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Is it at all easier to believe, that truth and falsehood can interchange their natures, than that a square and a circle can interchange theirs?

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Finally; if virtue and vice, or sin and holiness, are founded only in the will of God; then, I ask, What is the Nature of that Will? We are accustomed to say, the Scriptures are accustomed to say, that God is holy, righteous, good, and glorious in holiness: expressions which, together with many others of the same nature, indicate that God himself, and therefore, that the will of God, is excellent, and supremely deserving of his own infinite love, and of the highest love of all intelligent creatures. Does this excellence of God depend on the fact, that he willed his moral character, and therefore his Will, to be excellent? Or is the character of God, and of consequence his will, excellent in its own nature? If the divine character be not excellent in its own nature, and independently any act of the divine Will, determining that it should be so; then, if God had been a being infinitely malevolent, and by an act of his will had determined, that his character should be infinitely excellent, it would of course have become infinitely excellent; and he himself would have deserved to be loved, praised, and glorified, for his infinite malice, cruelty, and oppression, just as he now does for his infinite goodness, truth, faithfulness, and mercy. According to this scheme, therefore, there is no original moral difference between the characters of an infinitely malevolent being, and an infinitely benevolent one; because this difference depends on a mere arbitrary act of will, and not at all on the respective natures of the things themselves. That a malevolent being would have made this determination, there is no more reason to doubt, than that it would be made by a benevolent being: for it cannot be doubted, that a malevolent being would have entirely loved and honoured himself. The question, whether God is a benevolent, or malevolent, Being, seems, therefore, to be nugatory: for all our inquiries concerning the subject, which have any practical importance, terminate in this single question: What has God chosen?

We have of course no interest in asking what is his moral na

ture.

The Scriptures certainly exhibit this subject in a very different light. They every where consider moral things, that is, both moral beings, and their actions, as differing altogether in their several natures, and independently of any act of the divine will, determining that they should thus differ. Particularly, they exhibit God himself not only as being holy, righteous, just, true, faithful, kind, and merciful, but as excellent on account of these things; infinitely excellent; infinitely glorious; infinitely deserving of the love, that is, the Complacency, (the kind of love every where intended in this discourse) of his Intelligent creatures. Accordingly, God is often spoken of as excellent; and as excellency, in the abstract. Thus, he is styled the Excellency of Jacob. His name is said to be

excellent in all the earth. How excellent, saith the Psalmist, is thy loving kindness. The Lord of hosts, says Isaiah, is excellent in working. In all these passages it is plainly declared, that God is excellent in his own nature. In the same manner, the Scriptures assert, that his law is perfect, and his commandment pure; that his statutes are right, and his judgments altogether righteous; and that his commandment is holy, just, and good: that is, that these things possess the several kinds of excellence, attributed to them, in their own nature. For if the Scriptures intended only, that they were good, because God willed them to be so, when they were before neither good nor evil; it would have been mere tautology to have used this language. It would have been no more, than saying, that the law, the commandments, and the statutes, of God were his law, commandments, and statutes: this fact being, according to the scheme here opposed, all that, in which their excellence lies. In the same manner, when it is said, Thou art good, and doest good; it ought to be said, Thou art, what thou art ; and doest what thou doest, for this is all that is meant, according to the scheme in question.

In the same manner, the Scriptures declare, that the righteous Lord loveth righteousness; and thus teach us, that there is in rightcousness a cause, a reason, or, in other words, a nature, for which it is, and deserves to be, loved. They also assure us, that he hates wickedness, and that it is an abomination to him. There is, therefore, a reason, why he hates it. As he always hated the latter, and loved the former; and, therefore, before the one was forbidden, and the other required, of his Intelligent creatures; it is certain, that the one was hateful, and the other lovely, in its own

nature.

