COIN WRA aen whose hands are reeking with the blood of thei: Sovereign? What, shall we degrade our selves by going to Paris, and there asking in humble, diplomatic language, to be on a good understanding with them?" Gentlemen will remember these lofty words; and yet we have come to this humiliation; we have negotiated with France; and I should not be surprised to see the noble Lord himself (Hawkesbury) going to Paris, not at the head of his regiment, but on a diplomatic mission to those very regicides, to pray to be upon a good understanding with them. Shall we, then, be blind to the lessons which the events of the world exhibit to our view? Pride, obstinacy, and insult, must end in concessions, and those concessions must be humble in proportion to our unbecoming pride. Now is the moment to prevent all these degradations; the monarchy, the aristocracy, the people themselves, may now be saved; it is only necessary, at this moment, to conquer our own passions. Let those ministers whose evil genius has brought us to our present condition retire from the post to which they are unequal. I have no hesitation in saying, that the present administration neither can nor ought to remain in place. Let them retire from t On a division, the numbers were, Yeas, 93, Noes, 253. Mr. Grey's motion was therefore rejected. SPEECH OF MR. FOX ON THE REJECTION OF BONAPARTE'S OVERTURES FOR PEACE, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEBRUARY 3, 1800. INTRODUCTION. NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, having usurped the government of France, became First Consul in December 1799; and, as an air of moderation seemed appropriate under these circumstances, be made overtures of peace to the King of England, in a letter written with his own hand. Mr. Pitt, who had no belief in the permanence of his power, rejected his offers in terms which were certainly rude, if not insulting. Some :f them will be given hereafter in notes to this speech. The correspondence in question was laid before Parliament, and, on the 3d of February, 1800, a motion was made by Mr. Dundas approving of the course taken, and pledging the country for a vigorous prosecotion of the war. After Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Canning, and Mr. Erskine had spoken, Mr. Pitt rose, and held the House in fixed attention for nearly five hours by one of the most masterly orations he ever pronounced in Parliament. Mr. Fox then delivered the following speech in reply; and never were these two grea: arators brought into more direct competition, or the distinctive features of their eloquence exhibited in finer contrast. Mr. Pitt, instead of entering at once on the reasons for refusing at that time to negotiate, treated the rise of Napoleon as only a new stage of the French Revolution, and thus dextrously prepared the way for go ing back to consider, I. The origin of the war, maintaining that France was the sole aggressor throughout the whole conflict II. The atrocities of the French in overrunning and subjugating a large part of Europe during the preceding eight years. III. The genius and spirit of the Revolution, as "an insatiable love of aggrandizement, an implacable spirit of destruction against all the civil and religious institutions of every country." IV. The instability of the system, as marked from the first by sudden and great changes. V. The past history and character of Napoleon, whom he depicted in the darkest colors, as devoid of all faith, the inveterate enemy of England, and the cruel oppressor of every country he had overrun. His power he represented as wholly unstable, and insisted that England ought never to enter into a treaty with him until, "from experience and the evidence of facts, we are convinced that such a treaty is admissible." On these grounds he defended his refusal to negotiate. This speech should be taken up previous to the Jac before us, if the reader intends to enter fully into the merits of the case. Mr. Fox, in reply without the exactness of Mr. Pitt's method, touches upon most of these points, and ad verts to others with great pungency and force. He condemns Mr. Pitt for reviving the early animosities of the contest as a reason for refusing to treat since on this principle the war must be eternal. He censures the severe and unconciliating terms in which a respectful offer of negotiation had scen re jected. He insists, in regard to the origin of the war, that Austria and Prussia (so long the allies of England) were undeniably the aggressors; that England provoked the contest by harsh treatment of the French minister; that, in relation to her grievances, she ought from the first to have stated definitely to the French what would satisfy her; that she ought, especially, to have accepted the mediation urged upou her by France, before a single blow had been struck, with a view to prevent the contest; that the English were, therefore, far from being guiltless as to the origin of the war, while the French, in all their agressions, had been simply carrying out the principles taught them by the Bourbons, whom Mr. Pitt now proposed to restore. While condemning the atrocities of the French, he sets off against them the outrages practiced on Po and and other countries by the powers in league with England; and exposes the inconsistency of refus ing, on the ground of character, to treat with the French, while such rank oppressors were taken into the strictest alliance. He dwells upon the fact, that Mr. Pitt, who now refused to treat on account of the outrages of the French and the instability of their government, had himself twice opened negotiations (in 1796 and 1797) in the midst of these very outrages, while the existing