19. And next to them, simple

modes.

20. The most doubtful, are
the names of very com-
pounded mixed modes and
substances.

21. Why this imperfection
charged upon words.
22, 23. This should teach us mo-
deration in imposing our
own sense of old authors.

CHAP. X.

Of the abuse of words.

SECT.

1. Abuse of words.

2, 3. First, words without any,

or without clear ideas.

4. Occasioned by learning

names, before the ideas

they belong to.

un-

5. Secondly, steady appli-

cation of them.

6. Thirdly, affected obscu-

rity, by wrong applica-

tion.

7. Logic and dispute have

much contributed to this.

8. Calling it subtilty.

9. This learning very little

benefits society.

10. But destroys the instru-

ments of knowledge and

communication.

11. As useful as to confound

the sound of the letters.

12. This art has perplexed re-

ligion and justice.

13. And ought not to pass for

learning.

14. Fourthly, taking them for

things.

15. Instance in matter.

16. This makes errours lasting.

17. Fifthly, setting them for

what they cannot signify.

18. V. g. putting them for the

real essences of substances.

19. Hence we think every

change of our ideas in sub-

SECT.

1. They are worth seeking.

2. Are not easy.

3. But yet necessary to phi-
losophy.

4. Misuse of words, the cause

of great errours.

5. Obstinacy.

6. And wrangling.

7. Instance, bat and bird.

8. First remedy, to use no

word without an idea.

9. Secondly, to have distinct

ideas annexed to them in

modes.

10. And distinct and con-
formable in substances.

11. Thirdly, propriety.

12. Fourthly, to make known

their meaning.

13. And that three ways.

4. Fourthly, not demonstra-

tive knowledge.

5. Fifthly, sensitive know-

ledge, narrower than ei-

ther.

6. Sixthly, our knowledge,

therefore, narrower than

our ideas.

7. How far our knowledge

reaches.

8. First, our knowledge of

identity and diversity, as

far as our ideas.

9. Secondly, of co-existence,

a very little way.

10. Because the connexion be-

tween most simple ideas

is unknown.

11. Especially of secondary

qualities.

12-14. And farther, because all

connexion between any se-

condary and primary qua-

lities is undiscoverable.

15. Of repugnancy to co-exist,

larger.

16. Of the co-existence of

powers, a very little

way.

17. Of spirits yet narrower.

18. Thirdly, of other rela-

tions, it is not easy to say

how far. Morality capa-

ble of demonstration.

19. Two things have made

moral ideas thought in-

capable of demonstration.

Their complexedness and

want of sensible represen-

tations.

20. Remedies of those difficul-

ties.

21. Fourthly, of real exist-

ence; we have an intui-

tive knowledge of our

own, demonstrative of

God's, sensitive of some

few other things.

22. Our ignorance great.

23. First, one cause of it, want

of ideas, either such as we

have no conception of, or

such as particularly we

have not.

24. Because of their remote-

ness, or,

25. Because of their minute-

ness.

26. Hence no science of bo-

dies.

27. Much less of spirits.

28. Secondly, want of a dis-

coverable connexion, be-

tween ideas we have.

29. Instances.

30. Thirdly, want of tracing

our ideas.

31. Extent in respect of uni-

versality.

CHAP. IV.

Of the reality of our knowledge.

SECT.

1. Objection,

knowledge

placed in ideas, may be

all bare vision.

2, 3. Answer, not so, where

ideas agree with things.

4. As, first, all simple ideas

do.

5. Secondly, all complex

ideas, except of substances.

6. Hence the reality of ma-

thematical knowledge.

7. And of moral.

8. Existence not required to

make it real.

9. Nor will it be less true,

or certain, because moral

ideas are of our own mak-

ing and naming.

10. Mis-naming disturbs not

the certainty of the know-

ledge.

11. Ideas of substances have

their archetypes without

us.

12. So far as they agree with

these, so far our know-

ledge concerning them is

real.

1. What truth is.

2. A right joining, or sepa-

rating of signs, i. e. ideas

of words.

3. Which make mental, or

verbal propositions.

4. Mental propositions are

very hard to be treated of.

5. Being nothing but joining,

or separating ideas, with-

out words.

6. When mental propositions

contain real truth, and

when verbal.

7. Objection against verbal

truth, that thus it may be

all chimerical.

8. Answered, real truth is

about ideas agreeing to

things.

9. Falsehood is the joining of

names, otherwise than

their ideas agree.

10. General propositions to be

treated of more at large.

11. Moral and metaphysical

truth.

CHAP. VI.

Of universal propositions, their

truth and certainty.

SECT.

1. Treating of words, neces-
sary to knowledge.

2. General truths hardly to
be understood, but in ver-
bal propositions.
3. Certainty two-fold, of
truth, and of knowledge.
4. No proposition can be
known to be true, where
the essence of each species
mentioned, is not known.
more particularly

5. This

concerns substances.
6. The truth of few universal
propositions concerning
substances, is to be known.
7. Because, co-existence of
ideas in few cases is to be
known.

8, 9. Instance in gold.

10. As far as any such co-ex-

istence can be known, so

far universal propositions

may be certain. But this

will go but a little way,

because,

11, 12. The qualities, which make

our complex ideas of sub-

stances, depend mostly on

external, remote, and un-

perceived causes.

13. Judgment may reach far-

ther, but that is not know-

ledge.

14. What is requisite for our

knowledge of substances.

15. Whilst our ideas of sub-

stances contain not their

real constitutions, we can

make but few general,

certain propositions con-

cerning them.

16. Wherein lies the general

certainty of propositions.

4. First, as to identity and

diversity, all propositions

are equally self-evident.

5. Secondly, in co-existence,

we have few self-evident

propositions.

6. Thirdly, in other relations

we may have.

7. Fourthly, concerning real

existence, we have none.

8. These axioms do not much

influence our other know-

ledge.

9. Because they are not the

truths the first known.

10. Because on them the other

parts of our knowledge do

not depend.

11. What use these general

1. We are capable of know-

ing certainly that there is

a God.

2. Man knows that he him-

self is.

3. He knows also, that no-

thing cannot produce a
being, therefore something
eternal.

4. That eternal being must
be most powerful.

5. And most knowing.
6. And therefore God.
7. Our idea of a most perfect
being, not the sole proof
of a God.

8. Something from eternity.
9. Two sorts of beings, co-
gitative and incogitative.