Idiots and madmen, I. 140, § 12,
Ignorance, our ignorance infinite-
ly exceeds our knowledge, II. 344, § 22 Causes of ignorance, II. 345, § 23
1. For want of ideas, ibid.
2. For want of a discoverable connexion between the ideas we have, II. 350, § 28
3. For want of tracing the ideas we have, II. 352, § 30 Illation, what, III. 104, § 2 Immensity, I. 148, § 4
How this idea is got, E. 195, § 3 Immoralities, of whole nations, I. 38-40, § 9, 10 Immortality, not annexed to any shape, II. 363, § 15 Impenetrability, I. 99, § 1 Imposition of opinions unreason- able, III. 94, § 4
Impossible est idem esse & non esse, not the first thing known, I. 29, § 25 Impossibility, not an innate idea, I. 55, § 3 Impression on the mind, what, I. 14, § 5
Inadequate ideas, II. 102, §.1 Incompatibility, how far know- able, II. 337, § 15 Individuationis principium, is ex- istence, II. 46, § 3 Infallible judge of controversies, I. 63, § 12
Inference, what, III. 86-7, § 2, 3, 4 Infinite, why the idea of infinite not applicable to other ideas as well as those of quantity, since they can be as often repeated, I. 197, § 6
The idea of infinity of space, or number, and of space, or num- ber infinite, must be distin- guished, I. 198, § 7 Our idea of infinite very obscure, I. 199, § 8
Number furnishes us with the clearest ideas of infinite, I. 200, § 9
The idea of infinite, a growing idea, I. 201, § 12
Our idea of infinite, partly posi- tive, partly comparative, part- ly negative, I. 203, § 15 Why some men think they have an idea of infinite duration, but not of infinite space, I. 207, § 20
Why disputes about infinity are usually perplexed, I. 208, § 21 Our idea of infinity has its ori- ginal in sensation and reflec- tion, I. 209, § 22
We have no positive idea of in- finity, I. 202, § 13, 14: I. 204, §16
Infinity, why more commonly al- lowed to duration than to ex- pansion, 1. 181, § 4
How applied to God by us, I. 194, § 1
How we get this idea, I. 195, § 2, 3
The infinity of number, dura-
tion, and space, different ways considered, I. 187, § 10, 11 Innate truths must be the first known, I. 30, § 26
Principles to no purpose, if men can be ignorant or doubtful of them, I. 44, § 13
Principles of my lord Herbert examined, I. 45, § 15, &c. Moral rules to no purpose, if effaceable, or alterable, I. 49, § 20 Propositions must be distinguish- ed from others by their clear- ness and usefulness, I. 71, $21 The doctrine of innate principles of ill consequence, I. 75, § 24
Instant, what, I. 167, § 10 And continual change, I, 168, § 13, 14, 15
Intuitive knowledge, I. 69, § 1 Our highest certainty, III. 120, $14 Invention, wherein it consists, I. 132, § 8
Iron, of what advantage to man- kind, III. 80, § 11 Judgment, wrong judgments, in reference to good and evil, I. 258, § 58
Right judgment, 11. 252, § 4 One cause of wrong judgment, III. 93, § 3
Wherein it consists, III. 86, &c.
KNOWLEDGE has a great con- nexion with words, II. 266, § 25
The author's definition of it ex- plained and defended, II. 292, note. How it differs from faith, III. 89, § 2, 3: II. 293, note.
What, II. 287, § 2
How much our knowledge de- pends on our senses, 11. 282, § 23
Actual, II. 294, § 8 Habitual, ibid. § 8
Habitual, twofold, II. 295, § 9 Intuitive, I. 69, § 1 Intuitive, the clearest, ibid. Intuitive, irresistible, ibid. Demonstrative, II. 298, § 2 Of general truths, is all either intuitive or demonstrative, II. 304, § 14
Of particular existences, is sensi- tive, ibid.
