2

our Senfations: That the Bodies that furround us do really act in and upon us, not only by making impreffion upon our Bodies, and ftriking upon our Organs of Senfe, but also by raifing and exciting, those Senfations our Spirits are confcious of, fo as to be the true efficient Causes of our Pleasure and our Pain That the Fire gives us that fentiment of Heat which we feel when we approach it and, That Wine caufes in us that pleafing Taste which we feel when we drink it: And the like.

Now I confess, if this Hypothefis be true, if fenfible Objects do really act upon our Souls, and are the proper efficient Caufes of those pleafing Senfations which we feel there, then 'twill neceffarily follow, that a certain portion of my Love is due to these fenfible Objects: for, if these Objects produce Pleasure in me, then they do me good, they perfect my Being, and render it more happy; and if they do me good, then in their proportion they are my good; and if they are in any degree my good, then they are so far lovely; and if they are any way lovely, then fo far they ought to be loved. But now, if some part of our Love be due to fenfible Objects (as upon this Hypothefis it is) then 'tis impoffible that God fhould have a right to all of it; and confequently, to love him with all the heart, and all the foul, and all the mind, can fignifie no more than to love him principally and above all, to give him the Preference in our Love. I fay the Preference, for it feems the Creatures put in for a fhare; and

if they have a part, 'tis impoffible that God fhould
have the whole: they must then both go fharers
in our Affection; and the only Priviledge which
God can claim upon this Hypothefis, is, to
to have
the largest share in our Love.

Whether this Hypothefis be true or no, shall be confider'd in its proper place; in the mean while: it may ferve as a ftrong Prefumption, that it is not, that the Explication which is founded upon it falls fo very short of the literal Emphasis of the Text, Thon fhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy foul, and with all thy mind. But is it to love God at this rate, to love him only principally, and more than any thing elfe? Does this exhaust the sense of this great Commandment? Can he be faid with any tolerable Sense to love God with all his heart, all his foul, and all his mind, that only loves him above other things, at the fame time allowing other things a fhare in his Love? Can he be faid to love God with all his Love, that loves him only with a Part? What though that part be the larger Part, 'tis but a Part still; and is a Part the Whole? What Logick, or what Grammar, will endure this?

I think it therefore very evident, that the words of this great Law do call for a higher fenfe. And what can that be short of this (which indeed is what in ordinary conftruction they import) that we ought to love God, not only with the Beft and Most, but with the Whole of our Affe&tion; that we love him intirely, not only with an integrity

B 4

integrity of Parts, but with an integrity of Degrees; that we love him not only with every Capacity, Paffion, and Faculty; with the Underftanding(fuppofe) Will and Affections, (here expreft by Heart, Soul, and Mind) but in every degree of every Power, with all the Latitude of ' our Will, and with the whole Poffibility of our Souls; that we bestow on him not only the higheft degree of our Love, but every degree of it, the Whole? In one Word, that God be not only the principal, but the only, Object of our Love. This indeed is a Sacrifice worthy of a God, when the Whole Man is offer'd up to him as a Burnt Offering: And no lefs can he be supposed to require from us by vertue of this great Law, when he bids us to love him with all our Heart, with all our Soul, and with all our Mind. In the fame Senfe therefore as 'tis faid, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only fhalt thou ferve; fo is this great Commandment to be understood, as if it were faid, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, and him only fhalt thou defire. For Love is the true natural Worship of the Soul; and as we are to Worship none but God, fo are we to Love none but God.

But to make this appear intelligible Divinity, we must look about for a proper Ground for it in Philofophy; it being neceffary that we lay our Foundation as much deeper than the Common Interpreters have done, as we intend to build higher. Which leads me to the fecond general Part of my Undertaking; namely, to confider the Reason

and

and Bottom upon which this great Commandment stands.

The Sense of it I have already explain'd, and made to be the fame with what the Letter of the Text imports; namely, That our whole Affection be placed upon God, and that we love him fo intirely as to love none but him. I come now to juftifie this Senfe, which I fhall endeavour to establish upon this double Bafis in general.

I. That God is the only Author or Cause of our Love.

II. That he is also the only proper Object of it. First, I confider that God is the only Author or Cause of our Love. By Love here I understand that original Weight, Bent or Endeavour whereby the Soul of Man ftands inclined, and is moved forwards, to Good in general,or Happiness. Now that this Impreffion is from God, and that 'tis he alone that has put this Biafs into our Natures, I think demonftrable feveral ways; but at prefent fhall only confider that this Motion of the Soul is a neceffary Adherent to our Beings, fuch as we were never without, and fuch as we can never put off; fuch as is all over invincible and irrefiftable. The Soul of Man must not pretend to the least degree of Liberty here (for indeed it being impoffible that our Love to Good in general should be bad, it was not fit it fhould be free) but is altogether paffive in this Motion, and moves no otherwife than as she is moved. She has no more Command over this Motion than fhe has over the Motion of the Heart or Pulfe, which shews it to

be

be equally Vital and Natural, and of the very effential Make and Constitution of our Being. Well then, I demand, Is this natural neceffary Motion, from our Selves or from God? If from our Selves, How comes it then to pass, that we cannot command it, or ftop it? Had we Power to produce,what we have not Power to govern? or, is it more difficult to govern than to produce? No certainly, were we the Authors of this Motion we should have fome Power over it, and be able to manage and controul it; which fince we cannot do, we may well conclude, that 'tis not a thing of our Production; and that though it be in us, yet 'tis not of or from our Selves. And whence then must it be but from God? Who else could kindle in our Natures fuch an unquenchable Flame? Who elfe could fix such a strong Spring in our Souls, and actuate our Beings with fuch a mighty Energy? And who should be the Author of what is Natural and Neceffary in us, but he that is the Author of our Natures? Love > is the fame in the Moral and Intellectual World, as Motion is in the Natural; and as we make God to be the Author of Natural Motion, fo there is as much reafon to make him the Author of our Love. But now if God be the only Author and Cause of our Love, has not he then the fole Right and Title to it; and has not he also a Right to it all? This may feem perhaps at first glance to be a captious and furprizing way of Arguing; but confider it well; Has not God a Right to all that he produces? What is it that gives him a Gravitation

Right