pilgrims here on earth, and consequently have a better interest in another country which ought not to be neglected for the low gratifications of this: whoever allows the principle, must allow the consequence. This leads us to an inquiry worthy of all our pains, how far we may pursue the pleasures of this life, consistently with our hopes of a better: some enjoyments there are not below the care of a wise and good man in this world, both in the cultivation of the mind, and in the pleasures of sense properly restrained: but whenever our appetites are too strong for our reason, and carry us beyond the bounds of temperance to the injury of ourselves and others, then it is that our fleshly lusts do war against the soul; then we wound our own souls, and, for the sake of momentary pleasures, expose ourselves to eternal death. The express command of the gospel against drunkenness, fornication, and such vices, coming as it does from one who has power to execute his decrees, ought to be a sufficient argument to Christians: but the Apostle in the text goes farther, and lays before us the reason in which the command to abstain from fleshly lusts is founded: this point enlarged on. If we consider wherein the dignity of man consists, and what are his means to make himself happy, we shall see clearly the ill effects of sensual lusts: no need of abstracted speculations on the subject.

There is no man so little acquainted with himself, but that he sometimes finds a difference between the dictates of his reason, and the cravings of appetite: this discord is the foundation of the difference observable among men with regard to moral character and behavior: this point enlarged on. If our passions are to govern us, and reason only to furnish means and opportunities of gratifying them, it will be hard to account for the wisdom of God in making such a creature as man. If we have no higher purposes to serve than the brutes, why have we more understanding than they? but it would be well if we could say as much for some sensual men, as we can for the brutes, who

are ten times less mischievous, in having only appetites, without reason and the powers of contrivance, &c.

Hence it is evident in what manner sensual lusts do war against the soul, considered as the seat of reason and all the nobler faculties. If we look into past or present ages, we shall see numberless instances of the pernicious effects of passion, assisted by a corrupt and depraved reason: this point enlarged

on.

But let us consider, that the only part of man capable of improvement is the soul: we can do little or nothing for the body; and if we could do more it would be little worth: if therefore we have any ambition of being better than we are, either in this world or in the next, we must cultivate the mind. The excellency of a rational creature consists in knowlege and virtue, one the foundation of the other: these are what we ought to labor for: but sensual lusts prohibit our improvement in either, and do therefore war against the soul.

As to knowlege, the best and most useful is the knowlege of ourselves, of the relation in which we stand to God and man, and of the duties thence arising. Now this knowlege is such an enemy to sensual lusts, that a sensual man will be much indisposed to receive it, because to him it is self-condemnation : hence the many prejudices in the world against the first principles of natural religion, and the many arguments to destroy the distinction between soul and body, and all hopes of a future state. If the fear of God be, as in truth it is, the beginning of wisdom, sensuality cuts us off from all hopes of improvement, as rational beings, by choking the spring from whence all wisdom flows: it ties us down to the world, materializes the soul, and makes it incapable of conceptions worthy of itself: this point enlarged on.

Secondly, virtue and morality are the distinguishing characters of rational beings; but these will always be lost where the appetites have dominion.

In all cases where our thoughts are confined to ourselves, and we aim only at our own interest and pleasure, we act on a principle destructive of morality: the ability we have of extending our views beyond ourselves, and considering what is fit, proper, and reasonable, with regard to others, is the foundation of morality: this subject extended, and various instances given, in which sensuality makes a man overlook what is due to others, and lose all regard for justice, equity, and compassion.

