A Study of the Realistic Movement in Contemporary Philosophy, المجلد 225McClure Company, Incorporated Printers, 1912 - 67 من الصفحات |
عبارات ومصطلحات مألوفة
analysis asserted assumption body cognitive complex compresent concept connection conscious behavior constitutive construction content element content known content perceived Descartes distinction distinguish epistemology experience external relation extra-mental fact feeling function G. E. Moore given in perception Grammar of Science hallucinations idealism ideas illusion immediate objects internal Journal of Phil knowing process laws of thought Locke's mathematics mean memory contents ment mental entities metaphysical mind modern philosophy monism naive realism nature neo-realistic nervous system ness non-perceptual contents Nunn objects of knowledge pain perceived object perceptive process physical objects physical relations present primary problem Professor Holt Professor Montague proposition psychical act psychical existents psychology qualitative differences question real object realistic doctrine reality rela relational theory relations are external representative realism Russell Scientific Method sciousness secondary qualities sense situation solipsism stimulations stimulus-reaction Subjective subjectivism subsistents T. H. Green term consciousness theory of consciousness thing thinking thought tion Virtual images
مقاطع مشهورة
الصفحة 8 - SINCE the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate ; it is evident, that our knowledge is only conversant about them.
الصفحة 8 - IT is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination— either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.
الصفحة 9 - We perceive, on reflection, that to be real, or even barely to exist, must be to fall within sentience. Sentient experience, in short, is reality, and what is not this is not real. We may say, in other words, that there is no being or fact outside of that which is commonly called psychical existence.
الصفحة 21 - Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term.
الصفحة 16 - There is, therefore, no question of how we are to "get outside the circle of our own ideas and sensations.
الصفحة 20 - I met a man," the proposition is not about a man : this is a concept which does not walk the streets, but lives in the shadowy limbo of the logic-books. What I met was a thing, not a concept, an actual man with a tailor and a bank-account or a public-house and a drunken wife.
الصفحة 19 - The discussion of indefinables — which forms the chief part of philosophical logic — is the endeavour to see clearly, and to make others see clearly, the entities concerned, in order that the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with redness or the taste of a pineapple.
الصفحة 9 - But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul or myself.
الصفحة 16 - blue" is easy enough to distinguish, but the other element which I have called "consciousness" — that which sensation of blue has in common with sensation of green — is extremely difficult to fix. That many people fail to distinguish it at all is sufficiently shown by the fact that there are materialists. And, in general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact...
الصفحة 17 - I admit, that my awareness is blue as well as being of blue: but what I am quite sure of is that it is of blue; that it has to blue the simple and unique relation the existence of which alone justifies us in distinguishing knowledge of a thing from the thing known, indeed in distinguishing mind from matter.