necessity it is to be observed, is antecedent to the existence of the Being himself; not, indeed, with relation to time, but in the order of nature; whereas his own will is, on the contrary, subsequent, in order of nature, to the supposition of his existence, and consequently cannot be the efficient cause of such existence.

There is nothing in the world more ab surd, than to suppose the existence of a thing, or of some circumstance belonging to any thing, and to imagine that there is not. absolutely any reason why it exists rather than does not exist. It is readily conceived, that we may be ignorant of the reasons or causes of a great number of things; but any thing once admitted to exist, and the necessity in nature of the reasons why it exists rather than does not exist, are two things which have an alliance, as necessary and essential as that which is between two correlatives.

135. DEFINITION OF GOD.

No philosopher has more ably defined the Supreme Being than Sir Isaac Newton. It is thus that he expresses himself:

The sublime system of the sun, planets, and comets include movements so regular, that we cannot persuade ourselves that they are the effects of causes purely mechanical. We are convinced they could proceed only from the wisdom and power of a Being omniscient and all-powerful. This Being governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as Lord over all his creatures; and, relative to his sovereignty, he is called the Lord God, the universal master; for God is a relative form, having relation to his creatures, and the Divinity is this sovereignty of God over his subjects. is a Being eternal, infinite, and absolutely perfect; but this Being, although perfect, would not name himself the Lord God, if he had existed without Supreme Dominion. We say, my God, your God, the God of Israel, the Lord of Lords; but we do not

God

say, my Eternal, your Eternal, the Eternal of Israel; nor do we say, my Infinite; for these titles have no relation to the Creator. The word God, signifies generally the Lord; but every Lord is not God. It is the sovereignty of a spiritual Being which constitutes a God.

It results from the sovereignty of God, that he is a Being endued with life, intelligent and all-powerful; and from his other perfections it follows that he is Supreme and absolutely perfect. He is eternal, infinite, all powerful, and omniscient; that is to say, his duration embraces all eternity, his presence all infinity. He governs all things, and knows all things which are, or can happen. He is not duration or space, but he exists for ever, and is every where present; and by existing always and every where he constitutes duration and space. God is present every where, not merely virtually, but also substantially; in him all things are contained and move, but without mutually affecting each other; for God is not affected by the movement of bodies, nor do bodies experience any resistance

from the universal presence of God. It is acknowledged, that the Supreme Being exists necessarily, and by the same necessity he must exist eternally and every where. Whence it follows, also, that he is every where the same, all eye, all ear, all arm, all power to comprehend and act, but in a manner that is not human or corporeal; in short, in a manner that is absolutely unknown to us. As a blind man can have no idea of colours, so we cannot have any idea of the manner in which God sees and conceives things; there is not in any manner, any thing material or corporeal in him ; and for this reason it is, that he can neither be seen, touched, nor heard, and ought not to be worshiped under any corporeal form. We have ideas of his attributes; but we are ignorant, not only of his substance but that of every other thing. In bodies, we see only the forms and colours, we hear only sounds, we touch only the surface, we taste only the flavour; their real substance cannot be known, either by the sense or by reflection; still less can we have any idea of the substance of God.