governments were confessedly of the most unstable kind, and comments with great severity upon Mr. Pitt's explanation of his conduct on those occasions. Finally, in reference to the question, "When is this war to end?" he considers the grounds on which Mr. Pitt had intimated a willingness to treat with Bonaparte, if the Bourbons could not be restored, viz.. "experience and the evidence of facts;" he adverts for a moment to some of the charges brought against the First Consul; and, recurring again to the grounds stated, inquires, "Where, then, is this war, which is pregnant with all these horrors, to be carried? Where is it to stop? Not till we establish the house of Bourbon"—or, at least, not until we have had due "experience" of Bonaparte's intentions. "So that we are called upon to go on merely as a speculation"-"to keep Bonaparte some time longer at war, as a state of probation"-"to try an EXPERIMENT, if he will not behave himself better than heretofore!" With this thought he concludes, in the boldest and most eloquent strain of mingled argument, irony, and invective which he ever produced. The speech is admirably reported, and was considered by most who heard it as the ablest Mr. Fox ever made. SPEECH, &c. ME. SPEAKER,-At so late an hour of the night, I am sure you will do me the justice to believe that I do not mean to go at length into the discussion of this great question. Exhausted as the attention of the House must be, and unaccustomed as I have been of late to attend in my place, nothing but a deep sense of my duty could have induced me to trouble you at all, and particularly to request your indulgence at such an hour. A new era in o'd arguments used for its contsuance. enumerated and advanced as arguments for out continuing the war. What! at the end of seven years of the most burdensome and the most calamitous struggle in which this country ever was engaged, are we again to be amused with notions of finance, and calculations of the exhausted resources of the enemy, as a ground of confidence and of hope? Gracious God! were we not told five years ago that France was not only on the brink and in the jaws of ruin, but that Sir, my honorable and learned friend [Mr. Er- she was actually sunk into the gulf of bankruptskine] has truly said, that the present cy? Were we not told, as an unanswerable arthe war, but the is a new era in the war, and the gument against treating, “that she could not hold right honorable gentleman opposite out another campaign-that nothing but peace to me [Mr. Pitt] feels the justice of could save her-that she wanted only time tc the remark; for, by traveling back to the com- recruit her exhausted finances-that to grant mencement of the war, and referring again to her repose was to grant her the means of again all the topics and arguments which he has so molesting this country, and that we had nothing often and so successfully urged upon the House, to do but persevere for a short time, in order to and by which he has drawn them on to the sup- save ourselves forever from the consequences port of his measures, he is forced to acknowl- of her ambition and her jacobinism ?” What! edge that, at the end of a seven years' conflict, after having gone on from year to year upon we are come but to a new era in the war, at assurances like these, and after having seen the which he thinks it necessary only to press all his repeated refutations of every prediction, are we former arguments to induce us to persevere. All again to be gravely and seriously assured, that the topics which have so often misled us-all we have the same prospect of success on the the reasoning which has so invariably failed— same identical grounds? And, without any othall the lofty predictions which have so constantly er argument or security, are we invited, at this been falsified by events-all the hopes which new era of the war, to conduct it upon principles have amused the sanguine, and all the assuran- which, if adopted and acted upon, may make it ces of the distress and weakness of the enemy eternal? If the right honorable gentleman shall which have satisfied the king, are again succeed in prevailing on Parliament and the LL country to adopt the principles which he has advanced this night. I see no possible termination to the contest. No man can see an end to it; and upon the assurances and predictions which have so uniformly failed, we are called upon not merely to refuse all negotiation, but to countenance principles and views as distant from wisdom and justice, as they are in their nature wild and impracticable. surable for using harsh language in declining to | could be more proper nor more wise than this language; and such ought ever to be the tone and conduct of men intrusted with the very inportant task of treating with a hostile nation. Being a sincere friend to peace, I must say with Lord Malmesbury, that it is not by reproaches and by invective that we can hope for a reconciliation; and I am convinced, in my own mind, that I speak the sense of this House, and, if not of this House, certainly of a majority of the peo early circum+tan I must lament, sir, in common with every genMinisters cen- uine friend of peace, the harsh and un-ple of this country, when I lament that any unconciliating language which ministers provoked and unnecessary recriminations should have held to the French, and which be flung out, by which obstacles are put in the negotiate. they have even made use of in their way of pacification. I believe it is the prevailanswer to a respectful offer of a negotiation.' ing sentiment of the people, that we ought to Such language has ever been considered as ex- abstain from harsh and insulting language; and