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“ pulumque Romanum, atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro
flammaque vastare, ac novas sibi sedes quærere, de“ crevisset. Et de Caligula, quod palam denunciarit se
neque civem neque principem senatui amplius fore,
inque animo habuerit interempto utriusque ordinis “ electissimo quoque Alexandriam commigrare, ac ut
populum uno ictu interimeret, unam ei cervicem op“ tavit. Talia cum rex aliquis meditatur & molitur se
rio, omnem regnandi curam & animum ilico abjicit,
ac proinde imperium in subditos amittit, ut dominus “ servi pro derelicto habiti dominium.'
236. “ Alter casus est, Si rex in alicujus clientelam “ se contulit, ac regnum quod liberum à majoribus &
populo traditum accepit, alienæ ditioni mancipavit. « Nam tunc quamvis forte non eâ mente id agit populo “ plane ut incommodet: tamen quia quod præcipuum “ est regiæ dignitatis amisit, ut summus scilicet in
regno , secundum Deum sit, & solo Deo inferior, atque populum etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum,
cujus libertatem sartam & tectam conservare debuit “ in alterius gentis ditionem & potestatem dedidit, hâc “ velut quadam regni ab alienatione efficit, ut nec quod
ipse in regno imperium habuit retineat, nec in eum “ cui collatum voluit, juris quicquam transferat; atque “ ita eo facto liberum jam & suæ potestatis populum re
linquit, cujus rei exemplum unum annales Scotici suppeditant.” Barclay contra Monarchom. I. iii. c. 16.
Which in English runs thus :
237. “What then, can there no case happen “ wherein the people may of right, and by their own
authority, help themselves, take arms, and set upon “ their king imperiously domineering over them? « None at all, whilst he remains a king. Honour the
king, and he that resists the power, resists the ordi
nance of God; are divine oracles that will never per“ mit it. The people therefore can never come by a “ power over him, unless he does something that makes “ him cease to be a king: for then he divests himself
" of his crown and dignity, and returns to the state of “ a private man, and the people become free and supe“ riour, the power which they had in the interregnum,
before they crowned him king, devolving to them “ again. But there are but few miscarriages which
bring the matter to this state. After considering it 6 well on all sides, I can find but two. Two cases
there are, I say, whereby a king, ipso facto, becomes “ no king, and loses all power and regal authority over “ his people; which are also taken notice of by Win
go“ vernment, that is, if he have a purpose and design “ to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth ; as it is re“ corded of Nero, that he resolved to cut off the se“ nate and people of Rome, lay the city waste with fire 66 and sword, and then remove to some other place. 6 And of Caligula, that he openly declared, that he 66 would be no longer a head to the people or senate, " and that he had it in his thoughts to cut off the wor“ thiest men of both ranks, and then retire to Alex6 andria : and he wished that the people had but one
neck, that he might dispatch them all at a blow “ Such designs as these, when any king harbours in his
thoughts, and seriously promotes, he immediately
gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth; “ and consequently forfeits the power of governing his
subjects, as a master does the dominion over his slaves 56 whom he hath abandoned.”
$ 238. “ The other case is, When a king makes “ himself the dependent of another, and subjects his
kingdom which his ancestors left him, and the peo
ple put free into his hands, to the dominion of an“ other: for however perhaps it may not be his inten“ tion to prejudice the people, yet because he has here
by lost the principal part of regal dignity, viz. to be “ next and immediately under God supreme in his
kingdom ; and also because he betrayed or forced his
people, whose liberty he ought to have carefully pre“ served, into the power and dominion of a foreign “ nation. By this, as it were, alienation of his kingVOL. IV.
“ dom, he himself loses the power he had in it before, “ without transferring any the least right to those on “ whom he would have bestowed it; and so by this act
sets the people free, and leaves them at their own
disposal. One example of this is to be found in the 66 Scottish Annals.”
