Artifice of our Enemies is made a Matter of Complaint.

Of this Nature is the Sufpenfion of the Habeas Corpus Act, by which His Majefty has been enabled, in thefe Times of Danger, to feize and detain the Perfons of fuch, who He had reason to believe were confpiring against His Perfon and Government. The Expediency and Reasonableness of such a temporary Sufpenfion in the present Juncture, may appear to every confiderate Man, who will turn his Thoughts impartially on this Subject.

I have chofen in Points of this Nature to draw my Arguments from the firft Principles of Government, which as they are of no Party, but affented to by every reasonable Man, carry the greater weight with them, and are accommodated to the Notions of all my Readers. Every one knows, who has confider'd the Nature of Government, that there must be in each particular Form of it an abfolute and unlimited -Power; and that this Power is lodged in the Hands of thofe, who have the making of its Laws, whether by the Nature of the Conftitution it be in One or more Perfons, in a fingle Order of Men, or in a mixt Body of different Ranks and Degrees. It is an Abfurdity to imagine that thofe, who have the Authority of making Laws, cannot fufpend any particular Law, when they think it expedient for the Publick. Without fuch a Power all Government would be defective, and not arm'd with a fufficient Force for its own Security. As Self-prefervation by all honeft Methods is the first Duty of every Community, as well as of every private Perfon, fo the publick Safety is the general View of all Laws. When therefore

any

any Law does not conduce to this great End, but on the contrary, in fome extraordinary and unnatural Junctures, the very Obfervation of it would endanger the Community, that Law ought to be laid afleep for fuch a time, by the proper Authority. Thus the very Intention of our Habeas Corpus Act, namely, the Prefervation of the Liberties of the Subject, abfolutely requires that Act to be now fufpended, fince the Confinement of dangerous and fufpected Perfons, who might ftrengthen this Rebellion, and fpread a Civil War through all Parts of this Kingdom, fecures to us our Civil Rights, and every thing that can be valuable to a Free People.

As every Government muft in its Nature be arm'd with fuch an Authority, we may obferve that thofe Governments which have been the moft famous for Publick Spirit, and the most jealous of their Liberty, have never failed to exert it upon proper Occafions. There cannot be a greater Inftance of this, than in the old Commonwealth of Rome, who flatter'd themfelves with an Opinion, that their Government had in it a due Temper of the Regal, Noble, and Popular Power, reprefented by the Confuls the Senators, and the Tribunes. The Regal Part was however in feveral Points notoriously defective, and particularly because the Confuls had not a Negative in the paffing of a Law, as the other two Branches had. Nevertheless in this Government when the Republick was threaten'd with any great and imminent Danger, they thought it for the common Safety to appoint a Temporary Dictator, invested with the whole Power of the three Branches; who, when the Danger was over, retired again into

the

the Community, and left the Government in its natural Situation. But what is more to our Cafe, the Confular Power itself, tho' infinitely fhort of the Regal Power in Great-Britain, was intrufted with the whole Authority which the Legiflature has put into the Hands of His Majefty. We have an eminent Inftance of this in the Motto of my Paper, which I fhall tranflate for the Benefit of the English Reader, after having advertised him, that the Power, there given to the Conful, was in the time of a Confpiracy. The Senate therefore made a Decree as usual, when they have Matters before them of fo horrid a nature, That the Confuls fhould take care the Commonwealth did not fuffer any Prejudice. By virtue of this very great Power which the Senate allows to the Magiftrate, according to the Ancient Cuftoms of Rome, He may raife an Army, wage War, make use of all kinds of Methods to restrain the Affociates and Citizens of Rome, and exercife the Supreme Authority both at Home and Abroad in Matters Civil and Military; whereas otherwise the Conful is not invefted with any of thefe Powers without the express Command of the People.

There now only remains to fhew, that His Majefty is legally poffeft of this Power; and that the Neceffity of the prefent Affairs requires He fhould be fo. He is intrufted with it by the Legiflature of the Nation; and in the very Notion of a Legiflature is implied a Power to change, repeal, and fufpend what Laws are in Being, as well as to make what new Laws they fhall think fit for the Good of the People. This is fo uncontroverted a Maxim, that I believe never any Body attempted to refute it. Our Legiflature have however had that

juft

juft Regard for their Fellow-Subjects, as not to entertain a Thought of abrogating this Law, but only to hinder it from operating at a time when it would endanger the Conftitution. The King is impowered to act but for a few Months by Virtue of this Sufpenfion; and by that means differs from a King of France, or any other Ty rannical Prince, who in times of Peace and Tranquillity, and upon what Occafion he pleases, fends any of his Subjects out of the Knowledge of their Friends into fuch Caftles, Dungeons, or Imprisonments as he thinks fit. Nor did the Legiflature do any thing in this that was unprecedented. The Habeas Corpus Act was made but about five and thirty Years ago, and fince that time has been fufpended four times before his prefent Majefty's Acceffion to the Throne: Twice under the Reign of King William and Queen Mary; once under the Reign of King William; and once under the Reign of Queen Anne.

The Neceffity of this Law at this time arofe from the Prospect of an Invafion, which has fince broke out into an actual Rebellion; and from Informations of fecret and dangerous Practices among Men of confiderable Figure, who could not have been prevented from doing Mischief to their Country but by fuch a Sufpenfion of this Act of Parliament.

I cannot however but observe, that notwithftanding the Lawfulness and Neceffity of fuch a Sufpenfion, had not the Rebellion broke out after the paffing of this Act of Parliament, I do not know how thofe, who had been the most inftrumental in procuring it, could have escap'd that popular Odium, which their malicious and artful Enemies have now in vain endeavoured

to

to ftir up against them. Had it been poffible for the Vigilance and Endeavours of a Miniftry to have hindered even the Attempt of an Invafion, their very Endeavours might have proved prejudicial to them. Their prudent and refolute Precautions would have turned to their Difadvantage, had they not been juftified by thofe Events, which they did all that was in their Power to obviate. This naturally brings to mind the Reflexion of Tully in the like Circumftances, That amidft the Divifions of Rome a Man was in an unhappy Condition who had a Share in the Adminiftration, nay, even in the Prefervation of the Commonwealth. O conditionem miferam non modo administrandæ, verùm etiam confervandæ Reipublicæ !

Befides, every unprejudiced Man will confider how mildly and equitably this Power has been used. The Perfons confined have been treated with all poffible Humanity, and abridg ed of nothing but the Liberty of hurting their Country, and very probably of ruining both themselves and their Families. And as to the Numbers of those who are under this fhort Reftraint, it is very obfervable, that People do not feem fo much furprised at the Confinement of fome, as at the Liberty of many others. But we may from hence conclude, that every Englishman muft obferve with great Pleafure, that His Majefty does not in this great Point regulate Himself by any private Jealoufies or Sufpicions, but by thofe Evidences and Informations which he has received.

We have already found the good Confequences of this Sufpenfion, in that it has hinder'd the Rebellion from gathering the Strength it would other wife have gained; not to mention thofe Numbers