In Jer. ix. 24, it is said, Let him that glorieth glory in this; that he understandeth, and knoweth me; that I am the LORD, which exercise loving-kindness, judgment and righteousness, in the earth; for in these things I delight, saith the LORD. In this passage God requires mankind to glory not merely because he acts, but because he acts in such a manner; because he exercises loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness, in the earth; and informs us, that he himself delights in these things: in other words, because they are lovely in his sight.

In Hebrews vi. 18, it is said, that it is impossible for God to lie. If at any given time it is impossible for God to lie; it has been always impossible. For what reason? If truth and falsehood are in their own nature indifferent; then, certainly, it was once just as easy for God to lie, as to speak truth. The only reason, why it is now impossible for him to utter falsehood, is, that he is utterly indisposed to this conduct. But if falsehood and truth have the same moral nature in themselves; there can be no reason, why he was originally disposed to speak truth, rather than falsehood. Yet he is infinitely disposed to speak truth, and infinitely indisposed to

utter falsehood. Falsehood is therefore totally odious in itself, and truth altogether desirable.

Every thing contained in the Scriptures, relative to this subject, is of the same tenour, so far as I have been able to understand them, with the passages which I have quoted. Nor have I found in them a single hint, that virtue and vice have not in themselves a totally different moral nature; or that they depend for their excellence, and worthlessness, on an act of the divine will. On the contrary, the whole drift of the Scriptures is to exhibit them, as possessed of these characteristics in themselves; and as, for this reason, chosen and required on the one hand, and rejected and forbidden on the other.

There are persons, who speak of the Will of God as constituting the nature of things, when they only mean, that it gives them existence. These persons appear not to discern, that the nature of the thing is exactly the same, whether it exist, or is only seen in contemplation. The Achilles of Homer, the Æneas of Virgil, the Lear of Shakspeare, and the Grandison of Richardson, have all the same character, which real men, answering severally to the descriptions of them, would possess. The will of God gives birth to the existence of all things. But the things themselves, as seen by the divine Mind, have exactly the same nature, and sustain the same relations to each other; have the same value or worthlessness, the same excellence or turpitude; which they have, when they really exist. This nature is what makes them desirable, or undesirable, to the eye of God; and induces him either to choose, or reject them. While it is true, therefore, that the will of God gives birth to all things, and to their several natures, as really existing in fact; it is equally true, that, as seen by the divine Mind, the same things had exactly the same nature before they existed. A house, before it is built, and when formed merely in a plan, has exactly the same figure and proportions, as seen by the mind of the builder, which it has, after it is built according to this plan. Truth and falsehood, right and wrong, in creatures, were exactly the same things to the eye of Omniscience, before, and after, they

existed.

From these considerations it is, I apprehend, evident, that the Foundation of virtue is not in the Will of God, but in the Nature of things. The next object of inquiry, therefore, is, Where in the nature of things shall we find this foundation? I begin my answer to this question by observing,

2dly. That there is no Ultimate Good but Happiness. By Ultimate Good, I intend that, which is originally denominated good. Good is of two kinds only: Happiness, and the Causes, or Means, of happiness. Happiness is the ultimate good: the causes, or means, of happiness, are good, only because they produce it. Thus fruit is good, because it is pleasant to the taste. The tree, on which it grows, is good, because it produces it.

Health is good in itself: a medicine is good, because it preserves, or restores, it.

