that all our establishments are fixed; all our contracts, public and private, foreign and domestic, are made and regulated.

Is it not felf-evident then, that no alteration can be made in the standard of money, without an opprobrious breach of the public faith with all the world; without infringement of private property; without falfifying of all precedent contracts; without the rifque at least of producing infinite diforders, diftrufts, and panics among ourselves; as all men would become thereby dubious and infecure as to what might further be done hereafter; without creating fufpicions abroad, that there is • fome canker in the ftate; without giving fuch a fhock to our credit, as might not afterwards be easily repaired? These wild and unjustifiable measures have ever been, and ever will be, • confidered as a kind of public declaration of fome inward debility and decay; and the difcredit occafioned thereby, has ever proved injurious to thofe who used them. All payments abroad are regulated by the courfe of Exchange, and that is founded. · upon the intrinfic values, and not on the mere names of coins. But having once broke the public faith, and curtailed the settled and long established measure of property; foreigners will make • ample allowance for what we may do of this kind hereafter; • and however we may cheat and rob one another, they will not

only fecure themfelves, but make an advantage of our difcredit, by bringing the exchange against us beyond the par. If we think to avert this evil by tranfporting our coin, our having • debased it will avail us nothing.'

After fome pertinent obfervations on our laws relating to this fubject, our Author fhews, that trade abfolutely requires, and in effect will have, an indelible standard of money; the debafing of which would prove highly injurious to the government; would invalidate all preceding contracts; and at the fame time, by its affecting credit, might prove injurious to all in diftreffed circumftances. That it would more especially affect those who live upon their own eftablished properties; that it would be productive of many evils which could not be remedied, even by a contrary law; and laftly, that it would occafion cutting and tranfporting of the old coins at an under value.

This project of debafing the coin is afcribed partly to weak Princes, and weak counfeilors, who, at the real, but not thought of, expence to themfelves, as well as to the fubject, might hereby propoie a temporary accumulation of ready cafh in the exchequer. It is, however, imputed more particularly to bankers, fcriveners, and all forts of money jobbers, who became thus able not only to cheat all their creditors, but also to make large profits to themfelves, by taking advantages of the fears and ignorance of the

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many; buying up the old coins at an under value, and cutting and tranfporting, or fending into the Mint all the heaviest of < them.' But above all, as no people were more interefted in the promotion of fo destructive a scheme than the Mint-masters, it is fuggefted, that from their credit and influence, they had the greateft hand in bringing about the feveral adulterations that, < from time to time, have been made in coins: they had an intereft in keeping the Mint conftantly at work, and nothing ❝ could perpetuate this gainful trade fo effectually, as adulterating the standard of money; this, in effect, reduced all the old ⚫ coins into mere bullion, and created an abfolute neceffity of "recoinage: by virtue of this, thofe gentlemen were supposed to be the most competent judges, and moft to be relied upon in those matters.'

Our Author next enumerates the various pretences that have occafionally been started in favour of debafing the ftandard.

1. I,' fays he, have often heard it afferted, and that by men who thought themselves very wife and knowing in thefe ' matters, that our standard of money was too good, and should be debased.

2. Increafing the coinage, and also increafing the quantity of tale money, by giving the old names to fmaller pieces of filver, are both urged as arguments for debafing the standard • of money,

3. The keeping our coin from being melted, or exported; alfo the examples of former times, and of foreign ftates, are all brought as arguments for the fame purpose.

4. The lightness of our coins, from long wear, &c. is urged as an argument for altering the courfe of the Mint, fo as to 'make the new coins no better than the old in common currency.

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5. It is faid, that debafing the coin, provided it be done < gradually, a little at a time, would not be perceived, and there'fore no injury to any body.

6. Some confine the ftandard to the fineness only of the metal; and if that be but preferved, you may clip and diminish the coin as you please.

• These are all common-place, thread-bare arguments, ready upon all occafions; and founded only upon this fuppofition, that as good money may be coined at the Stamp-office, as at the Mint: but our modern projectors have found out new arguments, and, as they think, very formidable ones.

C 7. Some fay, that gold is our ftandard as much as filver; and therefore that no argument can be used as to the one, but will hold equally with refpect to the other.

8. Others go yet further; and fay, that gold only is our ftandard; that you may debase filver coins as you please, and treat them as mere tokens, without giving any one a right to complain. This is making fhort work of it, indeed, and with one ftroke demolishing our poor old ftandard: and in fupport of this, it is faid, that gold is the ftandard of merchants; and therefore, is or ought to be the national ftandard.

There is an obvious neceffity of bringing the rates of gold and filver coins to a jufter proportion to each other, than they bear at prefent; and as fomething fhould be speedily done, it is faid in, favour of gold,

9. That as we have greater plenty of gold coins, and of far greater value, than we have of filver; thould we lower the price of gold, we should undervalue our own treafure; therefore fay they, curtail the filver ftandard.

10. Some more modeft than the reft, are for debasing some of our coins only, as fhillings and fixpences, and leaving the crowns and half-crowns upon their prefent footing: they think • that would be fufficient to fecure them from the odium of having debafed the ftandard.

Laftly, As we are a nation indebted to foreigners, fhould we lower the price of gold, we should pay our foreign creditors more than we borrowed from them; therefore we should debafe the filver, &c.'

