There had been a skirmish on the twelfth, in which Colonel Archdale, of the twelfth dragoons, lost an arm, and Captain Butler of the same regiment was taken prisoner. In the action of the twenty-first, the French lost five thousand men, eleven hundred of whom the English themselve buried before their own lines, and in different parts of their camp. We saw the trenches wherein they were deposited.

It is a subject of wonder, that our troops should have succeeded in this instance so well as they did. They landed under every possible circumstance of disadvantage, and yet drove from their posts, with the bayonet, the veteran legions of Buona parte's army; a mode of fighting in which the French were supposed, at that time, to be superior to every other nation. It. was there manifested, as it has since been so decidedly proved, that, man to man, they have no chance of success when opposed to British soldiers. The laurels acquired by our army in Egypt can never fade. Posterity will relate the heroism, which, on these remote aud almost unknown deserts, enabled an inexperienced army to vanquish an enemy, not only in possession of the territory, but also inured to the climate, and well acquainted with the country. The obstacles encountered by our troops were greater than have ever been described. The most powerful originated in their want of information. Never did so much ignorance accompany an expedition. The maps they brought with them would have disgraced a Chinese atlas. The instruction they had received was a mere mass of error: and their guides were unable to direct them. It is said, Sir Ralph Abercrombie lameuted, in his last moments, the false notions he had been taught to entertain of Egypt, and of the situation in which the French were there placed. In fact every one possessed more information than the conductors of the British armament. There was not a clerk in the factory of Constantinople or Smyrna who was not better informed. Instead of the flat sands they expected to find between Aboukir and Alexandria, they discovered a country full of eminences, aud advantageous posts; so that the French, when defeated, had only to fall back from one strong position to another. Once having effected a landing, our troops were told, and they believed the tale, that they might march without interruption to the walls of Alexandria. It may be important to the interest of our empire to state the truth at this distance of time; and to afford a brief record of this memorable campaign, as far as it can be communicated by a writer destitute of any military science: It will:

be given as he recived it, from the most impartial among the French, as well as the most candid of his own countrymen.

The divisions and cabals among the chiefs on both sides were productive, often of failure, and sometimes of disaster. The rare military talents and valour of Sir Sidney Smith, beloved too as he was by the soldiers and sailors of the expedi tion, could not be viewed without jealousy by the commanding officers both of the army and navy. The most unpardonable resistance was therefore opposed to his measures, and to his suggestions. His situation was, in truth, singular. Certain of the captains in the fleet felt umbrage because oue of their profession associated so much with landsmen, and was so often on shore; while the generals of the army could ill brook counsel, or even assistance, from a naval officer. On this account, the important project, recommended by him, of sending gunboats into the lake of Aboukir,* previous to the action of the thirteenth of March, and the voluntary offer he made of conducting that operation, with a view to impede the retreat of the French, was not only rejected, but his information respecting that lake was scouted as false; it was even asserted, that there was not water sufficient in the lake for the free passage of boats of burden, fit for the conveyance of artillery or troops; although Sir Sidney Smith had himself been there, in his ship's cutter, and had sounded every part of it. One of his private letters, about this time, to his brother in Constantinople, reflects so much credit upon his patriotism and national character, that it deserves a place in the history of the expedition. Having stated the peculiarities of his situation, and the obstacles he had to encounter in his earnest endeavours to serve his country, he added, "it is true, I once held the helm where I must now work a labouring oar; but I shall not pull less stoutly on that account,”

The fleet with our army arrived in Marmorice harbour,

* In the extraordinary changes to which this part of Egypt has been liable, the very limited observations of the author do not authorise even an attempt to reconcile the existing appearance of the country with the descriptions of ancient geographers. Strabo (lib. xvii. p. 1135. ed. Oxon.) journeying by land from the Canopian gate of Alexandria toward the east, arrives, after the distance of one hundred and twenty stadia (fifteen miles), at the city of Canopus. This seems to coincide with the position of Aboukir. But as to the present lake, the result of an inundation during the year 1784, whether it cover the original course of the Alúpu, by means whereof, as distinct from the Alexandrian canal, the annual voyage took place from Canopus to Alexandria; or occupy territory formerly inundated, in a similar manner, by the sea; or whether the site of Aboukir may be not rather that of Taposiris than of Canopus, according to Forster's conjecture, in his notes upon Granger, supported by the testimonies of Niebuhr; may remain for future determination.

John Spenser Smith, Esq. his majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister pleni potentiary, previous to the arrival of the earl of Elgin, at the Ottoman Forte.