We are accustomed to hear so much said, and truly said, concerning the excellence, beauty, and glory, of Virtue, that we are ready to conceive, and speak, of it, as being Original, or Ultimate good, independently of the happiness, which it brings with it. Nay, we are ready to feel dissatisfied wi with ourselves and others, for calling this position in question; to consider this conduct as involving a kind of irreverence towards this glorious object; as diminishing its importance, and obscuring its lustre. This, however, arises from mere misapprehension. If virtue brought with it no enjoyment to us, and produced no happiness to others; it would be wholly destitute of all the importance, beauty, and glory, with which it is now invested. Let any good man ask himself what that is, for which he values his own virtue; what constitutes the commendations of it in the conversation and writings, particularly the sermons, with which he is acquainted; and what is the amount of all that, for which it is commended in the Scriptures; and he will find every idea, which he forms of it distinctly and definitely, completely summed up in these two things: that it is the means of glory to God, and of good to his creatures. I have shown in a former discourse, that to glorify God, that is, voluntarily, (the thing which is here intended) is exactly the same conduct towards him, which, when directed towards creatures, produces their happiness. It is, in truth, doing all that, which it is in our power to do, towards the happiness of the Creator. The happiness of God consists in the enjoyment, furnished partly by his sufficiency for all great and glorious purposes, and partly by the actual accomplishment of these purposes. I separate these things, only for the sake of exhibiting them more distinctly to view; and am well aware, that as they exist in the divine Mind, they are absolutely inseparable. The Lord, saith the Psalmist, shall rejoice in his works. Had these works never existed; God would not thus rejoice. God is also said to delight in the upright; and to delight in his Church. Were there no upright persons; were there no Church; this delight would cease. It is therefore true in the proper sense, that virtuous persons, by voluntarily glorifying God, become the objects of his delight; or, in other words, the means of happiness, or enjoyment, to him. It will not be supposed, that God is, for this reason, dependent on his creatures for his happiness, or for any part of it. These very creatures are absolutely dependent on Him; and are made by himself the objects of his delight: and such they become by the same voluntary conduct, which in other cases produces happiness in creatures. When we consider virtue, as it respects creatures only, the character, which I have given to it, is more easily seen, and more readily comprehended. It may easily be seen, in this case, that all its value consists in the enjoyment, which either attends, or follows it. All the exercises of virtue are

delightful in themselves. It is delightful to do good to others; to see them happy, and made happy by our means; to enjoy peace of conscience, and self-approbation. These and the like enjoyments, may be said to attend virtue; and, it is well known, enter largely into every account, which is given of its excellence. The Consequences of virtue are no other, than the good, which it produces in originating, and increasing, social happiness: and these, together with the articles involved in the two preceding considerations, make up the whole amount of all the commendations of this divine object, given either by the Scriptures, or by mankind. The excellence of virtue, therefore, consists wholly in this: that it is the cause of good, that is, of happiness; the Ultimate good; the only thing, for which virtue is valuable.

Virtue in God, or Benevolence, is on all hands considered as the glory, and excellency, of the divine character. What is Benevolence? The love of doing good; or a disposition to produce happiness. In what does its excellence consist? In this: that it is the voluntary cause of happiness. Take away this single attribute of Virtue; and it will be easily seen, that its excellence is all taken away also.

These observations prove, if I mistake not, that happiness is the only Ultimate good; and that virtue is termed good, only as being the cause of happiness.

3dly. Virtue is the only original cause of happiness. It is hardly necessary to say, that Involuntary beings can, of themselves, produce nothing; as being absolutely inactive; and that there are no Active beings, beside those which are Voluntary. But voluntary beings produce happiness, only when they are disposed to produce it and the only disposition, which prompts to the production of it, is Virtue. This is so obvious, after what has been said, as to need no further illustration.

Contrivance and Activity are the original sources of all the effects, or changes, which take place in the Universe; particularly of all the happiness, which it contains. Contrivance and Activity in the Creator gave birth to all existence, except his own. Contrivance and Activity in Intelligent creatures, under God, give birth to all the happiness, of which they are the sources to themselves and each other.

Minds are active, only by means of the power of Willing. The two great dispositions of minds, by which all their volitions are characterised, and directed, are Benevolence and Selfishness. Benevolence is Virtue; Selfishness is Sin. Benevolence aims to promote happiness in all beings capable of happiness: Selfishness, at the promotion of the private, separate happiness of one; subordinating to it that of all others, and opposing that of others, whenever it is considered as inconsistent with that of one's self. Benevolence, therefore, directs the whole active power, or energy, of the mind, in which it exists, to the production of the most extensive

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