faction of every candid inquirer. "The Lord of hosts hath sworn, saying, surely as I have thought, so shall it come to pass; and as I have purposed, so shall it stand." "My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure;" and we are further told, God "worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." In fact, the very idea of the infinity of God's perfections incontestibly proves that no event can happen as a contingency with him, or in opposition to his eternal purpose.

Many attempts have been made to reconcile the doctrine of endless sin and misery with the acknowledged attributes and perfections of Deity; and also to evade the force of the argument deduced from them in favor of universal salvation. Some of the principal ones I will now notice.

1. In attempting to evade the force of argument in favor of the salvation of all men, which has been drawn from the attributes of God, it is said, the argument proves too much; and therefore, destroys itself. Every argument, say our opposers, which would prove the endless continuance of sin and suffering inconsistent with the goodness of God, would prove the existence of them in this world, incompatible with the same goodness; for if he be infinitely good, and permit them to exist at all, he may be equally good in permitting them to exist eternally. Now if it can be fairly proved from scripture, or by any legitimate arguments drawn from reason, that God permits any sin, suffering, or evil of any description to exist in the world, for any other purpose than to cause final good from it, then, I acknowledge, our argument must be abandoned. true there are many circumstances transpire, in which we are not able to discern the goodness of God; and frequently, when suffering some of the ills of this life, we are led to exclaim with Jacob,

It is

"all these things are against me." But Jacob lived to see, that the evils which he so feelingly lamented were real blessings; not only to himself, but to those wicked sons whose iniquitous conduct was the cause of all the sufferings he endured. And ought we not rather to conclude that in all we are accustomed to call evil, there is some real, though hidden good, than by denying it, to deny the perfect goodness of God? But if evil be perpetuated without end, then no good can possibly succeed it. A direct appeal to the scriptures will be sufficient to decide the question before us. "Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee; and the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain." "Moreover the law entered that the offence might abound; but where sin abounded, grace did much more abound. That as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ our Lord."

By the light of these scriptures we are able to discover the goodness of God, the harmony of his perfections, and the excellency of his purpose in permitting the temporary existence of evil. Never could the value of saving grace be fully appreciated,- -never could the song of redeeming love be sung, had not man been so far under the dounion of sin as to need a deliverance from it. The best, and most affectionate earthly parent will subject a beloved child to pain and suffering, for the sake of some good which he could nor otherwise procure; but what father or mothet would do it for the sole purpose of causing pain? In further confirmation of the principle now laid down, we may notice the fact, that the captain of our salvation was made perfect through suffering; and if suffering was necessary, in the plan of God, to make him perfect, have we not just grounds for concluding that infinite wisdom

makes use of the same means to perfect all mankind?

2. Believers in endless punishment have attempted to reconcile their doctrine with the attributes, particularly the love, or goodness of God; by arguing that his love seeks the greatest good of the universe, as a whole; and contending that the good of the whole may be consistent with the suffering of some of the parts which compose this whole. In order to illustrate this proposition, the simile of a diseased limb, which the good of the whole body requires should be amputated, is generally introduced. To show the futility of this argument, all that is necessary is to consider the similitude fully, and in all its bearings upon the point in question. If the surgeon who should be called to amputate the diseased limb, could as easily restore it to perfect health and soundness as he could amputate it, could it in any way be said that the greatest good of the sufferer required, not only the painful operation which he must undergo, but also the loss of his limb? And would not the surgeon who, with the ability to heal, should persist in his determination to amputate, be justly considered a monster of cruelty? And I ask further, cannot God as easily heal the sinner, and restore him to holiness, and consequent happiness, as he can cast him off forever, and consign him to hopeless agony and despair?

To this it may perhaps be replied, that God has instituted proper and suitable means for the conversion of the sinner, and his restoration to divine favor; and if any will be so hardened as to withstand the operation of these means, it is not consistent for him to confer salvation on any other terms, or by any other means than those he has instituted. I readily admit that it would be inconsistent, and not only so, but impossible for

God to save sinners by any other than his own appointed means; but, I ask, did he know, when he instituted the means of salvation, whether they would be effectual or not? and if so, does it argue, either infinite wisdom or goodness in him, to say he has established means to reclaim his children which he infallibly knew would be ineffectual? The more we examine this argument, the more clearly we discover its weakness and inconsistency; and we must,I think, be convinced, that it cannot be supported, either by reason or revelation.

It would seem to require but a very small degree of sagacity to discover the absurdity and falsity of the proposition, that the greatest good of the whole does not necessarily imply the good of every individual composing that whole; but as this argument has been frequently used, and by divines of considerable standing and reputation for learning and talents, we will give it a little further attention. Suppose the father of a numerous family should adopt this mode of reasoning; and finally come to the conclusion, that the greatest good of his whole family, instead of requiring the good of every member, was perfectly consistent with the severe suffering and misery of a certain part of his children; and should adopt this principle in regulating his conduct towards them. In order to have his practice correspond with his theory, it would become necessary for him to confine his favors to a part of his children, -to treat them with kind indulgence, and grant them every thing in his power to make them as happy as possible; while he treated the remainder, not only with cold neglect, but actually inflicted on them all the suffering in his power. Now suppose these neglected, children were to inquire of their partial father the reason of his conduct towards them and his other children; would it be likely to satisfy them, and reconcile them to

their sufferings, were he to assert that his whole family,themselves included, were as perfectly hap py as they would be if he treated them with the same affection as he did their brothers and sisters? Would any reasonable person be likely to be convinced there was as much happiness in that family as there was capacity for enjoyment? But, I go further, and would ask, admitting the more favored members of this family possessed one spark of fraternal affection, or even one feeling of humanity, could there be any happiness enjoyed in such a family? My friends, you can bring this subject home to your own feelings; and answer the last question to your own satisfaction.

3. As I wish clearly and fully as possible to illustrate the subject before us, and to notice all the arguments of our opponents which have any bearing on it; I will examine one other which has been used for the same purpose as the one last considered. It is contended that God does all things with express reference to his own glory; and as this glory consists in the union, or rather in the perfect display of all his attributes and per fections, to the view and understanding of all intelligencies; and as justice is as important an attribute as mercy, it is equally necessary that justice should be eternally exhibited in the punishment of sin, as it is that mercy should be displayed in saving from it.

We have already seen, from the very nature of God and his attributes, that he must eternally have possessed within himself an infinite fulness of glory, as well as of happiness. If, therefore, we allow the argument under consideration to be correct, we must suppose that prior to the existence or sin of man, there must have been beings, both sensitive and intelligent, on whom justice had been eternally inflicting punishment