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of contemplation of the fame object, which is called enjoyment, or vision, and which will be confidered afterwards.

Since mental pleasure is in knowledge, the knowledge of the effect does not fully fatisfy the mind without knowing the cause, and confequently without knowing the first cause.

Thus we have three properties of that glory, the view of which is so requifite to beatitude: It must be fupreme, original, and underived. This shows, that the view of divine glory (such as will not cloy) is necessary to beatitude. That it is fufficient, may be made evident thus: That excellency, the view of which has been already experienced (which I defire to mention with veneration) fufficient to external fullness of joy in a being capable of, or rather incapable of wanting, infinite happiness, must be much more fufficient to, and eternal fullness of, joy in finite beings. If that beauty and excellence, without change, interruption, variety, or progress, in the view of it, was not, and could not, be cloying to an infinite knowledge and intelligence; much less can the fullest view of what a finite mind is capable of, ever turn less pleasant, unless conftant progress be poffible and needful, and therefore attainable.

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IN confidering the cause of the greatest mental joy or beatitude, we must consider not only the external or objective cause, but also the internal or subjective cause.

The objective cause is supreme excellency; but the subjective, or inherent internal cause, (which must exist in us, though not from us), is our knowledge knowledge or contemplation of it, and affection or difpofition of mind with which we contemplate it.

SECT. I. Different kinds and degrees of contemplation.

Irrational animals have no real enjoyment (if any thing they have deserve such a name) but what comes from the creator as its first cause. Beatitude, as was proved before, requires not only such joy as shall have the first cause for the author of it, but such as shall have him for the object of it. Brutes, and brutal men, have all their real pleasure from the creator; but they have no joy in him, fince their joy is not in the knowledge of him.

As there are various beauties or objects of pleafant knowledge, so there are various degrees or - kinds of knowledge of the fame object. Supreme glory, as was proved, is the only beatific object; but every degree or kind of contemplation of it, is not beatific contemplation; yea, some contemplations of it, to some dispositions, are more cloying and unpleasant than almost any other contemplations of other objects; and we may conceive such a contemplation of it is in fome, as might be a most effectual and most just cause of anguish.

Let us confider the different views the mind may have of inferior beauties, mental or material. Let us suppose a man enjoying the most pleasant and moft ravishing profpect on earth, in the springtime, delighting himself with all the charms of that place, and of that beautiful season; and then let us suppose him afterwards, in a dark winter-night, remembering, or contemplating, that profpect; the object of contemplation is the fame in both cafes, but the contemplations themselves so different, that whereas the former was the cause of joy, the latter

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may be the cause of the contrary, that is, melancholy.

In vision or fight of material beauty, we are paffive recipients, if I may so speak. In imagination, or pure intellection, which sometimes, perhaps, is the strict sense of idea, we are active causes. The latter, abstracting from composition, abstraction, &c. is a mere picture, an imitation of the former. The former is properly an effect of the Creator's power, the latter of our own. is the work of nature; the other, in a manner, a work of art. No wonder the former be a greater cause of joy.

The one

It is not needful to insist long, in shewing the difference between these two forts of contemplation, vision of an object as prefent, and the dark knowledge of it as abfent. In defiring any mental enjoyment, defire supposes, that we have fome knowledge of the beloved object already; which knowledge is the cause of defire: and defire likewise supposes another quite different knowledge of the fame object, which we call prefence, or enjoyment, and which is wanting when we defire it.

Defire of knowledge, or contemplation of any object, supposes a mixture of knowledge and ignorance of it; for if we had no knowledge of it at all, we could not defire it.

Let us suppose a man seeing a machine, building, city, or beautiful country, he sees in one fimultaneous view more than he can imagine at once. A man remembers, and imagines by parts, what he fees in one view. Besides, active producing of ideas, because it requires effort, is oft-times uneafy in comparison of vision, which is a contemplation of an object more comprehenfive, easy, bright, sted. fast, and confequently more delightful, than any

other.

Let us reflect on some of the most extraordinary effects of friendship, (and there is nothing in hiftory has

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has had more extraordinary effects), particularly the greatest forrow and melancholy that ever any man felt for the abfence or death of the most virtuous friend; his thinking on him when dead, or absent, and feeing him when present, are contem plations of the same object; but fo different, that the fame reason that makes the one pleasant, makes the other proportionably forrowful.

The prefence of a material object is that which gives us the clearest perception and contemplation of it, and in fome sense admits of degrees.

The prefence of a rational being is when we have, not only the clearest view of his state, and qualities, and disposition, of which the face is a mysterious representation; but also are within reach of mutual and reciprocal communication. If a rational being were present to us, so as to know all we think and do, but would make no return to us, nor give any intimation of affection and inclination to our good, or to anfwer our defires; as it would not be mutual prefence, so, as to our comfort, it would be in effect abfence and distance.

The more a rational being communicates to us, and particularly the more clear view we have of himself, he is the more present to us; so that presence admits of degrees.

The favourable prefence of a rational being is when we enjoy his prefence with figns of good-will to us; and the joy of it is proportionable to our love of him, and his power to do us good.

SECT. II. Of Affection.

Befides the beauty of an object, and the degree or kind of contemplation of it, the affection with which we contemplate it, has no small influence on the joy that refults from it. Two persons may have the fame view, or the fame thoughts, concerning the

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the same object; and yet difference of affection may make the fame view far more pleasant to the one than to the other; yea, may make it pleasant to the one, and painful to the other.

Curiosity is the inclination we fatisfy, when we delight in the view of a lifeless object, without any regard to any advantage by it, different from the pleafant view of it. Love is the affection which is the internal or fubjective cause of delight, in contemplating an intelligent being; but a man may incline, and take pleasure, in contemplating even an intelligent being, without the affection of love; and then he takes merely the pleasure of curiofity. Herod was defirous to fee the most amiable perfon that ever was in the world, without loving him; and vitious perfons, or perhaps even Atheists, may take fome kind of pleasure even in theological contemplations, merely from curiofity.

We cannot love the prefence or fociety of any person, without love to the person himself, unless it be for the fake of fome advantage different from his prefence; and then it is not properly his prefence we love, or delight in, but some other intereft we propose by it.

We cannot delight in contemplating any person as happy, without loving him; and we cannot perfectly love any person, without making his happinefs, in a manner, our own. If we had a perfect love of an infinitely happy being, it would be an inexhaustible fource of joy, though we are incapable of knowing all his blessedness, and confequently incapable of infinite happiness.

It would take a treatise to show the influence of a just and well-grounded love on happiness. The pleasure of fociety depends on it; and the exercife of that lovely affection has an elevated noble pleasure in it, even in forrow, in pity, in sympathifing with distressed virtue, though it were but in a fable. An affection which even when exercised towards infe

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