to terminate the dispute by authority, involves an utter misconception of the true nature and object of discipline, which is never to decide what is doubtful, or to elucidate what is obscure, but to promulgate the sentence which the immutable laws of Christ have provided, with the design in the first place, of exciting compunction in the breast of the offender, and next, of profiting others by his example. The solemn decision of a Christian assembly, that an individual has forfeited his right to spiritual privileges, and is henceforth consigned to the kingdom of Satan, is an awful proceeding, only inferior in terror to the sentence of the last day.

But what is it which renders it so formidable? It is its accordance with the moral nature of man, its harmony with the dictates of conscience, which gives it all its force. When, on the contrary, the pious inquirer is satisfied with his own conduct, viewing it with approbation and complacency; when he is fortified, as in the present instance, by the example of a great majority of the Christian world, who are ready to receive him with open arms, and to applaud him for the very practice which has provoked it, how vain is it to expect, that his exclusion from a particular church, will operate a change? When he learns too, that his supposed error is not pretended to be fatal, but such as may be held with a good conscience, and with faith unfeigned, and is actually held by some of the best of men, it is easy to foresee what sentiments he will feel towards the authors of such a measure, and how little he will be prepared to examine impartially the evidence of that particular opinion, which has occasioned it. Such a proceeding, not having the remotest tendency to inform, or to alarm the conscience, is ineffectual to every purpose of discipline; and as it professedly comprises nothing of the nature of argument, no light can be derived from it, towards the elucidation of a controverted question. It interposes by authority, instead of reason, where authority can avail nothing, and reason is all in all; and while it is contemptible as an instrument employed to compel unanimity, its power of exciting prejudice and disgust is unrivalled. Such are the mischiefs resulting from confounding together the provinces of discipline and of argument? and since the practice which we have ventured to oppose, if it have any meaning, is intended to operate as a punishment, without answering one of the ends for which it is inflicted, it is high time it were consigned to oblivion.

There is another consideration sufficiently related to the part of the subject before us, to justify my introducing it here, as I would wish to avoid the unnecessary multiplication of divisions. Whatever criminality attaches to the practice of free communion, must entirely consist in sanctioning the improper conduct of the parties with whom we unite; and if it be wrong to join with Pedobaptists

at the Lord's table, it must be still more so in them to celebrate it. When an action allowed in itself to be innocent or commendable, becomes improper, as performed in conjunction with another, that impropriety must result solely from the moral incompetence to that action, of the party associated. Thus in the instance before us, it must be assumed, that Pædobaptists are morally culpable, in approaching the sacred symbols, or the attempt to criminate us for sanctioning them in that practice, would be ridiculous. As it is allowed that every baptized believer not only may partake, but ought to partake, of that spiritual repast, his uniting with Pædobaptists on that occasion, is liable to objection on no other ground, than that it may be considered as intimating his approbation of their conduct in that particular. Upon the principles of our opponents, their approach is not only sinful, but sinful to such a degree, as to communicate a moral taint to what, in other circumstances, would be deemed an act of obedience. Here the first question that arises, is; Are the advocates of infant-baptism criminal in approaching the Lord's table?

Be it remembered, that our controversy with them respects the ordinance of baptism only, which we suppose them to have misconceived, and that it has no relation to the only remaining positive institute. Believing, as many of them unquestionably do, that they are as truly baptized as ourselves, and there being no controversy betwixt us on the subject of the eucharist, it is impossible for them, even on the principles of our opponents, to entertain the least scruple respecting the obligation of attending to that ordinance. Admitting it possible for them to believe, what they uniformly and invariably profess, they cannot fail of being fully convinced, that it is their duty to communicate. Under these circumstances, ought they to communicate, or ought they not? If we answer in the negative, we must affirm, that men ought not to pursue that course, which, after the most mature deliberation, the unhesitating dictates of conscience suggest; which would go to obliterate and annul the only immediate rule of human action. Nor can it be objected with truth, that the tendency of this reasoning is to destroy the absolute difference betwixt right and wrong, by referring all to conscience. That, apart from human judgements, there is an intrinsic, moral difference in actions, we freely admit, and hence results the previous obligation of informing the mind, by a diligent attention to the dictates of reason and religion, and of delaying to act till we have sufficient light; but in entire consistence with this, we affirm, that where there is no hesitation, the criterion of immediate duty is the suggestion of conscience; whatever guilt may have been previously incurred, by the neglect of serious and impartial inquiry. That this, under the

modifications already specified, is the only criterion, is sufficiently evident, from the impossibility of conceiving any other. If it lead (as it easily may, from the neglect of the previous inquiry already mentioned) to a deviation from absolute rectitude, we must not concur in the action in which such deviation is involved.

To apply these principles to the case before us. Whatever blame we may be disposed to attribute to the abettors of infantbaptism, on the score of previous inattention, or prejudice, as there is nothing in their principles to cause them to hesitate respecting the obligation of the eucharist, it is unquestionably their immediate duty to celebrate it, and they would be guilty of a deliberate and wilful offence, were they to neglect it. And as it is their duty to act thus, in compliance with the dictates of conscience, we cannot be guilty of sanctioning what is evil in them, by the approbation implied in joint participation. As far as they are concerned, the case seems clear; and no sanction is given to criminal conduct. It remains to be considered only, how the action is situated with respect to ourselves; and here the decision is still more easy, for the action to which we are invited, is not only consistent with rectitude, but would be allowed by all parties, to be an instance of obedience, but for the concurrence of Pædobaptists. Thus much may suffice in answer to the first question, respecting the supposed criminality of the act of communion, as performed by the advocates of infant-baptism; a criminality, which must be assumed as the sole basis of the charges adduced against the practice we are defending.

