against, as is any of those opinions which trouble men's ease or reputation, for that is the greatest of their malignity.

But if we consider that sects are made, and opinions are called heresies upon interest, and the grounds of emolument, we shall see that a good life would cure much of this mischief. For first, the church of Rome, which is the great dictatrix of dogmatical resolutions, and the declarer of heresy, and calls heretic more than all the world besides, hath made that the rule of heresy, which is the conservatory of interest, and the ends of men. For, to recede from the doctrine of the church, with them, makes heresy; that is, to disrepute their authority, and not to obey them, not to be their subjects, not to give them the empire of our conscience, is the great pingov of heresy.

So that, with them, heresy is to be esteemed clearly by human ends, not by Divine rules; that is formal heresy, which does materially disservè them. And it would make a suspicious man a little inquisitive into their particular doctrines: and when he finds that indulgencies, and jubilees, and purgatories, and masses, and offices for the dead, are very profitable,-that the doctrine of primacy, of infallibility, of superiority over councils, of indirect power in temporals, are great instruments of secular honour; he would be apt enough to think that if the church of Rome would learn to lay her honour at the feet of the crucifix, and despise the world, and prefer Jerusalem before Rome, and

heaven above the Lateran, that these opinions would not have in them any native strength to support them against the perpetual assaults of their adversaries, that speak so much reason and Scripture against them. I have instanced in the Roman religion, but I wish it may be considered also, how far men's doctrines, in other sects, serve men's temporal ends; so far that it would not be unreasonable or unnecessary to attempt to cure some of their distemperatures or mispersuasions, by the salutary precepts of sanctity and holy life. Sure enough, if it did not more concern their reputation, and their lasting interest, to be counted true believers rather than good livers, they would rather endeavour to live well, than to be accounted of a right opinion in things beside the creed.

For my own particular, I cannot but expect that God, in his justice, should enlarge the bounds of the Turkish empire, or some other way punish Christians, by reason of their pertinacious disputing about things unnecessary, undeterminable, and unprofitable, and for their hating and persecuting their brethren, which should be as dear to them as their own lives, for not consenting to one another's follies and senseless vanities. How many volumes have been written about angels, about immaculate conception, about original sin, when that all that is solid reason or clear revelation, in all these three articles, may be reasonably enough comprised in forty lines? And in these trifles and impertinencies men are curiously busy, while they neglect those glorious

precepts of Christianity and holy life, which are the glories of our religion, and would enable us to a happy eternity.

My lord, thus far my thoughts have carried me, and then I thought I had reason to go further, and to examine the proper grounds upon which these persuasions might rely and stand firm, in case any body should contest against them. For, possibly, men may be angry at me, and my design: for I do all them great displeasure, who think no end is then well served, when their interest is disserved; and but that I have written so untowardly and heavily, that I am not worth a consideration, possibly some or other might be writing against me. But then I must tell them, I am prepared of an answer beforehand: for I think I have spoken reason in my book, and examined it with all the severity I have; and if after all this I be deceived, this confirms me in my first opinion, and becomes a new argument to me that I have spoken reason; for it furnishes me with a new instance that it is necessary there should be a mutual compliance and toleration, because even then when a man thinks he hath most reason to be confident, he may easily be deceived.

For I am sure I have no other design but the prosecution and advantage of truth, and I may truly use the words of Gregory Nazianzen, "Non studemus paci in detrimentum veræ doctrinæ, ut facilitatis et mansuetudinis famam colligamus:" but I have written this, because I thought it was necessary, and seasonable, and charitable, and agreeable to the great precepts and design of Christianity, consonant

to the practice of the apostles, and of the best ages of the church, most agreeable to Scripture and reason, to revelation and the nature of the thing; and it is such a doctrine, that, if there be variety in human affairs, if the event of things be not settled in a durable consistence, but is changeable, every one of us all may have need of it. I shall only, therefore, desire that they who will read it, may come to the reading it with as much simplicity of purposes and unmixed desires of truth, as I did to the writing it; and that no man trouble himself with me or my discourse, that thinks beforehand that his opinion cannot be reasonably altered. If he thinks me to be mistaken before he tries, let him also think that he may be mistaken too,-and that he who judges before he hears, is mistaken, though he gives a right sentence.

Οὐ δεῖ σχετλιάζειν καὶ βοᾶν, πρὶν ἂν μάθης,

was good counsel. But at a venture, I shall leave this sentence of Solomon to his consideration, "A wise man feareth, and departeth from evil; but a fool rageth, and is confident."-Пávra sideva oleσban καὶ διισχυρίζεσθαι “ is a trick of boys, and bold young fellows,' says Aristotle; but they who either know themselves, or things, or persons, çoσтidéaσi ảeì tò Tows, nai To Táxα. Peradventure yea, peradventure no, is very often the wisest determination of a question. For there are μωραὶ καὶ ἀπαίδευτοι ζητήσεις, as the apostle notes, "Foolish and unlearned questions:" and it

9 Aristoph. in Pluto. 477. Brunck.

* 2 Tim. ii.

were better to stop the current of such fopperies by silence, than, by disputing them, convey them to posterity. And many things there are of more profit, which yet are of no more certainty; and, therefore, boldness of assertion (except it be in matters of faith and clearest revelation) is an argument of the vanity of the man, never of the truth of the proposition: for, to such matters, the saying of Xenophanes, in Varro, is pertinent and applicable, "Hominis est hæc opinari, Dei scire;" "God only knows them, and we conjecture."

Μάντις ἄριστος ὅστις εἰκάζει καλῶς.

And although I be as desirous to know what I should, and what I should not, as any of my brethren, the sons of Adam; yet I find that the more I search, the further I am from being satisfied, and make but few discoveries, save of my own ignorance: and, therefore, I am desirous to follow the example of a very wise personage, Julius Agricola, of whom Tacitus gave this testimony, "Retinuitque (quod est difficillimum) ex scientia modum :" or, that I may take my precedent from within the pale of the church, it was the saying of St. Austin, "Mallem quidem eorum, quæ à me quæsivisti, habere scientiam quam ignorantiam; sed quia id nondum potui, magis eligo cautam ignorantiam confiteri, quam falsam scientiam profiteri." And these words do very much express my sense. But if there be any man so confident as Luther sometimes was, who said that he could expound all Scripture;