$ 239. In these cases Barclay, the great champion of absolute monarchy, is forced to allow, that a king may be resisted, and ceases to be a king. That is, in short, not to multiply cases, in whatsoever he has no authority, there he is no king, and may be resisted: for wheresoever the authority ceases, the king ceases too, and becomes like other men who have no authority. And these two cases the instances differ little from those above-mentioned, to be destructive to governments, only that he has omitted the principle from which his doctrine flows; and that is, the breach of trust, in not preserving the form of government agreed on, and in not intending the end of government itself, which is the public good and preservation of property. When a king has dethroned himself, and put himself in a state of war with his people, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is no king, as they would any other man, who has put himself into a state of war with them; Barclay and those of his opinion would do well to tell us. This farther I desire may be taken notice of out of Barclay, that he says, “ The mischief that is de
signed them, the people may prevent before it be “ done : whereby he allows resistance when tyranny is “ but in design. Such designs as these (says he) when “ any king harbours in his thoughts and seriously pro“ motes, he immediately gives up all care and thought “ of the commonwealth ; " so that, according to him, the neglect of the public good is to be taken as an evidence of such design, or at least for a sufficient cause of resistance. And the reason of all, he gives in these words, “ Because he betrayed or forced his people, “ whose liberty he ought carefully to have preserved.” What he adds, “into the power and dominion of a
foreign nation,” signifies nothing, the fault and forfeiture lying in the loss of their liberty, which he ought to have preserved, and not in any distinction of the persons to whose dominion they were subjected. The people's right is equally invaded, and their liberty lost, whether they are made slaves to any of their own, or a foreign nation; and in this lies the injury, and against this only have they the right of defence. And there are instances to be found in all countries, which show, that it is not the change of nations in the persons of their governors, but the change of government, that gives the offence. Bilson, a bishop of our church, and a great stickler for the power and prerogative of princes, does, if I mistake not, in his treatise of christian subjection, acknowledge, that princes may forfeit their power, and their title to the obedience of their subjects ; and if there needed authority in a case. where reason is so plain, I could send my reader to Bractan, Fortescue, and the author of the Mirrour, and others, writers that cannot be suspected to be ignorant of our government, or enemies to it. But I thought Hooker alone might be enough to satisfy those men, who relying on him for their ecclesiastical polity, are by a strange fate carried to deny those principles upon which he builds it. Whether they are herein made the tools of cunninger workmen, to pull down their own fabric, they were best look. This I am sure, their civil policy is so new, so dangerous, and so destructive to both rulers and people, that as former ages never could bear the broaching of it; so it inay be hoped, those to come, redeemed from the impositions of these Egyptian under task. masters, will abhor the memory of such servile flatterers, who, whilst it seemed to serve their turn, resolved all government into absolute tyranny, and would have all men born to, what their mean souls fitted them for, slavery.
240. Here, it is like, the common question will be made, “ Who shall be judge, whether the prince or · legislative act contrary to their trust?” This, perhaps, ill-affected and factious men may spread amongst the people, when the prince only makes use of his due prerogative. To this I reply, “ The people shall be judge;" for who shall be judge whether his trustee
or deputy acts well, and according to the trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him, and must by having deputed him, ' have still a power to discard him, when he fails in his trust ? If this be reasonable in particular cases of private men, why should it be otherwise in that of the greatest moment, where the welfare of millions is concerned, and also where the evil, if not prevented, is greater, and the redress very difficult, dear, and dangerous
? § 241. But farther, this question, (“Who shall be
judge ?") cannot mean that there is no judge at all : for where there is no judicature on earth, to decide controversies amongst men, God in heaven is judge. He alone, it is true, is judge of the right. But every man is judge for himself, as in all other cases, so in this, whether another hath put himself into a state of war with him, and whether he should appeal to the supreme judge, as Jephthah did.
§ 242. If a controversy arise betwixt a prince and some of the people, in a matter where the law is silent, or doubtful, and the thing be of great consequence, I should think the proper umpire, in such a case, should be the body of the people: for in cases where the prince hath a trust reposed in him, and is dispensed from the common ordinary rules of the law; there, if any men find themselves aggrieved, and think the prince acts contrary to, or beyond that trust, who so proper to judge as the body of the people, (who, at first, lodged that trust in him) how far they meant it should extend ? But if the prince, or whoever they be in the administration, decline that way of determination, the appeal then lies no where but to heaven; force between either persons, who have no known superior on earth, or which permits no appeal to a judge on earth, being properly a state of war, wherein the appeal lies only to heaven; and in that state the injured party must judge for himself, when he will think fit to make use of that appeal, and put himself upon it.
§ 243. To conclude, The power that every individual gave the society, when he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the society