She had a

consequently entirely at her mercy. powerful army ready to enter the territory of Holland at the first moment of the war, with the avowed object not merely of conquest, but of effecting a revolution in that country upon her own destructive principles; and in the Mediterranean she had a formidable fleet, which had struck all the Italian states with such consternation, as had given her the absolute control over the commerce of that sea, and the undisputed command of whatever resources could be drawn from the countries which border upon it. This was our situation at the opening of the campaign. It was no doubt truly serious, and such as would not have tempted us to undertake a war, if peace could have been maintained consistently with our safety and honour. It might reasonably have been expected, that with such advantages on her side the general balance of events would have been greatly in favour of France at the conclusion of the first campaign; especially when it is considered, that the policy which has been adopted by this country, of keeping both her naval and military establishments at the lowest possible scale in time of peace, must necessarily confine the extent, and weaken the vigour of her efforts in the early periods of war.

Prophecies of a much more gloomy complexion were uttered in this house; we were told (nearly in the language of one of the extracts which I have read from Brissot) that the sea would be immediately covered with 'the armed vessels of our enemy, and that our commerce would be exposed to depredation in every quarter. We were told in the same tone, that perhaps after five or six years of war, the Netherlands might be evacuated as the price of peace. What is our situation now at the conclusion of the first year of the war?

Holland has been saved. The importance of this event in the present situation of Europe may be estimated by the designs which France has uniformly entertained against that country since the time of her success in the Netherlands. Robespierre lamenting

that Dumourier did not invade Holland immediately after the conquest of the Netherlands, says, "If we had invaded Holland, we should have become masters of the Dutch navy; the wealth of that country would have been blended with our own, her power added to that of France, the government of England would have been undone, and the revolution of Europe secured." The nature of the revolution intended in Holland is now well known. When the invasion of that country was projected, Cambon is said to have declared, that "as the Dutch had no church lands to offer to France for her indemnification in the war, the Dutch revolution must be made on new principles. It must be a revolution of strong boxes and purses." The decree which passed about the time Dumourier entered Holland, is a sufficient commentary on this expression. It shows that if the French had succeeded in that expedition, they would have struck the most fatal blow that commercial credit has ever received.

But the protection of Holland was of great importance in another view. From the moment that France had declared war against the Dutch, Dumourier repeatedly states, that the conquest of Holland was essentially necessary for the purpose of maintaining the possession of the Netherlands in the hands of the French; he says, that "without Holland the Netherlands must soon fall; and with Holland he entertained no doubt of being able to oppose an effectual barrier to the progress of the Austrian and Prussian armies." The recovery of the Netherlands therefore was intimately connected with the protection of Holland. Whatever opposition was made to the force under the command of Dumourier in Holland, must in this view of the subject be considered as a combined operation with the attack of the prince of Saxe Cobourg upon the armies of Valence and Miranda on the banks of the Roer and of the Meuse. It is certain, that the brilliant successes of the Austrians would have been at least retarded, if the gallant defence of Williamstadt and of the passage of the Meuse had not checked the

progress of Dumourier, and prevented him from effecting a junction with the armies opposed to the prince of Cobourg at an earlier period, and under circumstances of greater advantage. It is unnecessary to state, that the seasonable assistance afforded by this country to the Dutch, was alone the circumstance which encouraged and enabled them to make so vigorous an effort in that critical conjuncture of their affairs. The recovery of Flanders, thus connected on the one hand with the defence of Holland, was on the other hand an object of equal importance to the permanent security of the Dutch frontier. It was also material to the prosecution of the war in many other respects. It deprived our enemies of resources, which, according to the account given by Cambon, were become necessary to the support of their declining finances, and added what was thus taken from them to the strength of our allies. Brissot says, that "the evacuation of Belgium tarnished the glory of the French arms, and retarded" what he calls "the liberty of Europe." The Netherlands, recovered under such circumstances, have not only been maintained through. out the campaign, but an impression has been made upon the frontier of France, by the capture of Valenciennes, Condé, and Quesnoy. Against these successes are to be set the raising of the sieges of Dunkirk and Maubeuge. Making the utmost allowance for each of those failures, and comparing the circumstances of our situation on the side of Holland and Flanders in the month of February, 1793, with their actual state, it cannot be denied, that the campaign in Flanders has been productive of the most considerable acquisitions both in point of territory and resource, which this country and her allies ever obtained in that quarter in any single year of our most prosperous wars. On the Rhine the recapture of Mentz and the progress made in Alsace, after the distinguished action of Weissembourg, afforded effectual protection to the frontier of Germany during the greater part of the campaign, and operated as a powerful diversion of the force of the enemy. Notwithstanding the sud

den irruption of the French, by means of the requisition of the mass of the people, (a measure, the effects of which upon the internal situation of France I shall have occasion to examine more particularly before I sit down) our general situation is far more favourable than at the opening of the campaign. Although the French have regained a considerable part of the country from which they had been driven in the course of the summer, they have as yet been contending with us for our conquests, and not for any advantages which they did not possess before the commencement of the war. While our allies retain Mentz, it must be admitted, that after all the extraordinary exertions of the enemy their situation is much more disadvantageous than it was in the month of July. In the territories of the king of Sardinia the French have made no additional progress. On the side of Spain they have suffered considerable losses. The blockade of the French fleet, in the port of Toulon by an inferiour force was highly creditable to the naval honour of this country, and in the circumstances attending the evacuation of that town, one of the most severe blows was given to the naval power of France, which has ever been struck in the whole history of our marine, and the command of the Mediterranean was at once transferred from the hands of France into our own. If the fleets of the enemy have offered no opportunity to our's of obtaining any brilliant success, let us compare the actual state of our trade and commerce with those gloomy predictions to which I have already alluded, and with the captures made from the enemy. On this subject I must again refer to the authority of Brissot, which is corroberated by our own accounts. He says, "in the month of March all our privateers were destroyed by the English in the Channel. In the month of April our trading vessels were taken by English frigates at the very mouths of our rivers; our ships could not go into the Mediterranean without danger, and yet we had a fleet there of 15 ships of the line."

If we look to the result of the campaign abroad, the prospect is equally favourable. The fishery of Newfoundland, from which the French have been driven, has always been considered as a most valuable object. We know that it has formed one of the most contested articles in most of our negotiations of peace since the commencement of the present century. The acquisition of this fishery in the first campaign of the war must operate as a material check to one source of the naval power of France. of France. In the West Indies, the importance of the island of Tobago, which we have acquired, may be estimated, when we recollect, that it was the only one of all her conquests which France retained at the peace of 1783, after all the calamities of the American war. In the island of St. Domingo we are in possession of Nicola Mole, the most advantageous post with a view to the command of the windward passage, and of Jeremie, the part of the island which has suffered the least from the ravages of Brissot's commissioners. In the East-Indies, the French have been expelled from all their possessions, excepting Pondicherry, the capture of which could not, according to the latest advices, long be delayed. The acquisition of the fort of Mahé on the coast of Malabar, is of the greatest advantage to our new territories on that coast, both with a view to the commerce and good government of those countries. In a political view it is obviously of considerable importance that the French should not continue to hold a possession, which afforded them the means of so direct and easy an intercourse with Tippoo Sultan.

Thus, Sir, I have endeavoured to give a summary view of the events of the campaign. It does not belong to me to enter into any reply to the critical observations which have been made upon the conduct of particular expeditions, or upon the general disposition and application of our naval and military force. That argument will not be declined by those whose situation in his majesty's councils renders them most competent to treat it with effect. But from what lies within the observation of every man we may collect,