"sured," said he, in concluding, "that my conscience does "not reproach me with having committed any fault knowingly, and with premeditated design, against the Romans; " and if I have done any thing unwarily, apprized as I now 66 am, it is in my power to amend it. I have certainly done 66 nothing to deserve the implacable enmity with which I am "pursued, as if I had been guilty of the blackest and most enormous crimes, which were neither to be expatiated nor "forgiven. It must be without foundation, that the clemency and wisdom of the Roman people are universally extolled, if for such slight causes, as scarce merit complaint "and remonstrance, they take up arms and make war upon kings in alliance with them."

The result of this conference was, that Perseus should send new ambassadors to Rome, in order to try all possible means to prevent a rupture and open war. This was a snare laid by the artful commissioner for the king's inadvertency, in order to gain time. He feigned at first great difficulties in complying with the truce demanded by Perseus, for time to send his ambassadors to Rome, and seemed at last to accede to it only out of consideration for the king. The true reason was, because the Romans had not yet either troops or general in a condition to act; whereas, on the side of Perseus, every thing was ready; and if he had not been amused by the vain hope of a peace, he might have taken the advantage of a conjuncture so favourable for himself, and so contrary to his enemies, to have entered upon action. After this interview the Roman ambassadors advanced into Boeotia, where there had been great commotions; some declaring for Perseus, and others for the Romans; but at length the latter party prevailed. The Thebans, and the other people of Boeotia, by their example, made an alliance with the Romans; each by their own deputies, and not by the consent of the whole body of the nation, according to ancient custom. In this manner the Boeotians, from having rashly engaged in the party of Perseus, after having formed, through a long course of time, a republic which on several occasions had preserved itself from the greatest dangers, saw themselves separated and governed by as many councils as there were cities in the province; all of which in the sequel remained independent of each other, and formed no longer one united league as at first. And this was an effect of the Roman policy, which divided them to make them weak; well knowing that it was much easier to bring them into their measures, and subject them, by that means, than if

tra clementiæ gravitatisque vestræ fama vulgata pergentes est, si talibus de causis, quæ vix querela et expostulatione dignæ sunt, arma capitis, et regibus suciis bella infertis. Liv.

their union subsisted. No other cities in Boeotia, except Coronæa and Haliartus, persisted in the alliance with Per

seus.

From Boeotia the commissioners went into Peloponnesus. The assembly of the Achæan league was summoned to Argos. They demanded only a thousand men, to garrison Chalcis, till the Roman army should enter Greece; which troops were ordered thither immediately, Marcius and Atilius, having terminated the affairs of Greece, returned to Rome in the beginning of the winter.

« About the same time Rome sent new commissioners into the most considerable islands of Asia, to exhort them to send powerful aid into the field against Perseus. The Rhodians signalized themselves upon this occasion. Hegesilochus, who was at that time Prytanis (the principal magistrate was so called), had prepared the people by representing to them, that it was necessary to efface by actions, and not by words only, the bad impressions with which Eumenes had endeavoured to inspire the Romans in regard to their fidelity; so that upon the arrival of the ambassadors, they showed them a fleet of forty ships, entirely equipped, and ready to sail upon the first orders. This agreeable surprise was highly pleasing to the Romans, who returned from thence exceedingly satisfied with so conspicuous a zeal, which had even anticipated their demands.

Perseus, in consequence of his interview with Marcius, sent ambassadors to Rome to treat there upon what had been proposed in that conference. He dispatched other ambassadors with letters for Rhodes and Byzantium, in which he explained what had passed in the interview, and deduced at large the reasons upon which his conduct was founded. He exhorted the Rhodians in particular to remain quiet, and to wait as spectators only till they saw what resolutions the Romans would take. If, contrary to the treaties subsisting "between us, they attack me, you will be," said he, "the "mediators between the two nations. All the world is in“terested in their continuing to live in peace, but it behoves ་ none more than you to endeavour their reconciliation. De"fenders, not only of your own, but of the liberty of all Greece, "the more zeal and ardour you have for so great a good, the "more ought you to be upon your guard against every one "who should attempt to inspire you with different sentiments. "You cannot but know, that the certain means to reduce "Greece into slavery, is to make it dependent upon one peo"ple only, without leaving it any other to have recourse to."

a Liv. l. xlii. n. 45-48. Polyb. Legat. Ixiv-lxviii.

Cum cæterorum id interesse, tum præcipue Rhodioram, quo plus inter ali As civitates dignitate atque opibus excellant, quæ serva atque obnoxía fore, si allus alio sit quam ad Romanos respectas. Liv.

The ambassadors were received with great respect; but were answered that, in case of war, the king was desired not to rely upon the Rhodians, nor to demand any thing of them to the prejudice of the alliance they had made with the Romans. The same ambassadors went also into Boeotia, where they had almost as little reason to be satisfied; only a few small cities separating from the Thebans to embrace the king's party.

Marcius and Attalus at their return to Rome reported to the senate the success of their commission. They dwelt particularly upon their address in their stratagem to deceive Perseus, by granting him a truce, which prevented him from beginning the war immediately with advantage, as he might have done, and gave the Romans time to complete their preparations, and to take the field. They did not forget their success in dissolving the general assembly of the Baotians, to prevent their uniting with Macedonia by com

mon consent.

