Effects, nor have any Natural Relation to them; but are indifferent to either, as being difproportionate to both. That the fame Motion that is now attended with Pleasure, might as well (for any particularity in the thing it felf) be attended with Pain, there being as great difproportion between these particular Motions and their particular Senfations, as between Motion and Sensation in general.

What is here faid of Motion, is as applicable to Figure; and fince thefe are the only two Modifications Body is capable of, and these hold no proportion with our Senfations, 'tis plain that our Senfations ought not, cannot be ascribed to Bodies as their proper Efficient Causes. The fum of the Argument refolves into this. There is nothing in Bodies but Figure and Motion, if therefore Bodies do produce or caufe our Senfations, they must do it by Figure and Motion. But they cannot do it by Figure' and Motion; therefore Bodies cannot produce our Senfations.

And whereas it is again further concluded, that Bodies have not in themselves any Quality resembling the Sensations which we feel at their Prefence, because this would oblige us to allow them capable of Thought; which in Reason we cannot do: Is not the very fame Confideration of equal force to prove alfo, that they do not produce our Senfations? Does not the fame Want and Incapacity of Thought infer the one as well as the other? Bodies have no Thought, therefore they have no Sensations; Bodies have no Thought, therefore

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therefore they produce none: Is not the last Confequence as good as the firft? Without all queftion it is. For how can a Thoughtless Principle produce a Thought? That is, how can the Effect be above the Order of its Cause? If it may, then any thing may produce any thing, and any thing may follow from any thing, which would overturn all the Order both of Science and of Nature.

And if further, it be reckon'd fuch an Abfurdity that Matter should Think (as it is by those who to avoid this inconvenience, deny that there is any thing in Bodies resembling our Sensations) then is it not a much greater abfurdity to fuppofe it capable of producing Thought? And are not thofe very inconfiftent with their own Principles, who fcruple to allow to Bodies a Capacity of Thinking, and upon that ground reject the Old Doctrin of Qualities, as they fignifie fomething in Bodies correfponding to our Senfations; and yet at the fame time will allow them a Power of producing that Thought in us which they think they are not capable of in themselves? Is not this a very great inconfiftency, especially for Men of Principles and Demonstration to be guilty of? For certainly it is a great deal more to be able to produce Thought, than to be ineerly capable of it. I my felf am capable of Thought, but I do not find I have a Power to produce it, not fo much as in my felf, much lefs in another. If therefore we deny Matter what is Lefs, we ought to be the more Cautious how we allow it what is Greater; and if it be fuch an Absurdity that

Bodies fhould be capable of Thought, then much more abfurd is it, that they fhould have a Power to produce it.

And thus have I fhewn, that the very fame Reasons which prove that Bodies have not any Qualities in them like our Senfations, do allo prove that they do neither produce Senfations in us, and confequently that our Modern Philofophers who upon those Grounds rejected the former part, ought upon the very fame Grounds to have rejected the latter too. And as they ought, fo they easily might. They had the right Thread in their Hands, but 'twas their Unhappiness to let it go, and not to pursue the Clue of their own Reasonings.

What I have hitherto argued from the Principles upon which thofe Men built their Conclufion, may also be as well argued from the Conclufion it felf built upon thofe Principles. Their Conclufion is, that Bodies have not in themselves any fuch inherent Qualities as correfpond to our Sen fations. Well then, if they have not any thing like Sensation in themselves, how fhall they be able to produce them in us? Can they commu nicate what they are not poffeft of? Can they cause Sensations in us which they have not,which they feel not, which they know not, and which they cannot ever caufe in themselves? They themselves are here fuppofed utterly void and uncapable of all Senfation; but if they can pro duce it in us, why may they not be as well able to produce it in themselves? But this must not

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be; the Conclufion is, that they have not any thing like those Sensations in themselves; whence I may juftly infer, that they are as little capable of producing them in us.

But befides, Can Bodies act upon Spirits? So indeed they must do, if it be true that they produce our Senfations, fince the Soul is the only proper Subject of all Perception. But is this poffible? Is not Spirit fuppofed to penetrate Body? Well, if so, then it may coexift with it in the. fame determinate point of Space; if fo, then it will not resist it, and if fo, then it will not be capable of fuffering by it, or receiving any impreffion from it, it being impoffible that Bodies fhould act upon that which does not resist their Action. The lefs the refiftance is, the lefs always is the Impreffion (as appears from that little force the strongest Wind has upon a Body of a Conical Figure) and confequently where there is no refiftance at all, there can be no Impreffion at all. And therefore fince Spirits make no refistance against Bodies, it is not poffible that Bodies should have cany Action, or make any Impreffion upon Spirits. The most that can be allow'd to Bodies, is to be able to act upon other Bodies, either by moving all their parts at once out of their place, or by changing the Order and Situation of the Parts among themselves; but how they fhould be capable of acting upon Spirits, upon a fort of Beings that make no refiftance against them, is what I can neither Conceive, or think Conceivable.

Suppose

Suppose I should fling a Stone at a Spirit, fhould I hurt it, do you think? No you'll fay, not a mere Spirit; but should that Spirit be in a Body, you would hurt it then. But pray why so? What's the meaning of this? Why if it were in a Body? If the Stone cannot hurt it when there is nothing that interpofes, it will be less able to do fo when there is fo thick a Wall between. But if it be the Stone that properly hurts it when 'tis in the Body, then why can it not as well do it when 'tis out of the Body? It should by right be better able then, as I can more eafily wound a naked Man, than a Man clad in Armour. But this plainly discovers the bottom of the Mistery; this clearly fhews, that 'tis not the Stone that strictly and properly speaking, caufes the Sensation of Pain in the Spirit (for then it would be as well, nay better able to hurt a separate Spirit than an imbody'd one) but that all that the Stone truly does is only to administer the Occafion of this Sensation to the Spirit by what it impreffes upon its Body, but that fome other Being is the true Efficient Cause of it; of which further by and by.

In the mean while I further confider that if Bodies fhould be allow'd to be the proper Caufes of our Senfations, of that Pleasure and that Pain which we feel at their Prefence and in their Ufe, then it would be in the power of Bodies to make us happy or miserable, to reward or punish us, tò perfect or to deteriorate our Condition; our well or ill being would depend upon them; confe quently they would be above us, fo far above us

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