Hence it is plain that the virtue of a man consists in bounding his desires within the limits of reason and morality: these limits the lusts of the flesh are perpetually transgressing; every such transgression is a wound to the soul, which weakens its natural faculties, and renders it less able to discharge its proper office, &c. Hence arises another consideration, showing how effectually sensual lusts do war against the soul, by extinguishing natural conscience, and not leaving a man reason and religion enough to repent of his iniquities: for the mind grows sensual by degrees, loses all relish for serious thought and contemplation, and contracts a brutal courage that cares neither for God nor man: this point enlarged on. The sensual man has but one hope with respect to futurity, and a sad one it is, that he may die like the beasts that perish: but nature, reason, religion, deny him this comfort, and with one voice proclaim, that God has appointed a day in which he will judge the world. The terrors of that day to sensualists and sinners described. Conclusion: a return to the argument: the sensual man's condition briefly reviewed: the sum of his account is, that he has his portion of enjoyment in this world with the brutes, and in the next his punishment with wicked spirits: this is the war which the lusts of the flesh wage against the soul: from such enemies a wise man ought to fly, for they have power to cast both body and soul into hell.

DISCOURSE XXIII.

I PETER, CHAP. 11.-VERSE 11.

Dearly beloved, I beseech you as strangers and pilgrims, abstain from fleshly lusts, which war against the soul.

PART I.

THE exhortations of Scripture to abstain from fleshly lusts, or lusts of the flesh, are so many, the expression itself is so familiar to Christians, and so well understood, that there is no ́need, I think, of many words to explain the subject matter of the advice now before us. Some sins are privileged by their impurity from being exposed as they deserve: a modest tongue cannot relate, nor a modest ear receive an account, without great pain, of the various kinds of lewdness practised in the world; for as the Apostle to the Ephesians remarks, 'It is a shame even to speak of those things which are done of them in secret.' Had he lived in our times, he might perhaps have varied his phrase, and said, 'which are done of them in public.' 'These impurities are, in one sense of the word, no longer 'works of darkness,' they appear at noon-day. Since therefore they no longer affect to be disguised, they will speak for themselves what they are: I have no mind to speak for them.

The Apostle in the text has pointed out to us the common source from whence vices of this kind proceed: they arise from 'fleshly lusts' words which carry a reason in them, to all who value their reason, not to give themselves up to the dominion of appetites, made not to govern, but to serve the man. But reason, when it becomes a slave to vice, must do the drudgery of vice, and support its cause: and therefore, on this topic, vice has borrowed some assistance from reason, and made a show of arguing in its own defence. These fleshly lusts,' as

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the Scripture calls them, others are willing to call natural desires; and then the question is asked, how it becomes so heinous an offence to comply with the desires which God, for wise reasons, has made to be part of the nature which he has given us? Were this question asked in behalf of the brute creatures, we would readily answer, we accuse them not; but when man asks it in his own behalf, he forgets that he has another question to answer before he can be intitled to ask this, for what purpose was reason and understanding given to man? Brutes have no higher rule to act by than these instincts and natural impressions; and therefore, in acting according to these, they act up to the dignity of the nature bestowed on them, and are blameless. But can you say the same of man? Does he act up to the dignity of his nature, when he makes that his rule which is common to him and the beasts: when he pursues the same inclinations, and with as little regard to virtue and morality? Why is man distinguished from the brute creatures by so superior a degree of reason and understanding, by a knowlege of moral good and evil, by a notion of God his Creator and Governor, by a certain expectation of judgment, arising from a sense of his being accountable, if, after all, there is but one rule of acting for him and for the beasts that perish? Let these desires be natural; yet tell me, does the addition of reason make no difference? Is a creature endowed with knowlege at liberty to indulge his desires with the same freedom as a creature that has no reason to restrain it? If this be absurd, it is to little purpose to plead that the desires are natural, since we have reason given us to direct them, and are not at liberty to do whatever appetite prompts us to do, but must in all things consider what is reasonable and fit for us to do: for surely there is no case in which a reasonable creature may renounce the direction of reason.

It will be farther urged, to what purpose were these desires given, which are apparently the cause of much mischief and iniquity in the world, and oftentimes a great disturbance to the best in a life of religion? In reply to this, it will be necessary to consider how far these desires are natural.

If we look into mankind, we shall find that the desires which are common, and therefore may be called natural, are