Clear ideas do not always produce clear knowledge, II. 305, § 15
What kind of knowledge we
have of nature, III. 154, § 12 Its beginning and progress, I. 142, § 15, 16, 17: 1. 20-1, § 15, 16
Given us, in the faculties to at- tain it, I. 64, § 12 Men's knowledge according to the employment of their facul- ties, I. 72, § 22
To be got only by the application of our own thought to the contemplation of things, I. 74, § 23
Extent of human knowledge, II. 306
Our knowledge goes not beyond our ideas, ibid. § 1
Nor beyond the perception of their agreement or disagree- ment, ibid. § 2
Reaches not to all our ideas, ib.§3 Much less to the reality of things, II. 307, § 6
Yet very improveable if right ways were taken, ibid. § 6 Of co-existence very narrow, II. 334-5, § 9, 10, 11
And therefore, of substances very narrow, II, 336, &c. § 14, 15, 16
Of other relations indetermina- ble, II. 339, § 18 Of existence, II. 344, § 21 Certain and universal, where to be had, II. 351, § 29
Ill use of words, a great hin- drance of knowledge, II. 352, $30 General, where to be got, II. 353, § 31
Lies only in our thoughts, III. 17, § 13
Reality of our knowledge, II.
Of mathematical truths, how real, II. 356, § 6
Of morality, real, II. 357, § 7 Of substances, how far real, II. 360, § 12
What makes our knowledge real, II. 355, § 3: II. 357, § 8 Considering things, and not names, the way to knowledge, II. 361, § 13
Of substances, wherein it con- sists, II. 360, § 11 What required to any tolerable knowledge of substances, III. 18, § 14
Self-evident, III. 20, § 2 Of identity, and diversity, as large as our ideas, II. 106, §8; III. 21, § 4 Wherein it consists, ibid. Of co-existence, very scanty, III. 23, § 5
Of relations of modes, not so scanty, III. 24, § 6
Of real existence, none, ibid. § 7 Begins in particulars, III. 25, $9
Intuitive of our own existence, III. 50, § 3
Demonstrative of a God, ibid. § 1 Improvement of knowledge, III. 72
Not improved by maxims, ibid. § 1
Why so thought, ibid. § 2 Knowledge improved, only by perfecting and comparing ideas, III. 75, § 6: III. 82, § 14 And finding their relations, III. 76, § 7
By intermediate ideas, III. 82, § 14
In substances, how to be improv- ed, III. 77, §9 Partly necessary, partly volun- tary, III. 83, § 1: III. 84, § 2 Why some, and so little, ibid. § 2
How increased, III. 96, § 6
The use of language destroyed by the subtilty of disputing, II. 253-4, § 6, 7, 8 Ends of language, II. 265, § 23 Its imperfections, not easy to be cured, II. 270, § 2: II. 271-2, $4,5,6
The cure of them necessary to philosophy, II. 271, § 3
To use no word without a clear and distinct idea annexed to it, is one remedy of the imperfec- tions of language, II. 274, $8,9 Propriety in the use of words, another remedy, II. 275, § 11 Law of nature generally allowed, I. 37, § 6
There is, though not innate, I.
Its inforcement, II. 90, § 6 Learning, the ill state of learning in
these latter ages, II. 234, &c. Of the schools lies chiefly in the abuse of words, II. 239, &c. II. 253
Such learning of ill consequence,
II. 255, § 10, &c. Liberty, what, I. 224-7, § 8, 9, 10, 11, 12: I. 228, § 15
Belongs not to the will, I. 227, $14
To be determined by the result of our own deliberation, is no restraint of liberty, I. 250, § 48, 49, 50 Founded in a power of suspend- ing our particular desires, I. 249, § 47: I. 252-3, § 51,
Light, its absurd definitions, II. 175, § 10
Light in the mind, what,III.142, §13
Logic has introduced obscurity into languages, II. 253-4, § 6, 7 And hindered knowledge, II. 254, §7 Love, I. 216, § 4
MADNESS, I. 140, § 13. Opposi-
tion to reason deserves that name, II. 138, § 4 Magisterial, the most knowing are least magisterial, III. 95, § 4 Making, II. 1, § 2 Man not the product of blind chance, I. 189, § 6
The essence of man is placed in his shape 11.304, § 16 We know not his real essence, II. 194, §3: II. 206, §22: II. 210, § 27
The boundaries of the human species not determined, II. 210, § 27
What makes the same individual man, II. 61, § 21: II. 60, $29
The same man may be different persons, H. 60, § 19 Mathematics, their methods, III. 70, § 7. Improvement, III. 82, § 15 Matter incomprehensible, both in its cohesion and divisibility, II. 22, § 23: II. 28, § 30, 31 What, II. 258, § 15 Whether it may think, is not to be known, II. 308-31, § 6: II. 316, &c.