upon the coast of Caria, on the twenty-eighth day of December, 1800. Having waited there near two months, during which time a small reinforcement arrived from England, it sailed for Egypt on the twenty-second* of February. The troops, burning for action, in excellent health and spirits, arrived in Aboukir Bay upon the second of March, at ten o'clock A. M. A sham descent had been practised in Marmorice, to exercise the soldiers. By this it was found, that six thousand men might be landed, in the most perfect order, and ready for immediate action, in the short space of twenty-three minutes. Their passage had been boisterous. Several Greek transports parted from the fleet during a gale of wind, and disappeared for many days, with part of the 12th, the 26th, and Hompesch's regiments of dragoons. Owing perhaps to this circumstance, or finding it was too late to land the troops upon the day of their arrival, the undertaking was postponed until the next an unfortunate circumstance, although perhaps unavoidable, as an opportunity was thereby lost not to be afterward recovered. Had the landing been then effected, it is certain we should have encountered no opposition; and it was well known that the reserve at least might have been put on shore. The enemy, although long before informed of our approach, was totally unprepared; and the lives of many brave soldiers might have been spared. The following day proved unpropitious, and our army was unable to land in consequence of this, the enemy gained time to strengthen himself, and to spread news of the invasion in all part sof the country where his forces were stationed. Preparations were accordingly made for a stout opposition. The succeeding morning was equally unfavourable, and six days were lost in the same manner; during all which time, the English fleet remained in sight of the French army, and were at length so little regarded, that the French, becoming dupes by the delay, believed the whole was intended to operate as a feint, in order to beguile their attention from the part of the coast where the descent was really meditated. So completely did this opinion finally prevail, that the time thus allowed them to prepare for their defence was not employed so advantageously as it might have been. A Greek deserter, sent, as they afterward believed, by our army, had circulated among them a report, to

According to Sir R. Wilson's narrative, this happened on the twenty-third. The author gives his information as he received it from the captains of the fleet, and from the logbooks of their ships.

which implicit credit was given. This man affirmed, that our intention was to land the army at Jaffa, upon the coast of Syria.

The delay shown upon this occasion was not solely owing to the weather. A principle source of it might be referred to another cause. Major M'Arras, chief engineer, had been forwarded in a vessel, previous to the sailing of our fleet from the bay of Marmorice, in order to reconnoitre the country, and to obtain information necessary for expediting the landing of our troops. This officer had been twice on shore, either in the Penelope's or Petrell's boat, and with the greatest success. He had observed the lake of Aboukir; had surveyed all the adjoining territory; ascertained the different heights; and selected a convenient place for landing. Having finished all his plans, he unfortunately ventured on shore the third time, to confirm the accuracy of certain observations, and was observed by a French armed boat, in the very instant when he was putting off to return to his ship. The wind was against him; and the crew of his boat, finding every effort ineffectual, suffered it to fall alongside, and surrendered. By a most dastardly instance of cruelty on the part of the French, they poured a volley of musquetry into the boat, after the surrender had taken place; by which Major M'Arras was killed. Soon after this disaster, our fleet arrived; and the commander in chief, instead of obtaining the information confidently expected, was reduced to the dilemma of waiting until the business of reconnoitring, now rendered more difficult than ever, could in some measure be again accomplished.

Thus was the descent of our army postponed until the eighth of March. The French had gained even more time than they thought proper to employ for the means of defence; and were stationed upon the sandy heights eastward, and within gun shot of Aboukir castle, between that fortress and the entrance to the lake Said. The spot selected for landing the troops was immediately under this hill; and that a worse place could hardly have been chosen, is evident from this circumstance, that the enemy had, beside their artillery upon the heights, a covering for their flanks, of eight field pieces upon the right, and four upon the left. These, together with the guns of the castle, bore down upon the place of landing. The day prior

*It is known to every officer who attended this expedition, that the army might have been landed any where to the eastward, near Rosetta, without the loss of a single man. Whenever it is asked, why was not this the case? there is but one mode of

to that of the descent, signals were made to cook three days' provisions for the troops, and for boats of every description to put off from their respective ships, and repair to the Mondovi brig, as a point of rendezvous, when a false fire should be shown from the Foudroyant, the ship of the commander in chief. On the following morning, the eighth of March, at three o'clock A. M. the expected signal was made. Agreeably to the instructions given, every boat then repaired to take in her proportion of troops from the ship, or ships, to which they were allotted; and then proceeded to the appointed station, close in under the hill, about a league from the enemy, whence they were to move, according to the order of battle: there they all remained, until the whole of the reserve collected around the Mondovi.

was

Never was any thing conducted with greater regularity: The French, to their astonishment, as they afterward often related, instead of beholding a number of men landed pell-mell, saw the British troops preserving a regular line, as they advanced in their boats, although the wind was directly in their teeth; and, finally, landing in regular order of battle, under the heaviest fire perhaps ever experienced. Shells, cannon

balls, and grape shot, coming with the wind, fell like a storm of hail* about them; yet not a soldier quitted his seat nor moved, nor did a single sailor shrink from the hard labour of his oar. Not a musket was suffered to be charged, until the troops could form upon the strand. They were commanded to sit still in the boats; and this command, with inconceivable firmness, did these men obey; with the exception only of returning for each volley of shot from their enemies three general cheers, an effect of ardour in which their officers found it impossible to restrain them. The feelings of those who remained in the ships were not proof against such a sight. Several of our brave seamen wept like children; and many of those upon the quarter decks, who attempted to use telescopes, suffered the glasses to fall from their hands, and gave vent to their tears.

But the moment of triumph was at hand. For three loug miles, pulling in this manner against the wind, did our brave

reply namely, that suggested by another interrogation: why were we as ignorant of the country whereof we came to take possession, as of the interior of Africa?

*The sailors upon the occasion compared the thick shower of shot falling about them to a violent storm, of jail the fleet had experienced in the Bay of Marmorice, when the hailstones were said to have been as large as musket balls. On the eighth of February," says Sir R. Wilson, (Hist. of the Exp p. 5.) commenced the most violent thunder and hail storm ever remembered, and which continued two days and nights intermittingly. The hail, or rather tacco stones, were as big as large walnuts.”