1. They are self-evident.

2. Wherein that self-evidence

consists.

3. Self-evidence not peculiar

to received axioms.

4. First, as to identity and

diversity, all propositions

are equally self-evident.

5. Secondly, in co-existence,

we have few self evident

propositions.

6. Thirdly, in other relations

we may have.

7. Fourthly, concerning real

existence, we have none.

8. These axioms do not much

influence our other know-

ledge.

9. Because they are not the

truths the first known.

10. Because on them the other

parts of our knowledge

do not depend.

11. What use these general

maxims have.

12. Maxims, if care be not

taken in the use of words,

may prove contradictions.

13. Instance in vacuum.

14. They prove not the exist-

ence of things without us.

15. Their application danger-

ous about complex ideas.

16-18. Instance in man.

19. Little use of these maxims,

in proofs, where we have

clear and distinct ideas.

20. Their use dangerous,

where our ideas are con-

fused.

CHAP. VIII.

Of trifling propositions.

SECT.

1. Some propositions bring

no increase to our know-

ledge.

2, 3. As, first, identical propo-

sitions.

4. Secondly, when a part of

any complex idea is pre-
dicated of the whole.

5. As part of the definition

of the term defined.

6. Instance, man and palfry.

7 For this teaches but the

signification of words.

8. but no real knowledge.

9. General propositions, con-

cerning substances, are

often trifling.

10. And why.

11. Thirdly, using words va-

riously, is trifling with

them.

12. Marks of verbal proposi-

tions. First, predication

in abstract.

13. Secondly, a part of the

definition, predicated of

any term.

CHAP. IX.

Of our knowledge of existence.

SECT.

1. General, certain proposi-

tions concern not exist-

2. Man knows that he him-

self is.

3. He knows also, that no-

thing cannot produce a

being, therefore

thing eternal.

some-

4. That eternal being must

be most powerful.

5. And most knowing.

6. And therefore God.

7. Our idea of a most perfect

being, not the sole proof

of a God.

8. Something from eternity.

9. Two sorts of beings, co-

gitative and incogitative.

10. Incogitative being cannot

produce a cogitative.

11, 12. Therefore there has been

an eternal wisdom.

13. Whether material, or no.

14. Not material, first, be-

cause every particle of

matter is not cogitative.

15. Secondly, one particle

alone of matter cannot be

cogitative.

16. Thirdly, a system of in-

cogitative matter cannot

be cogitative.

17. Whether in motion or at

rest.

18, 19. Matter not co-eternalwith

an eternal mind.

CHAP. XI.

Of the knowledge of the existence
of other things.

SECT.

1. Is to be had only by sen-
sation.

2. Instance, whiteness of this

paper.

3. This, though not so cer-

tain as demonstration, yet

may be called knowledge,

and proves the existence

of things without us.

4. First, because we cannot

have them but by the in-

lets of the senses.

5. Secondly, because an idea

from actual sensation, and

another from memory, are

very distinct perceptions.

6. Thirdly, pleasure or pain,

which accompanies actual

sensation, accompanies not

the returning of those

ideas, without the external

objects.

7. Fourthly, our senses assist

one another's testimony of

the existence of outward

things.

8. This certainty is as great

as our condition needs.

9. But reaches no farther

than actual sensation.

10. Folly to expect demon-

stration in every thing.

11. Past existence is known

by memory.

12. The existence of spirits

not knowable.

13. Particular propositions con-

cerning existence are

knowable.

14. And general propositions

concerning abstract ideas.

CHAP. XII.

Of the improvement of our
knowledge.

SECT.

1. Knowledge is not from
maxims.

2. (The occasion of that opi-
nion.)

3. But from the comparing

clear and distinct ideas.

4. Dangerous to build upon

precarious principles.

5. This no certain way to

truth.

6. But to compare clear,

complete ideas under stea-

dy names.

SECT.

CHA P. XV.

Of probability.

1. Probability is the appear-

ance of agreement, upon

fallible proofs.

2. It is to supply the want

of knowledge.

3. Being that, which makes

us presume things to be

true, before we know

them to be so.

4. The grounds of probabi-

lity are two; conformity

with our own experience,

or the testimony of others

experience.

5. In this all the arguments,

pro and con, ought to be

examined, before we come

to a judgment.

6. They being capable of

great variety.

5. Probability is either of

matter of fact, or specu-

lation.

6. The concurrent experi-

ence of all other men with

ours produces assurance

approaching to
to know-

ledge.

7. Unquestionable testimony

and experience for the

most part produce confi-

dence.

8. Fair testimony, and the

nature of the thing indif-

ferent, produces also con-

fident belief.

9. Experience and testimonies

clashing, infinitely vary

the degrees of probability.

10. Traditional testimonies, the

farther removed, the less

their proof.

11. Yet history is of great use.

12. In things which sense can-

not discover, analogy is

the great rule of probabi-

lity.

13. One case, where contrary

experience lessens not the

testimony.

14. The bare testimony of re-

velation is the highest cer-

tainty.

8. We reason about particu-

lars.

9. First, reason fails us for

want of ideas.

10. Secondly, because of ob-

scure and imperfect ideas.

11. Thirdly, for want of inter-

mediate ideas.

12. Fourthly, because of wrong

principles.

13. Fifthly, because of doubt-

ful terms.

14. Our highest degree of

knowledge is intuitive,

without reasoning.

15. The next is demonstration

by reasoning.

16. To supply the narrowness

of this, we have nothing

but judgment upon pro-

bable reasoning.

17. Intuition,

judgment.

demonstration,

18. Consequences of words,

and consequences of ideas.

19. Four sorts of arguments:

first, ad verecundiam.

20. Secondly, ad ignorantiam.

21. Thirdly, ad hominem.

22. Fourthly, ad judicium.

23. Above, contrary, and ac-

cording to reason.

24. Reason and faith not oppo-,

site.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of faith and reason, and their dis-

tinct provinces.

SECT.

1. Necessary to know their

boundaries.

2. Faith and reason what, as

contra-distinguished.

3. No new simple idea can

be conveyed by traditional

revelation.

4. Traditional revelation may

make us know proposi-

tions. knowable also by

reason, but not with the

15, 16. Belief, no proof of reve-
lation.

CHAP. XX.

Of wrong assent, or errour.

SECT.

1. Causes of errour.

2. First, want of proofs.

3. Obj. What shall become

of those who want them,

answered.

4. People hindered from in-

quiry.

5. Secondly, want of skill to

use them.

6. Thirdly, want of will to

use them.

7. Fourthly, wrong measures

of probability; whereof,

8-10. First, doubtful proposi-

tions, taken for principles.

11. Secondly, received hypo-

theses.

12. Thirdly, predominant pas-

sions.

13. The means of evading
probabilities, 1st, suppos-
ed fallacy

14. 2dly, supposed arguments
for the contrary.

15. What probabilities deter-

mine the assent.

16. Where it is in our power

to suspend it.

17. Fourthly, authority.

18. Men not in so many er-

rours, as is imagined.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the division of the sciences.

SECT.

1. Three sorts.
2. First, Physica.

3. Secondly, Practica.
4. Thirdly, EnuεIVITINY.
5. This is the first division of

the objects of knowledge.