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النشر الإلكتروني

SECTION II.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS FOUNDED ON THE ASSERTED ETERNITY OF MATTER.

1. To relieve himself of the difficulty of the preceding argument, the unbeliever will probably resort to the old assertion, that matter is eternal. We know of but one argument that has ever been advanced to prove the eternity of matter, and that is grounded upon another assertion, that it is indestructible. But here likewise we call for proof. If in reply to this call it be said that we cannot destroy a single particle of any body, nor annihilate so much as one atom, it is readily granted. But what then? Does it follow from this that matter is indestructible? We cannot do a great many things which can nevertheless be done. Because we cannot destroy a single grain or atom, it is by no means certain, therefore, that it cannot be destroyed. We cannot create a single atom; and the abstract argument drawn from this fact, has the same force against the existence of matter, as the one just named has against its destruction.

2. However, be this as it may, we regard the point as having but very little bearing upon the question at issue. Suppose we grant that matter is eternal, or that the materials of which the universe are composed have existed from eternity; what advantage does the unbeliever derive from this admission? Certainly none whatever; his course

is involved in the same darkness as before. A moment's consideration will show this. Does the eternity of matter explain all the wonderful phenomena of the world around us? Does it account for the order and harmony of the solar system-for the regular and exact revolutions of the planets-for the complicate, yet nicely balanced influences by which for ages they have been kept in play without once deviating from their path? Does it account for the ten thousand forms of animal and vegetable organization which are found on the surface of our globe? Does it account for the existence of that wonderful creature man, and solve the mystery of mind?* Not one of these questions can be answered in the affirmative, not one of these problems is solved by the eternity of matter.

3. It is repeated, therefore, that if we grant the unbeliever all for which he contends in this respect, it does not lighten the burthen of his difficulties, nor aid him one step in his progress. He has still to account for the wisdom and intelligence every where visible in the natural world; he has still to explain the design and contrivance which appear in every department of the universe that has come

* Suppose any parcel or lump of matter eternal and at rest-how came it to move? It is impossible that it should have added motion to itself. This must have been given it by some other power. But suppose motion eternal too; yet matter, unthinking matter and motion, could never produce thought. If so, why is it not the case now? why do we not see the mud of the street, when set in motion by the wagon wheel, bringing forth mind, forming itself into an intelligent being? If simple matter and motion have ever produced thought, there is no reason why they should not in this age. Or if, as certain philosophers affirm, thought is the effect of organization, which is in turn the production of the elements, why do not the elements fall into such productions now? If they ever did in any age or country bring forth the organization in question, it is a weighty inquiry, which the philosophical sceptic is desired to answer-why have they not continued from that time to the present to bring forth such organization?

within our observation, and to inform us how dead unconscious matter could think, reason, determine, and adopt the stupendous plan, for plan it is, call it by what name he may, according to which the affairs of that universe were at first carried into operation, and have ever since been directed. All this labor, even if we allow that matter is eternal, is yet before the unbeliever, and we call upon him to come forth to the task, and show how these things can be, and remove the difficulties still in his way.

4. But the great mistake in this argument remains to be noticed, and it is one which seems to us unfortunate for him who adopts this method of reasoning, to prove "there is no God." Why does the sceptic refuse to believe the world was created? Because this would pre-suppose a God. And why does he deny the existence of a God? The reply is that he cannot conceive of an uncreated selfexistent being. And does he deny the existence of every thing he cannot conceive or comprehend? Does he understand the nature of mind? Does he know why or how he thinks? Does he comprehend the process by which an acorn becomes an oak-by which the nourishment it draws from earth is changed to wood? We venture to say, No. But does he, therefore, refuse to believe that mind exists, or that the acorn produces an oak? Does he fully understand the nature and essence of magnetism and electricity? But does he deny that there are such fluids? Does he "comprehend the primary cause of the light, by which he sees; or of the elasticity of the air by which he hears; or of the fire, by which he is warmed?" Can he tell what first gave motion to the heart or the lungs, or what continues it? Can he explain the cause of animal heat? Does he know what gravitation is? To none of these questions can he give an affirmative answer. But because he cannot comprehend these things, does he therefore refuse to believe in the existence of light, and

air, and heat? Does he deny that the heart and lungs move, or that there is such an influence or principle as gravity? No; in the existence of all these he believes without hesitation. Where then is the propriety or philosophy of denying the existence of God, because he cannot comprehend it? But the absurdity of this is yet to

come.

5. He will not believe in God, because he cannot conceive of an uncreated self-existent being, and asks with a sort of triumph, Who made God? And with the same tone of triumph we might ask, Who made matter? He asserts that matter is eternal, and on this ground we put the question to him, If he can any more easily conceive of uncreated, self-existent matter, than he can of uncreated, self-existent Intelligence? To most minds, it is presumed, the former would come loaded with as much obscurity, and as many difficulties as the latter; yet the sceptic unhesitatingly receives the one, and as unhesitatingly rejects the other. By what philosophical or logical rules he does this, we know not; but one thing we know, that the very admission of the eternity and self existence of matter destroys the foundation of his theory, and deprives him of all farther objection to the being of a God. For by whatever rule he proves the eternity and self-existence of matter, by the same rule we pledge ourselves to prove the eternity and self-existence of Intelligence. We say to him thenproceed to the proof, and every step you take for yourself is one for us, and whenever you establish your own position, you establish ours by the side of it; and if you can believe the one, it will require no greater stretch of faith to believe the other.

6. It may be, however, that the sceptic will say here, that, the eternity of matter admitted, it possesses certain inherent properties or tendencies, which may have effected the present arrangement of things. This is mere as

sertion, and we might meet it with a contrary assertion and there leave it. But, if granted, it does not change the complexion of the preceding argument. It is still true, that the same rule which proves the eternity of matter will also prove the eternity of Intelligence; it is still true that it is as easy to conceive of, and to believe, the one as the other. Nevertheless, as we are not disposed to avoid any argument which may be offered, we shall give this an examination in the next section.

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