tremely unwise, and has ever been reprobated in common with them, I must lament that both by diplomatic men. I remember with pleasure in the papers of Lord Grenville, and this night, the terms in which Lord Malmesbury, at Paris, such license has been given to invective and rein the year 1796, replied to expressions of this proach.3 sort, used by M. de la Croix. He justly said, For the same reason, I must lament that the "that offensive and injurious insinuations were right honorable gentleman [Mr. The original and only calculated to throw new obstacles in the Pitt] has thought proper to go at ces of the war rot way of accommodation, and that it was not by such length, and with such severity now the question. revolting reproaches nor by reciprocal invective of minute investigation, into all the early circumthat a sincere wish to accomplish the great work stances of the war, which (whatever they were) of pacification could be evinced." Nothing are nothing to the present purpose, and ought not The language referred to was of the following to influence the present feelings of the House. 1 kind. As a reason for refusing to negotiate, Lord certainly shall not follow him through the whole Grenville goes back to the origin of the war, de- of this tedious detail, though I do not agree with claring it to have been “an unprovoked attack" on him in many of his assertions. I do not know the part of France. He says it sprung out of "a what impression his narrative may make on other system, to the prevalence of which France justly gentlemen; but I will tell him fairly and candid ascribes all her present miseries, and which has in-ly, he has not convinced me. I continue to think, volved all the rest of Europe in a long and destructive warfare, of a nature long since unknown to the practice of civilized nations"-he assumes that this system "continues to prevail; that the most solemn treaties have only prepared a way for fresh aggressions;" and ascribes to the French those "gigantic objects of ambition, and those restless schemes of destruction, which have endangered the very exist ence of civil society." In addition to this, he tells the French people, through their new ruler, that they ought at once to take back the Bourbons; that "the best and most natural pledge" they can give of a desire for peace, is "the restoration of that line of princes which for so many centuries maintained the French nation in prosperity at home, and consideration and respect abroad." He tells Bonaparte in direct terms, that England can not trust him; that there is "no sufficient evidence of the principles by which the new government will be directed; no reasonable ground by which to judge of its stability." Such language deserved the cen sures passed upon it by Mr. Fox. Nothing could more irritate the French people than to talk to them of restoring that hated dynasty against which they had so lately rebelled. Nothing was more calculated to provoke Bonaparte to the utmost, and to foster a desire to invade England (which he attempted some years after), than personal reflections of this kind on the stability of his government. 2 This is one of Mr. Fox's characteristic arguments, ad hominem. It was Mr. Pitt (through his embassador) who thus reproved the French minister, M. de la Croix, for certain harsh expressions used during the negotiations for peace in 1796; and Mr. Fox now turns the reproof back upon Mr. Pitt, in language dictated by himself. The British al es, Austria deuably the g and Prussa, 03 gressors. and until I see better grounds for changing my 3 Warmly as Mr. Wilberforce was attached to Mr. Pitt, he expressed himself still more strongly on this subject in a letter to a friend. "I must say I was shocked at Lord Grenville's letter; for though our government must feel adverse to any measure which might appear to give the stamp of our author ity to Bonaparte's new diguity, yet I must say that unless they have some better reason than I fear they possess for believing that he is likely to be hurled from his throne, it seems a desperate game play to offend, and insult, and thereby irritate, this vair man beyond the hope of forgiveness."-Life. 215 the declarations which were made at Mantua,' as well as at Pilnitz, as they are given by M. Bertrand de Molville, without acknowledging that this was not merely an intention, but a declaration of an intention, on the part of the great powers of Germany, to interfere in the internal affairs of France, for the purpose of regulating the government, against the opinion of the people. This, though not a plan for the partition of France, was, in the eye of reason and common sense, an aggression against France. The right honorable gentleman denies that there was such Declaration a thing as a treaty of Pilnitz. Grant Pilaitz ed. But was there not a Declaration which amounted to an act of hostile aggression ? The two powers, the Emperor of Germany and the King of Prussia, made a public declaration, that they were determined to employ their forces, in conjunction with those of the other Sovereigns The Count d'Artois, brother of the King of France, met the Emperor Leopold of Austria, the King of Sardinia, and the King of Spain, at Mantua, in May, 1791, and, on his representation, these monarchs entered into an agreement to march one hund red thousand men to the borders of France, in expectation that the French people, terrified at the approach of the allied powers, would seek safety by submitting themselves to Louis XVI., and asking his mediation; but Louis, hoping at that time to restore the monarchy by his own efforts, discouraged the immediate execution of the plan. See Mignet. p. 119; Ason's History of Europe, vol. i., p. 