that, if they are formed for the sake of providing a proper habitation for man, the house seems to be of far greater dignity than the master, and the end proposed by no means to answer and justify the means made use of. So again, in the work of our redemption, if the only Son of God came down from heaven, and did and suffered all that is reported of him in the gospel; what is there in man, considered in the most advantageous light, that bears any proportion to this wonderful method made use of to save him, or to justify the wisdom of God in sending the Lord of power, and of the whole creation, to die for the meanest, perhaps, of all intelligent beings belonging to it?

Now, whether these reflexions on our weak and infirm condition, and the low rank we hold in the order of intelligent beings, be a sufficient ground for calling into question the credibility of the great things said to be done for us, is a matter deserving serious consideration. And

The first question we should ask ourselves is, whether we are proper judges in this matter? It is a great undertaking to judge of the wisdom of God, and to say what is fit or not fit for him to do; especially where the subject of the inquiry is the counsels of God in governing the natural and moral world; points, not only of the highest consequence, but of all others the most removed out of our sight.

In human affairs we pretty well know the powers and abilities of men, and can oftentimes judge of the ends they propose to themselves; and this knowlege of their powers, and this ability to judge of the ends they propose, qualifies us in many cases to estimate comparatively the means and the end, and to discern whether the thing aimed at is worth the expense or labor employed in obtaining it. This judgment cannot be made merely by considering and comparing the means and the end together; but consideration likewise must be had of the power and ability of the agent. The end of building a house is for the habitation of men but whether the house be too big or too little, too magnificent or not magnificent enough, can never appear from considering merely the end of building of a house, which is for men to dwell in; but you must take into the account the power, station, wealth, and other circum

stances of the builder, and then you may reasonably say whether too much or too little pains and cost have been bestowed on it. To apply this to the present case: when you view the works of nature, you think them too great and too magnificent to be intended for the use of man: but consider a little, who is the builder? Is it not one of whose power and ability you cannot possibly judge? How do you know then that it was not as easy (and doubtless it was as easy) to God to produce this beautiful and wonderful order of things, as to have produced a much worse, and more adapted, as you may imagine, to the circumstances of man, the inhabitant of this world? You cannot say too much pains or too much cost has been bestowed for all these considerations are relative to the power of the agent; and when the agent has infinite power, this consideration is wholly excluded.

But farther; in order to judge rightly in the case before us, we ought perfectly to comprehend the end proposed. If you see a great building, but know not for what use it was intended, nor what use is made of it, it is impossible to judge whether it be too large or too confined; for that judgment must arise necessarily from knowing to what purpose and to what use it was erected. And where is the man who will pretend to know all the ends of God in the creation of the universe? what relates to ourselves we know tolerably well from sense and experience: we feel the influence of the heavenly bodies, and are sure that we are the better for them; but that no others are, besides ourselves, we can never be sure.

Since then we know nothing of the power of God but that it is infinite, the true consequence from which is, that all possible things are equally easy to be effected by his hand; since the purposes of God to be served in the creation of the universe are various, and more than we can discover, probably more than we can even imagine; we act the absurdest part in the world, when we pretend to judge of the works of Providence by comparing the greatness of the works of nature with such ends and purposes as we can discover to be served by them for with respect to the infinite power of God, we talk childishly when we call his works great or little; and with

respect to the ends and purposes of Providence, supposing at just measure of his works were to be taken from thence, yet it is a measure of which we are not masters.

As this reasoning must necessarily hold in the works of nature, so is it equally strong when applied to the works of grace. It is indeed a surprising and wonderful event, the coming of the Son of God into this world, being made man, and born of a pure virgin, living and dying as a man to redeem sinners. But what is there that shocks your faith in this? You think perhaps the means too great and too considerable to be made use of for the sake of the end proposed, which might have been obtained at a cheaper rate. But when you say or think this, do you pretend to know by what other way all the purposes of God in sending his Son into the world might have been answered? If you do not, possibly this was the only way to answer all the ends and intentions of Providence in this great work; and if it was, the means used were necessary, and therefore, without doubt, proper and supposing them proper, you will not surely be surprised that God should design, and his blessed Son undertake to perform, what was proper to execute the wise ends of Providence. It was indeed a very great thing for a man to be born of a virgin: but in what sense was it great? only as being unusual, and contrary to the established course, in our eyes: with respect to God, I see no reason to call it so. Were God to form a new race under this new law of nature, that all should be born of virgins, I conceive there would be nothing in it more wonderful than in the present established course of nature.