The greatest part of the senate expressed much satisfaction in so wise a conduct, which argued profound policy and uncommon dexterity in negotiation. But the old senators, who had imbibed other principles, and persevered in their ancient maxims, said, they did not recognise the Roman character in such dealing. That their ancestors, relying more upon true valour than stratagem, used to make war openly, and not in disguise and under cover; that such unworthy artifices should be abandoned to the Carthaginians and Grecians, with whom it was more glorious to deceive an enemy, than to conquer him with open force. That indeed stratagem sometimes, in the moment of action, seemed to succeed better than valour; but that a victory, obtained vigorously in a battle, where the force of the troops on each side was tried as near as possible, and which the enemy could not ascribe either to chance or cunning, was of a much more lasting effect, because it left a strong conviction of the victor's superior force and bravery.

Notwithstanding these remonstrances of the elder senators, who could not relish these new maxims of policy, that part of the senate which preferred the useful to the honourable were much the majority upon this occasion, and the conduct of the two commissioners was approved. Marcius was sent again with some gallies into Greece, to regulate affairs as he should think most consistent with the service of the public, and Atilius into Thessaly, to take possession of Larissa, lest, upon the expiration of the truce, Perseus should make himself master of that important place, the capital of the country. Lentulus was also sent to Thebes, to have an eye upon Baotia.

Corona an Haliartus.

Though the war with Perseus was resolved at Rome, the senate gave audience to his ambassadors. They repeated the same things which had been said in the interview with Marcius, and endeavoured to justify their master, principally upon the attempt he was accused of having made on the person of Eumenes. They were heard with little or no attention, and the senate ordered them, and all the Macedonians at Rome, to quit the city immediately, and Italy in thirty days. The consul Licinius, who was to command in Macedonia, had orders to march as soon as possible with his army. The prætor Lucretius, who had the command of the fleet, set out with five and forty gallies from Naples, and arrived in five days at Cephalonia, where he waited for the arrival of the land forces.

SECT. II.

Licinius and Perseus take the field. The latter has at first considerably the advantage.

"The consul Licinius, after having offered his vows to the gods in the Capitol, set out from Rome, covered with a coat of arms, according to the custom. The departure of the consuls, says Livy, was always attended with great solemnity, and an incredible concourse of the people, especially upon an important war, and against a powerful enemy. Besides the interest which every individual might have in the glory of the consul, the citizens were induced to throng about him, out of a curiosity to see the general, to whose prudence and valour the fate of the republic was confided. A thousand anxious thoughts presented themselves at that time to their minds upon the events of the war, which are always precarious and uncertain. They remembered the defeats which had happened through the bad conduct and temerity, and the victories for which they were indebted to the wisdom and courage of their generals. "What mortal," said they, "can know the fate of a consul at his departure; whether "we shall see him with his victorious army return in triumph "to the Capitol, from whence he sets out, after having offer"ed up his prayers to the gods, or whether the enemy may "not rejoice in his overthrow?" The ancient glory of the Macedonians, that of Philip, who had made himself famous by his wars, and particularly by that against the Romans, added very much to the reputation of Perseus; and every body knew, that from his accession to the crown a war had been expected from him. Full of such thoughts, the citizens conducted the consul out of the city. C. Claudius and Q. Mutius, who had both been consuls, did not think it below a A. M. 3833. Ant. J. C. 171

Eiv, lib. xlii. n. 49–63.

them to serve in his army in quality of military tribunes (or as we may now say, as colonels or brigadiers), and went with him; as did P. Lentulus and the two Manlii Acidini. The consul repaired in their company to Brundusium, which was the rendezvous of the army, and, passing the sea with all his troops, arrived at Nymphæum, in the country of the Apollonians.

Perseus, some days before, upon the report of his ambassadors, who had returned from Rome, and assured him that there remained no hope of peace, held a great council, in which opinions were different. Some thought it necessary for him either to pay tribute, if required, or give up a part of his dominions, if the Romans insisted upon it; in a word, to suffer every thing that could be endured, for the sake of peace, rather than expose his person and kingdom to the danger of entire destruction. That if a part of his kingdom was left him, time and chance might produce favourableconjunctures, to put him in a condition not only to recover all he had lost, but even to render him formidable to those who at present made Macedonia tremble.

The greater number were of a quite different opinion. They insisted, that by making cession of any part he must determine to lose all his kingdom. That it was neither money nor lands that incited the ambition of the Romans, but universal empire. That they knew the greatest kingdoms and most powerful empires were subject to frequent revolutions. That they had humbled, or rather ruined Carthage, without taking possession of its territories; contenting themselves with keeping it in awe by the neighbourhood of Masinissa. That they had driven Antiochus and his son beyond Mount Taurus. That there was no kingdom but Macedonia that was capable of giving umbrage to, or making head against the Romans. That prudence required Perseus, whilst he was still master of it, seriously to consider with himself, whether, by making the Romans sometimes one concession, and sometimes another, he was resolved to see himself deprived of all power, expelled from his dominions, and obliged to ask, as a favour of the Romans, permission to retire and confine himself in Samothracia, or some other island, there to pass the rest of his days in contempt and misery, with the mortification of surviving his glory and empire; or whether he would prefer to hazard all the dangers of the war, armed as became a man of courage in defence of his fortunes and dignity; and, in case of being victorious, have the glory of delivering the universe from the Roman yoke. That it would be no more a wonder to drive the Romans out of Greece, than it had been to drive Hannibal out of Italy. Besides, was it consistent for Perseps, after having opposed