571, third edition. The following is a copy of this celebrated Declaration, which led to a general war in Europe. It was framed in August, 1791, at Pilnitz, a fortress in Saxony, by the Emperor Leopold and the King of Prussia, and was given to the Count d'Artois, that he might use it to induce the other courts of Europe to enter into a league for restoring Louis XVI. "His Majesty the Emperor, and his Majesty the King of Prussia, having heard the desires and representations of Monsieur and of his royal highness the Count, d'Artois, declare jointly, that they regard the situation in which his Majesty the King of France actually is, as an object of common interest to all the Sovereigns of Europe. They hope that this concern can not fail to be acknowledged by the powers whose assistance is claimed; and that in cousequence they will not refuse to employ jointly with their said Majesties the most efficacions means, in proportion to their forces, to place the King of France in a state to settle in the most perfect liberty the foundations of a monarchical government, equally suitable to the rights of Sovereigns and the welfare of the French. Then and in that case, their said Majesties are decided to act quickly and with the accord with the forces necessary to obtain the common end proposed. In the mean time they will give suitable orders to their troops, that they may be ready to put themselves in motion."-Alison's History of Europe, vol. i., p. 574. third edition. of Europe, "to put the King of France in a situ ation to establish, in perfect liberty, the founda. tions of a monarchical government equa ly agree. able to the rights of Sovereigns and the welfare of the French." Whenever the other princes should agree to co-operate with them, "then, and in that case, their Majesties were determined to act promptly, and by mutual consent, with the forces necessary to obtain the end proposed by all of them. In the mean time, they declared that they would give orders for their troops to be ready for actual service." Now, I would ask gentlemen to lay their hands upon their hearts, and say with candor what the true and fair construction of this Declaration was-whether it was not a menace and an insult to France, since, in direct terms, it declared, that whenever the other powers should concur, they would attack France, then at peace with them, and then employed only in domestic and internal regulations? Let us suppose the case to be that of Great Britain. Will any gentleman say that if two of the great powers should make a public declaration, that they were determined to make an attack on this kingdom as soon as circumstances should favor their intention; that they only waited for this occasion, and that in the mean time they would keep their forces ready for the purpose, it would not be considered by the Parliament and people of this country as a hostile aggression? And is there any Englishman in existence who is such a friend to peace as to say that the nation could retain its honor and dignity if it should sit down under such a menace? I know too well what is due to the national character of England to believe that there would be two opinions on the case, if thus put home to our own feelings and understandIngs. We must, then, respect in others the indignation which such an act would excite in ourselves; and when we see it established, on the most indisputable testimony, that both at Pilnitz and at Mantua declarations were made to this ef fect, it is idle to say that, as far as the Emperor and the King of Prussia were concerned, they were not the aggressors in the war. "Oh! but the decree of the 19th of Noveinber, 1792.6 That, at least, the right honorable This famous "Decree of Fraternity" was passed under the following circumstances. The allied Austrian and Prussian armies, under the Duke of Bruns wick, were beaten back by the French, who immedi ately pressed forward into the Austrian Netherlands, and made themselves masters of the country by the decisive battle of Jemmape November 6th, 1792. When the news reached Paris the decree in ques tion was passed in the exultaron felt at this and other victories of the republic. It was in the fol lowing words: The French justly regarded this as a hostile act, and. after calling in vain for an explanation from the Emperor, who had marched large bodies of troops to their borders, they declared war against Austria on the 20th of April, 1792. Prussia instantly united with Austria, and, three months after, July 25th, 1792, the Duke of Brunswick invaded France at the bead of one hundred and thirty-eight thousand Aus-Alison, vol. i., p. 592, third edition. trian and Prussian troops. "The National Convention declare, in the name of the French nation, they will grant fraternity and assistance to all those people who wish to procure liberty. And they charge the executive power to send orders to the generals to give assistance to such people; and to defend citizens who have suf fered, and are now suffering, in the cause of liberty." The reader will decide whether to consider it with Decree of tue al Convention. Explanation by the French minister at to prevent the been praisewor пров gentleman says, you must allow to be an act of | Did you explain yourself on that subject? Did aggression, not only against England, you make it one of the grounds for the dismissal French Nation but against all the Sovereigns of Eu- of M. Chauvelin? Sir, I repeat it, that a nation, rope I am not one of those, sir, to justify itself in appealing to the last solemn rewho attach much interest to the general and in- sort, ought to prove that it has taken every possi discriminate provocations thrown out at random, ble