is a murderer: this topic enlarged on. St. James also (i. 13-15.) describes all sin as the effect of inordinate passion, which is not only no excuse, but is said to bring forth death. Scripture has recorded the immoral actions of many persons, but lust and passions were no excuse for them: this exemplified in the case of Ahab, who slew Naboth, and of David, who slew Uriah. In the verses before the text our Saviour puts the case of those who received much, and those who received less: of the latter he says, they shall be beaten for doing things worthy of stripes; whence it appears that the strength of passion gives to rational beings no hope of being saved. Now the comparison in Scripture lies between those who enjoy the light of the gospel, who are said in the text to have received much, and those who are directed only by the light of reason; and these are they who have received little. Now the verses before the text, together with the text itself, state exactly the condition of these two sorts of people; from which we learn that to know the will of the Lord consists in having the light of God's word to direct us: for they who knew not the will of their Lord, are yet supposed to do things worthy of stripes; which supposes them possessed of the light of reason, and the knowlege of good and evil. Secondly: sinners, under all circumstances, are condemned to punishment; both they who know their Lord's will, but do not according to it, and they who do things worthy of stripes, i. e. who not knowing his will, act contrary to the light which they possess: this exactly agrees with what St. Paul has declared in Rom. ii. 12. All however will be judged and punished in proportion to their knowlege; which general determination agrees with a more particular one in Luke x. 13. 14. Explanation of these verses, showing the opinion of the Jews and of Christ himself on them. If we consider the world as divided into two parts, the one living under the light and direction of God's word, the other guided by mere reason and nature, we may learn from the maxim of the text-I. that no man shall be judged by a law of

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which he had no knowlege; it being true of every moral action, what St. Paul affirms of alms-giving; it shall be accepted according to that a man hath, and not according to what he hath not:-II. that immoral actions admit of no excuse, but will subject every man to the judgment of God; morality not being founded primarily on the authority of revelation, but of reason, for the use of which every one must answer: to plead therefore passion or temptation as an excuse for acting against reason, is the same as to plead our iniquity as an excuse against punishment; therefore, says St. James, to him that knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is sin. It may be said that custom and education have rendered the notions of morality different, so that the things which appear worthy of stripes to some, seem to others to contain nothing criminal in them. Be it so: yet this avails nothing in the present argument: where there is no consciousness of sin, there is no room to look for excuses; and whatever allowance may be made for those who sin without knowlege, it is certain that all who contrive excuses can take no advantage of this: for the very excuse itself shows the consciousness of sin: it is a foolish thing to deceive ourselves into an opinion that we require not pardon: repentance may cause forgiveness of sins, but no wit of man can ever justify them.-III. It appears that all who know the will of God, and live under the light of the gospel, shall be judged thereby. Men act sometimes as if they might choose what law they would be judged by; for as soon as they profess natural religion, they seem satisfied that they shall be judged by their own notions; but if the gospel of Christ be, as it is indeed, the will of God, it will not be so easily dismissed: we may neglect the advice of a friend, but the law of our superior must be obeyed. True, you may perhaps say; but this is the very thing we cannot admit, viz. that it is the law of our superior. Beware, from the dreadful examples of Chorazin and Bethsaida, of Tyre and Sidon, that your persuasion be not your crime. Here then is your case;

you have the gospel of Christ before you; it claims your obedience on the most extraordinary credentials; it cannot therefore be an indifferent matter whether you receive or reject this law; and you therefore come under the rule of the text. The gospel is a call to repentance from dead works, a summons to turn to the living God in works of righteousness and holiness: this the forewarning of John the Baptist; this the doctrine of our Lord and his Apostles. If then the great promises of Christ belong only to penitents, who in newness of heart turn to God, how sadly do men impose on themselves, who trust to be saved by God's mercy, without doing his work, and continue in sin that grace may abound: this subject enlarged on to the end.

DISCOURSE XX.

LUKE, CHAP. XII.-VERSE 48.

Unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required: and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more.

THE equity of this general rule is so apparent to common sense, that it admits of no dispute, and calls for no explanation. A single mite offered by a poor widow is a present fit for the King of heaven, which from the hand of a rich man would hardly be a decent charity to a poor widow. And thus the case is in all instances to which the rule is applicable.

But plain as this general maxim is, yet we are very apt to mistake in the application of it to particular cases: for then self-love and self-interest will not permit us to discern that true proportion of one thing to another, from which the equity of the rule arises. If we have any claim to make in our own behalf, we think nothing too much, and are apt to overrate the ability of the person on whom we have the demand, and to expect from him much more than he in reason ought to grant: if any claim be on us, we are ready enough to excuse ourselves, to dissemble, or to undervalue our power, and consequently to do less than may in reason and justice be required from us. Hence it is that we are rarely pleased with those who are above us, and seldom able to satisfy those who are below us.

As this rule has place in the intercourse of all the offices of life, so ought it especially to influence the distribution of rewards and punishments: but the weakness and wickedness of men have almost totally excluded it from human judicatures. For as it is in every body's power to pretend ignorance of the law, or some other inability, in excuse for the crimes for which

they are to answer; were the plea as easily admitted as it is pleaded, it would open a door to all kind of licentiousness, and take off the fear of punishment, which is so necessary a restraint upon the depraved inclinations of men and since the wisest and ablest judges cannot discern, some few cases perhaps excepted, between real and affected ignorance; or so distinguish the powers and abilities of one man from another, as to proportion rewards and punishments according to this rule; therefore the law puts all, except those who are manifestly deficient in reason, upon the same level, and supposes every man to know the law of his country; and consequently, where a malicious act is proved, a malicious intention is implied, and the criminal is sentenced accordingly.

But how justifiable soever this proceeding is, on the necessity there is for it in order to maintain some tolerable degree of peace and quiet in the world; yet it is evident that these general presumptions, on which all human judicatures proceed, do not leave room for an exact distribution of justice; but it often happens that men are made equal in the punishment, whose crimes, could all circumstances be considered, were not equal.

But could you introduce a judge endowed with the perfect knowlege of men's hearts, there would be an end of all such general presumptions: he would do in every case what was exactly right and equitable; and the only standing rule of the court, would be that of the text, Unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required.'

One such court there is in which he who knows the secrets of every heart will sit judge himself; before whose tribunal there will want no evidence to convict the guilty, no advocates to defend the innocent: there no pretended excuse will be admitted, no real one excluded: there every man with all his actions, with all his talents and abilities, and all his opportunities of knowing the will of God, will be weighed in the balance; and unto whom much was given, of him shall much be required.'

Since then we are to be judged, and finally sentenced, by this rule, it concerns us to be careful in the application of it to ourselves; for if we mistake, we shall gain only a deceitful security, and which at the last will prove fatal: and there is