Cannot produce motion, or any thing else, 111. 55, § 10 And motion cannot produce thought, ibid.
Not eternal, III. 60, § 18 Maxims, III. 20, &c.: III. 34-6,
Why the most general self-evi- dent propositions alone, pass for maxims, III. 34, § 11 Are commonly proofs, only
where there is no need of proofs, III. 36, § 15 ́
Of little use, with clear terms, III. 38, § 19
Of dangerous use, with doubtful terms, III. 34, &c. § 12: III. 39, § 20 When first known, I. 17, &c. $ 9, 12, 13: I. 19, § 14: I. 21, §16
How they gain assent, I. 25-6, § 21, 22
Made from particular observa- tions, ibid.
Not in the understanding before they are actually known, I. 20, § 22
Neither their terms nor ideas in-
nate, I. 27, § 23
Least known to children and il- literate people, I. 30, § 27 Memory, I. 128, § 2
Attention, pleasure, and pain, settle ideas in the memory, I. 129, § 3
And repetition, ibid. § 4 : I. 131, § 6
Difference of memory, I. 129-
In remembrance the mind some- times active, sometimes pas- sive, I. 131, §7
Its necessity, I. 130, § 5: I. 132, §8
Defects, I. 132, § 8, 9 In brutes, I. 133, § 10 Metaphysics, and school divinity filled with uninstructive pro- positions, III. 26, § 9
Method used in mathematics, III. 76, §7
Mind, the quickness of its actions, I. 125, § 10
Minutes, hours, days, not necessary to duration, I. 174, § 23
Miracles, the ground of assent to miracles, III. 102, § 13 Misery, what, I. 245, § 42 Modes, mixed, I. 274, § 1 Made by the mind, I. 275, § 2 Sometimes got by the explication of their names, I. 276, § 3 Whence a mixed mode has its unity, ibid. § 4
Occasion of mixed modes, I.277, §5
Mixed modes, their ideas, how got, I. 278, § 9 Modes simple and complex, I. 145, § 5
Simple modes, I. 147, § 1 Of motion, I. 209, § 2 Moral good and evil, what, II. 89, § 5
Three rules, whereby men judge of moral rectitude, II. 90, §7 Beings, how founded on simple
ideas of sensation and reflec- tion, II. 95-8 § 14, 15 Rules not self-evident, I. 35, § 4 Variety of opinions, concerning moral rules, whence, I. 36, § 5, 6
Rules,if innate, cannot with pub- lic allowance be transgress- ed, I. 40, &c. § 11, 12, 13 Morality, capable of demonstra- tion, III. 113, § 16: II. 340, § 18: III. 77, § 8 The proper study of mankind, III. 79, § 11
Of actions, in their conformity to a rule, II. 98, § 15 Mistakes in moral notions,owing to names, ibid. § 16 Discourses in morality, if not clear, it is the fault of the speaker, II. 279, § 17 Hindrances of demonstrative treating of morality. 1. Want of marks. 2. Complexedness, II. 341, § 19. 3. Interest, II. 343, § 20
Change of names in morality, changes not the nature of things, II. 358, § 9
And mechanism, hard to be re- conciled, I. 45, § 14 Secured amidst men's wrong judgments, I. 268, § 70 Motion, slow or very swift, why not perceived, I. 166-7, § 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
Voluntary, inexplicable, III. 61, § 19
Its absurd definitions, II. 174-5, $8,9
NAMING of ideas, I. 138, § 8 Names moral, established by law, are not to be varied from, II. 360, § 10
Of substances, standing for real essences, are not capable to convey certainty to the un- derstanding, III. 9, § 5 Standing for nominal essences, will make some, though not many certain propositions, III. 10, $6
Why men substitute names for realessences, which they know not, II. 261, § 19
Two false suppositions, in such an use of namse, II. 263, § 21 A particular name to every par- ticular thing impossible, 11. 154, § 2
And useless, ibid. § 3 Proper names, where used, II. 155, § 4, 5
Specific names are affixed to the nominal essence, 11.169, § 16 Of simple ideas and substances,
refer to things, II. 172, § 2 What names stand for both real and nominal essence, 11. 173, §3
Of simple ideas not capable of definitions, ibid. § 4 Why, II. 174, § 7
Of least doubtful signification, I. 179, § 15
Have few accents" in linea præ- dicamentali," II. 180, § 16
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