When we reflect, that the whole of our opponents' reasoning turns upon the disqualification of Pædobaptists for the Lord's supper, it is surprising, that we rarely, if ever, find them contemplate the subject in that light, or advert to the criminality of breaking down that sacred inclosure. The subordinate agents are severely censured, the principal offenders scarcely noticed; and if my reader be disposed to gratify his curiosity, by making a collection of all the uncandid strictures which have been passed upon the advocates of Pædobaptism, it is more than probable, the charge of profaning the Lord's supper, would not be found among the number. Yet this is the original sin; this the epidemic evil, as widely diffused as the existence of Pædobaptist communities; and if it be of such a nature, as to attach a portion of guilt to whatever comes into contact with it; it must, considering its extensive prevalence, be one of the most crying enormities. It is an evil, which has spread much wider than the sacrifice of the mass; it is a pollution which (with the exception of one sect only,) attaches to all flesh, and is unblushingly avowed by the professors of Christianity, in every part of the universe. And what is most surpris

ing, the only persons who have discovered it, instead of lifting up their voice, maintain a profound silence; and while they are sufficiently liberal in their censures, on the popular error respecting baptism, are not heard to breathe a murmur against this erroneous abuse. In truth, they are so little impressed with it, that they decline urging it even where the mention of it would seem unavoidable. When they are rebuking us for joining with our Pædobaptist brethren in partaking of a sacrament for which they are supposed to want the due qualifications, it is not their presumption in approaching, on which they insist, as might be reasonably expected; on that subject they are silent, while they vehemently inveigh against the imaginary countenance we afford, to the neglect of baptism. Thus they persist in construing our conduct, not into an approval of that act of communion in which we are engaged, but into a tacit admission of the validity of infant baptism, against which we are known to remonstrate. In short, they are disposed to attack our practice in any point, rather than in that in which, if we are wrong, it is alone vulnerable, that of its being an expression of our approbation of Pædobaptists celebrating the eucharist. In the same spirit, when they have once procured the exclusion of the obnoxious party from their assemblies, they are completely satisfied; their communion elsewhere gives them no concern, though it must be allowed, on the supposition of the pretended disqualification, that the evil remains in its full force. Nor are they ever known to remonstrate with them on this irregularity, during its continuance; nor, should they afterwards become converts to our doctrine, to recal it to their attention, with a view to excite compunction and remorse; so that this is perhaps the only sin for which men are never called to repentance, and of which no man has been known to repent. When our Lord dismissed the woman taken in adultery, though he did not proceed to judge her, he solemnly charged her to sin no more: the advocates for strict communion, when they dismiss Pædobaptists, give them no such charge; their language seems to be, "Go, sin by yourselves, and we are satisfied.”

The inference I would deduce from these remarkable facts is, that they possess an internal conviction, that the class of Christians whom they proscribe, would be guilty of a great impropriety, in declining to communicate in the sacramental elements; and that the union of Baptists with them in that solemnity, so far from being liable to the imputation of "partaking in other men's sins," is not only lawful, but commendable.

SECTION V.

On the impossibility of reducing the practice of strict communion to any general principle.

WHEN a particular branch of conduct is so circumstanced, as to be incapable of being deduced from some general rule, or of being resolved into some comprehensive principle, founded on reason, or revelation, we may be perfectly assured, it is not obligatory. Whatever is matter of duty, is a part of some whole, the relation to which is susceptible of proof, either by the express decision of Scripture, or by general reasoning; and a point of prac tice perfectly insulated, and disjointed from the general system of duties, whatever support it may derive from prejudice, custom or caprice, can never be satisfactorily vindicated. From want of attention to this axiom, both the world and the church have in different periods, been overrun with innumerable forms of superstition and folly; to which the only effectual antidote is, an appeal to principles. Unless I am much mistaken, the question under discussion will afford a striking exemplification of the justness of this remark. If it be found impossible to fix a medium betwixt the toleration of all opinions in religion, and the restriction of it, to errors not fundamental, the practice of exclusive communion must be abandoned, because it is neither more nor less than an attempt to establish such a medium. By errors not fundamental, I mean such as are admitted to consist with a state of grace and salvation; such as are not supposed to prevent their abettors from being accepted of God. With such as contend for the indiscriminate admission of all doctrines on the one hand, or with the abettors of rigid uniformity, who allow no latitude of sentiment on the other, we have no concern; since we concur with our opponents in deprecating both these extremes; and while we are tenacious of the "truth as it is in Jesus," we both admit that some indulgence to the mistakes and imperfections of the truly pious is due, from a regard to the dictates of inspiration and the nature of man. The only subject of controversy is, how far that forbearance is to be extended; we assert, to every diversity of judgement, not incompatible with salvation; they contend that a difference of opinion on baptism is an excepted case. If the word of God had clearly and unequivocally made this exception, we should feel ourselves bound to admit it, upon the same principle on which we maintain the infallible certainty of revelation; but when we press for this decision, and request to be directed to the part of Scripture which for ever prohibits unbaptized persons from approaching the sacrament, in the same manner as the Jews were prohibited from cele