means, consistent with dignity, to demand the like this resolution of the 19th of November, reparation and redress which would be satisfacto1792. I do not think it necessary to the digni- ry; and if she refuses to explain what would b ty of any people to notice and to apply to them- satisfactory, she does not do her duty, nor exoner selves menaces without particular allusion, which ate herself from the charge of being the aggressor. are always unwise in the power which uses them, The right honorable gentleman has this night, and which it is still more unwise to treat with se- for the first time, produced a most The phonfort ousness. But if any such idle and general prov-important paper; the instructions ng with Russia ocation to nations is given, either in insolence or which were given to his Majesty's war would Lave in folly, by any government, it is a clear first prin- minister at the court of St. Peters- thy if only acted ciple, that an explanation is the thing which a burgh, about the end of the year magnanimous nation, feeling itself aggrieved, 1792, to induce her Imperial Majesty to join ought to demand; and if an explanation be giv- her efforts with those of his Britannic Majesty, en which is not satisfactory, it ought clearly and to prevent, by their joint mediation, the evils distinctly to say so. There should be no am- of a general war. Of this paper, and of the biguity, no reserve, on the occasion. Now we existence of any such document, I, for one, was all know, from documents on our table, that M. wholly ignorant. But I have no hesitation in Chauvelin [the French minister] did give an ex- saying that I entirely approve of the instructions planation of this silly decree. He declared," in which appear to have been given; and I am the name of his government, that it sorry to see the right honorable gentleman dis of this decree was never meant that the French gov- posed rather to take blame to himself than eredernment should favor insurrections; it for having written them. He thinks that he London. that the decree was applicable only shall be subject to the imputation of having been to those people who, after having acquired their rather too slow to apprehend the dangers with liberty by conquest, should demand the assist- which the French Revolution was fraught, than ance of the Republic; but that France would that he was forward and hasty—“Quod solum respect, not only the independence of England, excusat, hoc solum miror in illo."s I do not but also that of her allies with whom she was agree with him. I by no means think that he not at war." This was the explanation of the was blamable for too much confidence in the offensive decree. "But this explanation was not good intentions of the French. I think the ten satisfactory." Did you say so to M. Chauvelin? or and composition of this paper was excellent-Did you tell him that you were not content with the instructions conveyed in it wise, and that it this explanation? and when you dismissed him, wanted but one essential thing to have entitled afterward, on the death of the King [of France], it to general approbation, namely, to have been did you say that this explanation was unsatisfac- acted upon! The clear nature and intent of that tory? No. You did no such thing; and I con- paper I take to be, that our ministers were to If not satisfact- tend, that unless you demanded fur- solicit the court of Petersburgh to join with them try were bound ther explanations, and they were re- in a declaration to the French government, stat tony, and fused, you have no right to urge the ing explicitly what course of conduct, with rewould satisfy decree of the 19th of November as spect to their foreign relations, they thought nec an act of aggression. In all your conferences essary to the general peace and security of Eu and correspondence with M. Chauvelin, did you rope, and what, if complied with, would have inhold out to him what terms would satisfy you? duced them to mediate for that purpose. This Did you give the French the power or the means was a proper, wise, and legitimate course of proof settling the misunderstanding which that de- ceeding. Now, I ask you, sir, whether, if this cree, or any other of the points at issue, had cre- paper had been communicated to Paris, at the ated? I maintain, that when a nation refuses to end of the year 1792, instead of Petersburgh, it state to another the thing which would satisfy would not have been productive of most seaher, she shows that she is not actuated by a de- sonable benefits to mankind; and, by informing sire to preserve peace between them; and I aver the French in time of the means by which they that this was the case here. The Scheldt, for might have secured the mediation of Great Brit instance. You now say that the navigation of ain, have not only avoided the rupture with this the Scheldt was one of your causes of complaint." country, but have also restored general peace to the ocean), under the provisions of the treaty of Westphalia, which settled the political relations of modern Europe. Holland and her protector, En gland, had just ground of complaint for the aggres sion, though it was too unimportant in itself to jus tify a war. ory, the minis declare what Mr. Fox, as an empty vaunt, or with Mr. Pitt, as a declaration of war against all the thrones of Europe. 7 When the French conquered the Austrian Netherlands (as mentioned in the preceding note), they forcibly opened the navigation of its principal river. the Scheldt, down to the sea. This had been closed for nearly one hundred and fifty years, out of regard to the rights of Holland (through which it entered The only thing he excuses is the only thing in him which I admire. |