It is more wonderful still to think of the Son of God living on earth in the form and fashion of a man; and if we speak in relation to our own abilities of searching into this mysterious work, it is and it ever must continue to be a wonder: but with respect to God, have you any reason to think this wonderful and mysterious, or a thing difficult to be performed? God has united our spirits, our souls, to these bodies: a wonderful and a mysterious thing it is to us: but can you imagine there is any thing in the works of God, that is wonderful, mysterious, or difficult in the execution to him? If not, how weakly do we

amuse ourselves, when we set ourselves with great wisdom to weigh the works of God in our scales, and to judge which are great and difficult in the performance!

But this is not the only mistake men are liable to, when they set themselves up for judges in this matter. That the redemption and salvation of men is the end of Christ's coming into the world, is certain, and is revealed in the gospel; but whoever shall say God had no other purpose in view than this only, will judge hastily, and, I doubt, rashly. What relates to us immediately in this great dispensation, God has been pleased to reveal to us distinctly; but he has no where told us that we are the only persons concerned: that others probably are, may be collected from many intimations in Scripture. Our blessed Redeemer has all power given him in heaven' as well as in earth principalities and powers,' the invisible powers, ' are made subject to him:' and they cannot be thought to be unconcerned in that work, for the sake of which their King was exalted, and 'every knee' made 'to bow' to him. How they are concerned, we know not: but this we know, that we are but a small part of the natural world. That there are many intelligent beings besides ourselves we know; that they may be numberless we have reason to believe; that God is the common Governor of all, is out of question; that all his dispensations in the moral government of the world regard the whole, and will finally appear in the eyes of every rational creature to be just and equal, we have great reason to conclude; and that God will be justified in his sayings, and clear when he is judged.' If this be so, the great work of our redemption, however immediately it relates to us, must be supposed adapted to answer the general ends and purposes of God's government in the universal moral world. And this plainly shows that we cannot judge of the propriety of the means made use of for redeeming the world by considering only the relation they have to men; for probably they relate to others, and to other purposes, and are, on the whole, in every respect proper and fit: but the propriety cannot be discerned by us, nor will it till we come into a clearer light, and see the whole scheme of Providence together.

You see then, on the whole, that the objections against God's government in the natural and moral world, founded on the disproportion between the means made use of and the ends proposed, are really the effects of short-sightedness, and of that great propensity which men have to judge, though they want proper materials to form a judgment on.

But let us consider whether the observations which have given rise to these perverse reasonings, will not, if duly attended to, open a way to far other and far juster conclusions. That men are weak and wretched, and not worthy of the care of Providence over them, we know by sad experience; and have reason enough, in this view, to fall into the Psalmist's reflexion, Lord, what is man, that thou regardest him?' But still most certain it is, that God does regard man: all nature bears witness to the truth of this; for he is served by the works of nature and though the works of nature may serve a hundred purposes more, yet it cannot be doubted but that they were made to serve man, though not him alone. This must appear on the strictest inquiry; for considering this solar system, of which we are a part, we have no reason to think but that it bears as great proportion to the whole as any other system in this system our earth is one considerable part: and this part was manifestly prepared for man, who has dominion over it. So that the human race is no inconsiderable part of the creation in this way of reckoning: and it is reasonable to say, that the world was made, if not for him only, yet as much and as truly for him as for others.

Being then possessed of this fact, that, weak and infirm as we are, God has abundantly provided for us in this life; and that, considered as part of the natural world, we have a very full proportion of good things allotted to us; what conclusion does it lead us to, if we consider ourselves as part of the rational and moral world? Is it reasonable to imagine that God has taken so much care of us in his natural government of the world, and that he will neglect us in the moral part of it? that he regards us as animals, but has no regard to us as rational agents? Can any man think seriously of God, as a reasonable, just, and upright Being, and suppose this to be the case?