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determines the will, in my cool thoughts, I am apt to think them to be right, as far as my thoughts can reach. in so nice a point, and in short is this. Liberty is a power to act, or not to act, accordingly as the mind directs. A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or rest, in particular instances, is that which we call the will. That which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any change of operation, is some present uneasiness, which is, or at least is always. accompanied with that of desire. Desire is always, moved by evil to fly it; because a total freedom from pain always makes a necessary part of our happiness, But every good, nay every greater good, does not constantly move desire, because it may not make, or may not be taken to make, any necessary part of our happiness; for all that we desire is only to be happy. But. though this general desire of happiness operates con-. stantly and invariably in us; yet the satisfaction of any particular desire can be suspended from determining the will to any subservient action, till we have maturely. examined, whether the particular apparent good we, then desire make a part of our real happiness, or be, consistent, or inconsistent with it. The result of our judgment, upon examination, is what ultimately determines the man, who could not be free, if his will were, determined by any thing but his own desire, guided by his own judgment. This, in short, is what I think of this matter; I desire you to examine it by your own thoughts. I think I have so well made out the several particulars, where I treat them at large, that they have convinced some I have shown them to here, who were of another mind and therefore how much soever con trary to the received opinion, I think I may publish them; but I would first have your judicious and free. thoughts, which I much rely on; for you love truth for itself, and me so well, as to tell it me without disguise.

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You will herewith receive a new chapter “ Of Identity and Diversity," which, haying writ, only at your instance, it is fit you should see and judge of, before it goes to the press. Pray send me your opinion of every... part of it. You need not send back the papers, but

your remarks on the paragraphs you shall think fit; for I have a copy here.

You desired me too to enlarge more particularly about eternal verities, which, to obey you, I set about; but upon examination, find all general truths are eternal verities, and so there is no entering into particu-lars; though, by mistake, some men have selected some, as if they alone were eternal verities. I never, but with regret, reflect on the distance you are from me, and am,

Sir,

Your most humble servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. Molyneux to Mr. Locke.

HONOURED SIR,

Dublin, Sept. 16, 1693.

I HAVE yours from Oates of Aug. 23, with your chapter" of identity and diversity;" and I acknowledge myself extremely obliged to you, for being at all that thought on my account. However, I repent not of the trouble I gave you therein, seeing the effects thereof, such clear reasoning, and profound judgment, that convinces and delights at once. And I protest,

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sir, it is to me the hardest task in the world, to add any thing to, or make any remarks upon, what you deliver therein; every thing you write therein is delivered with such convincing reason, that I fully assent to all. And to make remarks where I have no room to say any thing would please neither you nor myself. And to show you that I would not wholly rely on my own examination of your chapter, I imparted it to others, desiring their censure of it; but still with the same event; all acknowledged the clearness of the reasoning, and that nothing more was left to be said on the subject.

The answer you make to what I writ on your Thoughts of Education, does fully satisfy me. But I assure you, sir, I was not the only person shocked at that passage. I find several stumble at it, as taking little playthings, that children are very apt to desire and ask for, to be matters of fancy and affectation within your rule. But seeing in your last letter, you confine desires of affectation and fancy to other matters, I am satisfied in this business.

I can say no more to the scheme you lay down of man's liberty, but that I believe it very just, and will answer in all things. I long to see the second edition of your Essay; and then, if any thing offer, I will give my thoughts more fully.

I am very sensible how closely you are engaged, till you have discharged this work off your hands; and therefore I will not venture, till it be over, to press you again to what you have promised in the business of man's life, morality. But you must expect that I shall never be forgetful of that, from which I propose so great good to the world, and so much satisfaction to Your most entirely affectionate humble servant, WILL. MOLYneux.

SIR,

Mr. Molyneux to Mr. Locke.

Dublin, Dec. 23, 1 93.

I HAVE now read over your Essay of Human Understanding a third time, and always make new discoveries therein, of something profound. I should set upon it again, but that I will wait for your next edition, which I hope, by this time, is almost finished. The usual satisfaction I take in reading all things that come from you made me lately again run over your

chapter of "identity and diversity;" concerning the justness whereof, I have yet the same opinion as formerly. But one thought suggested itself to me, which on my first reading did not occur. It relates

to sect. 22, wherein the reason you give, why the law may justly punish a sober man, for what he did when drunk, or a waking man, for what he did when walking in his sleep, though it be true and full in the case of the night-walker, yet I conceive it not so full in the case of the drunken man. For drunkenness is itself a crime, and therefore no one shall allege it an excuse of another crime. And in the law we find, "that killing a man by chance-medley is not capital;" yet if I am doing an unlawful act, as shooting at a deer in a park, to steal it, and by chance-medley I kill a man unawares, this is capital; because the act wherein I was engaged, and which was the occasion of this mischief, was in itself unlawful, and I cannot plead it in excuse. In the case of the night-walker, your answer is true, full, and satisfactory; but that in the drunkard's case is somewhat short. The night-walking is a sort of distemper, not to be helped, or prevented, by the patient. But drunkenness is a deliberate act, which a man may easily avoid and prevent. Moreover, whatever the law appoints in this case, I think, were I on the jury of one, who walking in his sleep had killed another, I should not violate a good conscience, if I acquitted him; for he is certainly, during those fits, "non compos mentis ;" and it were easy to distinguish, by circumstances, how far he counterfeited, or not.

You will very much oblige me by a line or two, to let me know how forward your work is, and what other things you have on the anvil before you; amongst which, I hope you will not forget your Thoughts on Morality. For I am obliged to prosecute this request to you, being the first, I presume, that moved you in it.

There is a gentleman in this town, one capt. Henry Monk, a nigh relation of the Albemarles, who tells me he has been known to you long ago; and on all occa

sions mentions you with the highest respects. He desired me, the other day, to give you his most humble service. I am,

Dear Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

WILL. MOLYneux.

Mr. Locke to Mr. Molyneux.

HONOURED SIR,

Oates, 19 Jan,-93-4.

I CAN take it for no other, than a great mark of your kindness to me, that you spend so much of

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your

time in the perusal of my thoughts, when you have so much better of your own to improve it. To which you add this farther obligation, that you read my book for my instruction, still taking notice to me of what you judge amiss in it. This is a good office that so few in the world perform in the way that you do, that it deserves my particular acknowledgment. And I own myself no less beholden to you, when I differ from you, than when, convinced by your better judgment, you give me opportunity to mend what before was amiss; your intention being that, to which I equally, in both cases, owe my gratitude.

You doubt, whether my answer be full in the case of the drunkard. To try whether it be or no, we must consider what I am there doing. As I remember (for I have not that chapter here by me) I am there showing that punishment is annexed to personality, and personality to consciousness: how then can a drunkard be punished for what he did, whereof he is not conscious? To this I answer, human judicatures justly punish him, because the fact is proved against him; but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him. This you think not sufficient, but would have me add the common reason, that drunkenness being a crime, one crime'

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