CHAP. V.

Of truth in general.

SECT.

1. What truth is.

2. A right joining, or sepa-

rating of signs; i. e. ideas

or words.

3. Which make mental, or

verbal propositions.

4. Mental propositions are

very hard to be treated of.

5. Being nothing but joining,

or separating ideas, with-

out words.

6. When mental propositions

contain real truth, and

when verbal.

7. Objection against verbal

truth, that thus it may be

all chimerical.

8. Answered, real truth is

about ideas agreeing to

things.

9. Falshood is the joining of

names, otherwise than

their ideas agree.

10. General propositions to be

treated of more at large.

11. Moral and metaphysical

truth.

2. General truths hardly to

be understood, but in ver-
bal propositions.

3. Certainty two-fold, of

truth, and of knowledge.

4. No proposition can be

known to be true, where

the essence of each species

mentioned, is not known.

5. This more particularly

concerns substances.

6. The truth of few universal

propositions concerning

substances, is to be known.

7. Because co-existence of

ideas in few cases is to be

known.

8, 9.

Instance in gold.

10. As far as any such co-ex-

istence can be known, so

far universal propositions

may be certain. But this

will go but a little way,

because,

11, 12. The qualities, which make

our complex ideas of sub-

stances, depend mostly on

external, remote,
and un-

perceived causes.

13. Judgment may reach far-

ther, but that is not know.

ledge.

14. What is requisite for our
knowledge of substances.
15. Whilst our ideas of sub-

stances contain not their

real constitutions, we can

make but few general, cer-

tain

2 2

1. They are self-evident.
2. Wherein that self-evidence
consists.

3. Self-evidence not peculiar

to received axioms.
4. First, as to identity and

diversity, all propositions
are equally self-evident.
5. Secondly, in co-existence,
we have few self-evident
propositions.

6. Thirdly, in other relations

we may have.

7. Fourthly, concerning real

existence, we have none.

8. These axioms do not much

influence our other know.

ledge.

9. Because they are not the

truths the first known.

10. Because on them the other

parts of our knowledge

do not depend.

11. What use these general

maxims have.

12. Maxims, if care be not

taken in the use of words,

may prove contradictions.

13. Instance in vacuum.

14. They prove not the exist-

ence of things without us.

15. Their application danger-

ous about complex ideas.

16-18. Instance in man.

19. Little use of these maxims,

in proofs, where we have

clear and distinct ideas.

20. Their use dangerous, where
our ideas are confused.

CHAP. VIII.

Of trifling propositions.

SECT.

1. Some propositions bring

no increase to our know-
ledge.

2, 3. As, first, identical propo-

sitions.

4. Secondly, when a part of
any complex idea is pre-
dicated of the whole.
5. As part of the definition
of the term defined.
6. Instance, man and palfry.
7. For this teaches but the
signification of words.
8. But no real knowledge.
9. General propositions, con-
cerning substances, are
often trifling.
10. And why.

11. Thirdly, using words va-

riously, is trifling with

them.

12. Marks of verbal proposi-

tions. First, predication

in abstract.

13. Secondly, a part of the

definition, predicated of

any term.

СНАР. ІХ.

Of our knowledge of existence.

SECT.

1. General, certain proposi-

tions concern not exist.

ence.

2. A threefold knowledge of
existence.

3. Our knowledge of our own
existence, is intuitive.

CHAP. X:

Of the existence of a God.

SECT.

1. We are capable of know-

ing certainly that there is
a God.

2. Man knows that he him-
self is.

3. He knows also, that no-
thing cannot produce a
being, therefore some.
thing eternal.

4. That eternal being must
be most powerful.

5. And most knowing.

6. And therefore God.

7. Our idea of a most perfect

being, not the sole proof

of a God.

8. Something from eternity.

9. Two sorts of beings, co-

gitative and incogitative.

10. Incogitative being cannot

produce a cogitative.

II, 12. Therefore there has been
an eternal wisdom.

13. Whether material, or no.

14. Not material, first, because

every particle of matter is

not cogitative.

15. Secondly, one
one particle

alone of matter cannot be

cogitative.

16. Thirdly, a system of in-

cogitative matter cannot

be cogitative.

17. Whether in motion or at

7. The true method of ad-

vancing knowledge, is by

considering our abstract

ideas.

8. By which, morality, also,

may be made clearer.

9. But knowledge of bodies

is to be improved only by

experience.

10. This may procure us con-

venience, not science.

11. We are fitted for moral

knowledge, and natural

improvements.

12. But must beware of hypo-

theses and wrong princi-

ples.

13. The true use of hypothe-

4. Judgment is the presuming

things to be so, without

perceiving it.

SECT.

CHAP. XV.

Of probability.

1. Probability is the appear-

ance of agreement, upon

fallible proofs.

2. It is to supply the want of

knowledge.

3. Being that, which makes

us presume things to be

true, before we know them

to be so.

4. The grounds of probability

are two; conformity with

our own experience, or
the testimony of others
experience.

5. In this all the arguments,
pro and con, ought to be
examined, before we come
to a judgment.

6. They being capable of
great variety.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the degrees of assent.

SECT.

1. Our assent ought to be re-

gulated by the grounds of

probability.

2. These cannot be always

actually in view, and then

we must content ourselves

with the remembrance,

that we once saw ground

for such a degree of assent.

3. The ill consequence of this
if our former judgment

were not rightly made.

4. The right use of it, is

mutual charity and for-

bearance.

5. Probability is either of

matter of fact, or specu-

lation.