* Mr. Malebranche. produce it; and I know but of * One amongst them that thinks any Otherwife, or any Farther. They thought, it seems, they had fufficiently reform'd from the Vulgar Philofophy, by fhaking off the former part of their Hypothefis, That Bodies have in themselves fome inherent Quality analogous to our Senfations; fo much, they faw, must be rejected. But they could not tell how to deny the later part; and do therefore hold, that Bodies do produce in us fuch and fuch Sensations, though they have nothing of a Similar Nature with them in themselves.

Very good. But were they determin'd to this Perfuafion by the Moments of Reason? I think 'tis to be doubted whether they ever so much as Confulted her in this part of the Question. They feem here rather to have hearkned to the Illufions of Senfe and Imagination, fuggesting to them, that because fuch Bodily impreffions are accompanied with fuch Senfations, therefore the later were the effect of the former. This is the only reason that is, or can be pretended in behalf of this Common Prefumption. But is this a Warrantable Conclufion? Does it follow, that because fuch Sensations do accompany fuch Bodily Impreffions, that therefore thofe Bodily Impreffions are the Cause of those Senfations? Can we argue from the Concomitancy of one thing with another, to the Caufal Dependance of one thing upon another? 'Tis certain that we cannot ; and 'tis therefore as certain, that the Reafon pretended for the

common

common Hypothefis, is indeed no Reason at all, but a Prejudice rather than a Reason.

Now though it be very unworthy of a Philosopher, and withall a very great let and intanglement to him in his Enquiry after Truth, to affert, any one thing without clear and full Evidence Yet this is neither the only, nor the greatest defect of this Conclufion. For as there is no fufficient Reason for it, so there is plain incontestable Reason against it.

Had our late Improvers of Science difregarded the importunate Clamours of Senfe and Imagina tion in this later point as they did in the former, and confulted only the Refponfes of inward Truth, they would have seen as much reafon to reject the Notion of Bodies being able to excite Sensations in us, as to reject that of their having fome certain Qualities like thofe Sensations in themselves. Nay, they would have seen, that the very fame Reasons that induced them to the one, ought also to have determin'd them to the other. For why is it that they will not allow that Bodies have in them fomething like our Senfations, particularly that in Fire there is any such thing as a Quality of Heat, anfwerable to what we call Heat in our felves: I fay, Why is it that they will not allow this, but because they reafon'd with themselves to this effect: There is nothing conceivable in Bodies but Magnitude, Figure, and Motion For inftance, There is nothing in Fire but certain Particles of Matter fo and fo fized, fo and fo figured, and fo and fo moved. Examin C

your

your Idea of Fire a thousand times over, and this is all you will ever be able to find in it. I fay, find in it: For 'tis true indeed, when you come near you find fomething more from it, you find withall a Senfation of Heat, either pleafing or painful according as your distance is. But you have no more reafon thence to conclude, that there is fuch a Quality as Heat, resembling what you feel, in the Fire, than you have to conclude Pain to be in a Needle or a Thorn. When you approach the Fire you feel Heat, and when you prick your Hand with a Needle you feel Pain but as you do not therefore fancy any fuch thing as Pain to be in the Needle, fo neither ought you to fuppofe any fuch thing as Heat to be in the Fire. That indeed which makes Men more apt to do fo in this Cafe than in the other is, because the Particles of the Fire are too minute to be difcern'd by the Eye, and fo Men not perceiving the Mechanicalnefs of its Operation, are apt to have recourse to fome inherent Quality; whereas the Thorn and Needle are of a visible bulk, and we see how they pierce and wound our Flesh. But did Men as clearly fee the Particles of the Fire, with their Size, Figure and Motion, and with what a Spring they are fhot and darted forth upon us, and how like fo many fine Needles or Launces they enter and divide the parts of our Body, they would no more Dream of any fuch thing as Heat in the Fire, than they do of Pain in a Needle; and would think it every whit as odd and improper to fay, Fire is Hot, as to fay a

Needle

Needle is Painful. And tho' as the Cafe now ftands, they are apt to fancy the contrary; yet 'tis plain, that this is only an Illufion of Senfe; Reason in the mean while conftantly affuring us, that there can be nothing in Fire but Particles of Matter of fuch a Size and Shape, and in fuch a degree of Motion: And withall, that we cannot ascribe such a thing as Heat to the Fire, answerable to that Sensation in our felves, without afcribing to it alfo Thought and Perception at the fame time, which would be of intolerable Confequence.

Upon these and fuch like Confiderations, the Reformers of Philofophy, I prefume, thought it neceffary to reject the former part of the Vulgar Hypothefis, that Bodies have in them fome certain Qualities answerable to our Senfations. And no doubt but that they reafon'd upon clear and diftinct Idea's. But will not the very fame Confiderations be of equal force to disprove the later part too, that Bodies do cause and produce Senfations in us? For if there be nothing in Bodies but Motion and Figure, if they are capable of no other Modification; then,whatever they do, they must do it by the Motion, and by the Figure of their Parts; there being nothing befides fuppofed to be in them. If therefore they cause our Sensations, 'tis by their Figure and their Motion that they must do it. But can Motion or Figure produce a Senfation, a Sentiment of the Mind, a Thought? 'Tis hard, extreme hard, to conceive how one Motion should beget another. But can it produce an Effect more Noble and Excellent,

C &

and

and of an Order fo very much higher than it felf? Can it produce a Thought? Is there any Proportion between fuch a Cause and fuch an Effect; between Motion and Thinking, between an Affection of a Body, and a Sentiment of the Soul? Or is there any proportion between fuch a particular Motion, and fuch a particular Senfation; between that Motion, fuppose, that is follow'd with Pleasure, and Pleafure; or between that Motion which, is follow'd with Pain, and Pain? Is that Motion which de facto is accompanied with Pleasure, more apt of its felf and in its own Nature, to produce that Sensation rather than Pain? Or may not that very Motion which is de facto follow'd with Pleasure, be as well the Occafion of Pain, for any Proportion, Affinity, or Natural Connexion that is in the things themfelves? 'Tis most certain that it may. For Pleafure and Pain are Senfations of a wholly different, nay contrary kind. They differ as much as any two things can do. They differ not only Effentially, but as Contraries, as extreme Oppofites. And they do almoft make their Subjects do fo, the Soul that is in Pleafure, differing almoft Specifically from her felf when she is in Pain. But now there is not the like difference between the refpective Motions fuppofed to produce them; They differ only Accidentally and Gradually. That Motion of the. Fire which occafions Pleafure, differs only in Degree from that which occafions Pain. Whence it is evident, that these Causes are not in themselves equivalent to their Effects,