Previous to his refutation of these pretences, our Author thinks it neceffary to remove out of the way, what he apprehends to have been a ftumbling block to many well meaning people, by the folution of the following question.- Why coin and bullion of the fame metal and finencfs, are not always of the fame value, or will not exchange in equal quantities one for the other?" This, we conceive, he has done fatisfactorily, nor does he appear lefs happy in his refutation of the pretences urged in favour of a debafement of the ftandard. As a fpecimen of his fuccefs in this refpect, take his reply to number 9.

We have already met with many pretences for debafing the ftandard; which, upon examination, appeared fufficiently weak and frivolous: but amongst them all, I think there is not onę quite fo vague and ridiculous, as this before us. Let us fuppole that the reduction wanted to be made in the rate of a gui6 nea, is one fhilling; for it is nothing to the argument, what

the

the precife quantity really is; and that will come to be confidered in another place. You fay, that if the rate of a guinea. ⚫ be reduced one fhilling, there would be a lofs of the one and < twentieth part upon all the guineas in the nation; but that there would be no lofs at all upon guineas, if they were or<dered to pass for twenty-one fhillings, having in them no more filver than there is at prefent in twenty fhillings. Strange, very ftrange, indeed, that there fhould be fuch magic in the word fhilling, and in the number twenty-one, as to make the fame thing, only calling it by different names, have fuch different effects! It is fcarce neceflary to take any farther no'tice of fuch a mere jingle of words; but out of tenderness to thefe young logicians, but more out of regard to those who 'may be deceived by them, if any fuch there can be: I fhall ' endeavour to fhew, that our scheme is more favourable to them than their own.

1. It is felf-evident, that the nation would not lofe one farthing upon all the gold it exported, by a reduction of the mint price of gold. For this reduction would not in the leaft debafe the intrinfic quality of the gold; and every guinea that 'went into foreign parts, would fetch there as much afterwards as it doth at prefent; unless, perhaps, there is now a trade abroad for purchafing guineas, and re-exporting them to us again; and if there be fuch a trade, it is much to our dif⚫ advantage.

2. Let us fuppofe, that the reduction is made, by calling twenty of our prefent fhillings, by the name of twenty-one 'fhillings; or, which is the fame thing, by a new coinage, wherein twenty-one pieces, called fhillings, are cut out of the fame quantity of filver, as before ufed to be put into twenty fhillings. Here it is felf-evident, that every one will lofe a fhilling upon a guinea; and that his lofs will be in the fame proportion, upon all the filver coins which he hath to receive. For, it hath been fhewed, that the prices of all things at home, are regulated by the filver ftandard; and therefore they would foon raise against us, in proportion as that standard had been debafed; unless you think, that founding the words twenty-one in their ears would lull men afleep, and deprive them of their understanding. By this fcheme then, the one and twentieth part of all their cath, gold as well as filver, would be taken away from, and irrecoverably loft to, every body; and this lofs would fall not only upon the prefent flock in hand, but also ' upon all that they had to receive for the future, in confideration of any contracts already made.

3. Let us fuppofe, that the rate of a guinea is, without using any other indirect means, directly reduced to twenty fhillings. Here then, whilft his property in general is left unviolated, ⚫ both now and in future; the only lofs any one can sustain, is upon his present stock in hand of guineas, and this lofs cannot exceed one fhilling upon each. But it is not improbable, that by the falling of commodities, there might be fome abatement of this lofs: for, by the conceffions of those who abett the contrary measure, they making gold to be the standard of merchants, foreign exchanges will alter in our favour, proportionably to our reduction upon gold; and with the exchanges, it is likely, the prices of all foreign commodities, would in fome ⚫ degree likewife alter, which would also cause an abatement in the prices of our own.

It is difficult to ftate to any exactness, what influence fo<reign exchanges, or the dealings of merchants, have upon the prices of goods in general; that is, how far our high valuation of gold, and fo the mercantile trade, may clafh with the legal ftandard, in measuring the values of contracts and of commodities: I admit, that this may have fome effect; but I think, for the reasons which have been already given, that this effect is very inconfiderable.

But to bring this whole debate, as far as it any way relates to our present subject, to a fhort iffue: if it be admitted, that contracts, and the prices of all things, are governed wholly by the established filver ftandard; then it is manifeft, that if you alter that ftandard, the prices of all things will raise, at leaft, in that proportion: on the other hand, if you infist that gold is the ftandard; then, I fay, that if you lower its price, and that will be equally done by either of the preceding methods, the prices of all things will fall proportionably. But whether gold hath any fhare jointly with filver, in fettling and measuring the prices of things; or whether gold takes all upon itfelf, it is as clear as the day, that according to which method is taken in adjusting the prefent difproportion between the legal rates of gold and filver, there will follow a difference, at least, in the prices of things in general, to the full amount of that difproportion and it is as clear, that our method of reducing them would be by much the most favourable to the prefent ⚫ poffeffors of guineas, as well as a fecurity to them of their full property for the future; which, by the other method, would be invaded and taken from them, to the whole amount of the • reduction or debasement of the standard. But is there need of balancing fo exactly, the immediate profits and lofs between thefe two different methods of reducing the price of gold? The one, all the world knows, is fair, equitable, and perfectly

6 ⚫ agree